

RADICAL EXTERIORITY AND INCORPOREAL A BRIEF COMMENTARY ABOUT MEMORY ASSEMBLAGE

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This essay examines the concept of memory and its connection to exteriority, indexicals, and incorporeals. It delves into the philosophical perspectives of Émile Bréhier, Deleuze, and the Stoics, emphasizing the omnipresence of memory and its role in constituting the past through addition. It discusses the importance of exteriority for ontology and the collective nature of memory, which transcends individual experiences. It highlights the role of indexicals in memory and the incorporeal nature of meanings, propositions, space, time, and other concepts. I propose that memory and addition involve a collapse of logical and ontological instances, leading to a dynamic and plastic understanding of being and history, as well as political engagement.

INDEXICAL, INCORPOREAL, APPARITION

First of all, I want to bring closer together the task of retrieval and addition that constitute memory — the process of adding to the past what comes from elsewhere — and the incorporeals as presented by Émile Bréhier and interpreted by Deleuze in *Logique du Sens*.¹ My wager is that indexicals, fundamental to understanding the notion of exteriority, already find a formulation in the incorporeals conceived by the Stoics. If memory and addition are omnipresent, there is no way to posit a radical externality to such a kind of presence. It is in memory and in that which constitutes it as addition — or rather, in the intervals,

¹ Bréhier, Émile, *La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme*, Paris, édition Vrin, 1938.
Deleuze, Gilles, *Logique du Sens*, Paris, édition Minuit, 1969.

the interstices between additions and the past — that the possibility of a world being external occurs.

The first question that arises concerns the importance, for an ontology or for a mode of thought seeking an ontological approach to traditional philosophical objects, of the exteriority of a world. Such a world is a necessary presupposition for something to be added to the past. What is added comes from the outside. Yet such a world is also a consequence of such addition. Although this addition may be carried out by an individual or by a group of individuals, memory is never individual. It is not restricted to a subject recalling certain events. Memory transcends, so to speak, for example, my own memories, and in this sense constitutes that from which my memory is made. I believe my memory is formed by events I have witnessed or lived through, that I have experienced in some way. It is therefore necessary for these memories to be memories and not creations of my mind, that they be representations of events, and these I may call real.

In my reading of Shajara's ideas, indexicals² are fundamental to the operation of addition upon which memory depends. The spectrality associated with them is a by-product of the intrinsically situated character of the present; revenants persist because there is no present without memory. Meanings or propositions are expressed by speech or thought. For example, the sentence "It is day" is a body (sound waves), but the meaning—the lekton—is incorporeal. *Lekta* are what can be true or false. Space, for instance, is incorporeal because it is pure extension without a body. Within the cosmos, there is no void — only bodies filled with *pneuma*. Place (*topos*) is nothing other than the extension occupied by a body; it is not the body itself. Time (*chronos*) is the measure of movement and change. It is incorporeal because it is not a body in motion, but its measure. What Stoics meant by *lekta*, I believe, is that the exact words can express different senses depending on who utters them, when, and where.³

We may say that meaning lies beyond the physical sign. The incorporeal "sayable" depends on context, the same utterance can express different *lekta*

² Bensusan, Hilan, *Indexicalism: Realism and the Metaphysics of Paradox (Speculative Realism)*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2021.

I refer to Hilan Bensusan by the first name he adopted for himself: Shajara.

Bréhier, Émile, *La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme*, Paris, édition Vrin, 1938.

Inwood, Brad. Editor. *The Cambridge Companion to Stoics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Deleuze, Gilles, *Logique du Sens*, Paris, édition Minuit, 1969.

depending on the circumstances. The incorporeals persist, but they do not exist; their semantic function depends on the speaker, the place, and the time, that is, on the context in which the proposition is made. What it expresses depends on the context; it is, so to speak, its content. The incorporeals (*asōmata*) are real in thought and discourse, but they have no body, no physical extension, and cannot act or be acted upon. They are not “beings” in the strict Stoic sense, they subsist, or instead insist (*huphestanai*), instead of existing (*einai*). In this sense, incorporeals are fixed, but meaning is not. Meanings emerge from the interaction between sign, thought, and context.

As for theories of the indexical⁴, in general, they seek to formalise the function of indexicals. For example, the notion of the character of an indexical can be understood as rules mapping the context to the proposition expressed, its content, in that context: “I” always means the speaker of the utterance, yet terms such as *I, here, now,* “ and “ *today* change their referent with each utterance while retaining their sense. Thus, I can formulate the following hypothesis: (i) Kaplan’s character/content distinction is analogous to the Stoic view that *lekta* are not bodies but contextual sayables; (ii) essential indexicals echo, in a certain sense, the Stoic idea that some *lekta* cannot be grasped without situating the speaker, “I am in danger” expresses a different *lekton* depending on who utters it. In short, the Stoics’ incorporeals provide the ancient metaphysical structure for what indexical theory later formalised in semantic terms.

I would now like, briefly, to return to what Deleuze draws from the theory of incorporeals, as he does in *Logique du Sens*. On the one hand, incorporeals reside, are expressed, in the organisation of propositions, that is, in logical, grammatical, and conceptual structuring; on the other hand, they originate on the surface: the incorporeal “skin” where events and senses appear. The surface is neither reducible to bodies nor detachable from them, but it insists, subsists. The next substrate is that in which bodies collide, mingle, and affect one another.

From the two hypotheses above, and in view of the Deleuzian position defended in *Logique du Sens* that incorporeals inhabit the order of the surface, the thin and paradoxical plane between the depth of physical causes and the height

⁴ Braun, David, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [Indexicals \(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy\)](#), 2015.

of logical structures, it is the events and sensory effects that make language and thought possible without ever becoming physical things, I would like to propose that Shajara's approach to memory and addition agrees with a collapse of these logical and ontological instances of the incorporeal, one into the other, one upon the other, confusing them in what Walter Benjamin's theory of history called ruins. Memory resembles the angel of history in Benjamin's vision.⁵

Perhaps in theology, angels are not incorporeal; maybe they possess some glorious body or something of the sort, but the angel of history is pure incorporeal; it is like a frame through which time passes, that is, what comes and what remains. They pass in a single stroke: what is added is summed, what remains is memory. Suppose the angel's gaze is upon the ruin, upon the past. In that case, its movement is in the opposite direction, towards the future that is always already drawing near, that is, it is found in the circumstances that constitute being. To be is to be pure circumstance, open possibility. Indexicals loosen their senses and, therefore, meanings must be negotiated. The surface of history, supposedly made of the matter of events, is in constant dispute. It is not given but must be continually contested. The incorporeals fragment, slide, and couple with other incorporeals through their process of collapse, whose proper name is "Present".

MEMORY AND ANGEL OF HISTORY

Memory, evidently, is not the prerogative of the subject, but is everywhere, in sedimentary rocks, in the genome, in planets, comets, stars, galaxies, and so on. Politics, which depends on this memory that is in constant dispute, must undoubtedly be stabilized with each discourse. The incorporeals must be calmed, fixed, even if only temporarily and for specific purposes; indexicals must be able to stabilize contexts of memory so that they become historical events, thereby writing and inscribing the present into matter. Without this, decision-making and action, in a political sense, that is, action arising from the collective and aimed at the good of a collective, become impossible.

In the image of the angel in Klee's engraving, the central character of passage,

⁵ Benjamin, Walter, *O anjo da história*. Translation, João Barrento. Belo Horizonte, editora Autêntica, 2012.

of time, or of history passing is reinforced, and in which, according to Shajara⁶, memory is central. Perhaps it is the angel itself, or the angel in this image, in its image conceived by Klee and marked by him upon the paper. Memory is the frame through which time passes, which is pure passage, plastic, fluid, and is made in the measure of the collapses of the incorporeals, of the substrates of meaning, one upon another, disfiguring repressive intensities and kindling the ruins through which reconstruction takes place with each gesture of engagement, of struggle for a future always retold in origin myths. Plasticity, which suggests change and transformation, is the field of ultrametaphysics, so to speak. It is almost a natural requirement arising from the recognition of the state of affairs when one has the collapse of the substrates in which the incorporeals subsist, that is, the recognition that a metaphysics of the impermanence of the incorporeals themselves is needed.

If the destiny of becoming is a ruin, a rubble, these can and must be taken in their factuality. This constitutes the condition of all effective engagement, in a political sense. Politics does not flourish in the arid terrain of parties, institutions, laws, and affiliations inherited according to established rules. Still, in precarious alliances with ruins, whose sole determination is to be open to the “plus one” of addition, that is, to the exterior. Plasticity affects both formal and material decisions, to use the vocabulary consecrated since Aristotle. Although there is in fact no difference between form and matter, I am inclined to believe, in the ultrametaphysical⁷ perspective embraced by Shajara. Thoughts and life transform. Even metaphysics itself is not merely transformed or exhausted in this transformation over the course of its historiography; it is a relatively continuous transformation in its very foundations.

The overcoming of metaphysics, therefore, obeys a certain sense of dialectic that operates, more specifically, in the plasticity of what appears — that is, of phenomena — which interrupt and disaggregate every attempt at substantialist conceptions: of gender, species, society, politics, and so on. It becomes impracticable to have metaphysics without incorporeals, and incorporeals without the plasticity that characterizes them. In this sense, engagement is

⁶ Bensusan, Hilan, *Memory Assemblages: Spectral Realism and the Logic of Addition*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2026.

⁷ Malabou, Catherine, *Plasticity: The Promise of Explosion*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2022.

cosmic, ancestral, cyclical, and circular. In the sense that, with the return of pain and misery, catastrophes, massacres, genocides, the struggle is resumed for affirmative positions that can only be realized in negativity: we say no to pain, no to misery, to genocides, and so on, because, in fact, by translating negativity into action, we find ourselves in engagement, we sharpen our listening, the senses to which, in the phenomenon, the event is unveiled. Appearance, therefore, is always apparition, always extraordinary and supernatural. It does not stand in contradiction to social and natural laws, because its order of appearance recognizes no law that must be obeyed. The only requirement of an ultrametaphysics is that of transmutation, which operates in the course of time. Beneath the ruins, the “I”s, the “they”s, the “here”s, the “now”s, the “never”s and “never again”s, the “and so on”s, are reborn with each mnemonic effort.

The pan-mnemonic character⁸ is justified insofar as mnemonic effort is not the prerogative of a species, nor even of living organisms, but of an entire complex of relations, of a mesh of connections from which the dead return, and other types of apparitions, such as those that never were born and never died: devils, angels, the sirens who enchanted Ulysses, Ulysses himself, *xapiris*, Lovecraft’s cosmic gods, *sacis*, werewolves, fairies, among others. The subject is no longer proper to the human. It never was, but as subjects we refused to grant this property, this place of the “I”, to the alterity most exterior to us.

Memory is not that of a subject, or of subjects; it is not recollections and testimonies. The location of the “I” disperses, dissolves into provisional places. The subject of ultrametaphysics is neither fixed, self-identical, nor rational, but a becoming whose biological and historical drift is plastically constituted. That is, between life and history there is no distance. In a certain sense, by referring to Malabou, Shajara recovers Hegel from a perspective in which the opposition between ontology and dialectic is at the very least irrelevant, and perhaps even false. Subject and object, the relation between them, one determining the other, all this is the product of the plasticity of being implicated in corporeality and in the incidence upon bodies of the incorporeals, in the form of apparitions that inscribe bodies into an order, however precarious, by defining their destinies.

⁸ Bensusan, Hilan, *Memory Assemblages: Spectral Realism and the Logic of Addition*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2026.

This destiny, the universal mnemonic effort, is very close to what Shajara thinks with sums, with additions.

If, on the one hand, the subject is the necessary condition of all experience in the classical formulation, on the other, this condition is embodied in various kinds of bodies. Subject bodies are all bodies. Insofar as there are no bodies without action, without movement, and these depend on the incorporeals, how can one affirm that the river that alters its bed and banks is not the subject of an action, and how can one affirm that it is, without falling into the animist thesis? And why avoid this thesis? My answer is simple: indexicals apply to everything whatsoever, to the existent, in sum, without the need for any idea derived from vitalism, an idea that everything is alive and sentient, to think about the subject and its relations. Fábian Ludueña Romandini⁹ also defends the thesis of what we might call the ultrasubject. It may be multiple and open to additions in Shajara's sense. It may be a brain, for example, any brain, any central nervous system, or at least a simple unicellular organism, but what I call ultrasubject here is, indeed, more like a super indexical, free for any personal, individual restriction, which means free for any body and determining anybody.

The subject may be organic or artificial; it may also be what it produces as an image of itself, or a third brain formed from the encounter between the organic and the artificial. But also, I am inclined to believe, atomic and subatomic particles, galaxies, nebulae, the Xapiri and other spirits, angels, and so forth, are also seized by subjectivity, this is not a matter of vitalism or animism. Given the incorporeality that indexicals mark and their plasticity, in an ultrametaphysical perspective, the subject is not a metaphysical constant but a plastic knot in a network of natural, technological, and political forces. This opens the door to rethinking freedom, responsibility, and political agency because our very neural architecture is shaped and reshaped by experience, trauma, and environment, in short, by the production of the ruins of the incorporeals and their return, their reappearance in the form of apparitions, of specters, that is, of the addenda, of the sum that gives the passage of time and the possibility of actions, of engagement in the listening to the event, which is nothing other than the

⁹ Romandini, Fábian Ludueña, *H. P. Lovecraft: a disjunção do Ser*. Translation, Alexandre Nodari, Florianópolis, editora Cultura e Barbarie, 2013.

mnemonic effort of the apparitions, of the phenomenal form of the event, an incorporeal, indexical form.

The spectrality of indexicals, the apparitions, points to a kind of realism we might call radical, since even fictional beings and events, as well as beings and events that will never be represented, thought, or felt, enter into the equation of ultrametaphysical memory. It is a donation of meaning that comes from the lack filled with the addenda. As I understand Shajara's proposal, the addenda are specters, but not of the kind that once existed corporeally; instead, of the type whose existence is always a promise. They exist as that which will come, or must come: a new love, a new form of socialization, a new politics, a new star, a new black hole, a new set of apparitions already inscribed in the way fragments, the ruins, have been gathered together in memory, in constellations of memory.

Ancestrality plays here a fundamental role, the same suggested by Meillassoux¹⁰: an ancestrality without presence, without phenomenon, unattainable; the limit and threshold of all correlationism. The problem with this formulation is precisely to know what the problem with correlationism is. Why should every kind of correlationism be a problem? Indeed, there are no organic subjects in this ancestral world, but is it not true that memory is independent of organic subjects? Bodies, though not organic, compose with the incorporeals; there is a here, a now, a there, a this, another, and so on. Perhaps there is no "I" in the sense conceived by philosophy of Cartesian extraction, yet it does not seem to me that this is an indexical indispensable for there to be a world. Perhaps it was in a modern, Cartesian perspective. Still, after the structures took to the streets in the revolts of '68, the "I act" effectively lost much of its force in terms of personal engagement, and even impersonality seems indispensable for the honesty of the act, for its commitment to memory and openness to the addenda. Without this, there is no possibility of change; the transmutation of the subject, its dissolution, its psychic, organic, and material multiplicity, becomes mere intoxication, mere delirium, myth, primitivism.

¹⁰ Meillassoux, Quentin, *Après la finitude* [nouvelle édition]: Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence. Seuil, 2012.

ASYMMETRIC ADDITION

As for the kind of addition that interests Shajara, it is, as he himself defines it, the asymmetric, for it is not reducible to the simple inverse of subtraction. Here, “asymmetric addition” means that we are not speaking of an ordinary mathematical operation, where adding and then subtracting returns to the starting point. It is a kind of sum that irreversibly alters the original element. Whereas indifferent addition, mere juxtaposition of elements, and prefigured addition, which already contains within itself an anticipated complement, operate under principles of reversibility or anticipation, asymmetric addition is distinguished by breaking with these logics.

The first seems to suggest an operation in which it suffices to place things side by side without their mutually transforming one another. In prefigured addition, as the name suggests, the sum is already, in some sense, “foreseen,” and the addendum is the missing piece to complete the representation. Asymmetric addition, in turn, is neither juxtaposition nor the insertion of a missing piece. Its process is irreversible, yet not unidirectional, precisely because it is asymmetric. One cannot, to return to the ruins of history — or rather, of memory — recover history or the past simply by removing the rubble of the collapse formed in the ruins of memory, because what comes, the addenda, the event, is not added to the past, to the original, previously delineated with the future that determined it. Asymmetric addition implies the new, something that belongs to memory but not to the past. The past cannot be restored; one cannot excavate the ruins to see the past. There is no originary archaeology that is not an an-archaeology¹¹, that does not invest in the ruins rather than in what supposedly lies beneath the debris.

It is like a chemical reaction: there is no way to separate two substances once they are mixed; what has been added has thus been transformed into a third substance. The original no longer exists; it is a body, or bodies, that have given way in the process of summation to the collapse of the ontological and logical substrates, mixing them in the ruins of memory, where a mnemonic effort subsists as a latent force acting against the predictability and reversibility of controlled environments. I imagine a sterilized, isolated, and controlled environment, such

¹¹ Bensusan, Hilan, *Being Up for Grabs: On Speculative Anarcheology*, London, Open Humanities Press, 2016.

as those found in biology laboratories and particle physics laboratories, which must be kilometers underground and protected by layers of insulating surfaces to prevent cosmic particles from interfering with the experiments. The particles here would be the addenda. Social institutions, including science, are intrinsically endowed with techniques to avoid unpredictability and maintain the continuity of their rules, which enable them to recognize those who belong and those who are outside. Philosophical and technical tendencies originate from a single vision (monism) or from a fundamental division (dualism), with the aim, in a certain sense, of “protecting” themselves against the kind of irreversible change, thereby creating safe environments in which such occurrences are unlikely to occur. Occurrences follow a chain of occurrences and are non-asymmetric sums, for they tend towards predictability.¹²

The original, upon receiving addenda, bends and deforms until the image it once had disappears. Each asymmetric addition is like a wind blowing against stone, eroding its original form. Yet the original form itself, the very matter of which the stone is made, is already a succession of Addenda. The succession of these additions is a narrative, an an-archaeological piece, a history without a fixed foundation, built upon absences. Every asymmetric addendum is a farewell: what came before serves neither as a base nor rests upon any foundation. The transformation it provokes is rarely total, but this may be because bidding farewell is a gesture that expects no return, and if a return there is, it may come too soon or never. The addendum is alterity, or perhaps an approach to Deleuze’s absolute difference. The other breaks in from outside; it is a foreign body, a virus, the angel of history, *Angelus Novus*, touching what exists with the force of exteriority.

At this point, I would like to defend the idea of radical exteriority, as proposed by Ludueña Romandini¹³, a kind of exteriority that can only be captured as a fictional image. For example, in Lovecraft’s tales and novellas, we can access the source of the addenda, so to speak, only in the metaphors and images, in the deliriums and dreams of characters who come into contact with the margins of this exteriority, that part closest to what we can know, feel, and, in a certain way,

¹² Bensusan, Hilan, *Memory Assemblages: Spectral Realism and the Logic of Addition*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2026.

¹³ Romandini, Fábio Ludueña, *H. P. Lovecraft: a disjunção do Ser*. Translation, Alexandre Nodari, Florianópolis, editora Cultura e Barbarie, 2013.

represent. However, such representation is either a painting within the tale, or a color from outer space, a dream, a hallucinatory delirium, a sailor's diary, or a book of magic. Medieval, or an archaeological relic. The margins are merely deformed representations within fiction.

Thus, only art, representation, fiction, in short, can grant us the step towards engagement towards taking a position responsible for the Other. It is the opposite of statistics, of nomenclature, of the newspaper report. Hundreds of thousands of dead, dead in humiliating ways, suffocated, crowded hospital corridors; dead the health workers contaminated; dead our relatives, friends, years of life. Dead, the hope of at least a new beginning, a slowing of consumption, of production. Of all this, not even the memory of death remains; memory has not reached it. The corpses are invisible; they cannot be mourned, remembered. The virus, described as undead, is the only ghost that remains. It reappears here, there, in him, in me, in the other; it contaminates, kills, reproduces, and proceeds towards the future. It is always an impediment to the addendum, yet it remains an addendum. It remains neither alive nor dead; it is almost as if it were a vast incorporeal substrate. The virus itself is here, in the cells of your body, of the bodies of the dead, in the air. It endures, dissolves, and reappears; it is pure multiple, has nothing individual, nothing of an "I", first person, it is always itself contaminating, killing. Yet, being various, incorporeal, it is also memory. I said it would not be an addendum, but perhaps its mutations are. The original has dissolved into ancestry, to preserve it and update it. The virus, this immemorial being between organism and dead matter, moves, has volition, and so on.

If, on one side, radical exteriority is the source of all cosmic horror that characterizes us as a species, on the other, it is the source of all possibility of free action and knowledge. There is a responsibility that precedes any free gesture, not because it is predetermined, or because it is born of some distant source. The past has never allowed itself to be fully explored, but it defines the present. Quite the contrary: responsibility is breathed into our ears by the phantasmagoric voices of apparitions and shows itself in visions and deliriums; it rises like a lighthouse on the horizon, this image of the future where the encounter with the Other has already inscribed the mark of interruption into the very fabric of what is to come. It inhabits an exterior time, always lying in wait on the horizon, as the mark of the force of interruption in the matter of historical time. It is this mark that makes

the future possible, provided the field remains open to the breath of what comes from outside. This responsibility precedes any free choice, not for being at the beginning, nor for inhabiting an origin that is a past never entirely present.

Responsibility for the Other is always ahead, in the possible encounter, on the horizon of my future, an encounter that may be the interruption already inscribed in the very possibility of there being a future, provided there is openness to what comes from outside. Memory, therefore, lives in debt to what comes from outside, to the addenda, to radical exteriority. It does not seal in the vault of the present what it touches, nor does it raise barriers against what approaches with the step of absolute difference. It is incapable of taming the time to come, or of molding it to the shadow cast by the now or by the past, this other addendum that is nothing more than the imaginary origin, for the future, like a supernatural voice, always bursts forth from beyond the horizon. It brings both the promise of transformation and the sharp blade of brutal suppression that descends upon our senses when we contemplate the angel of history.

But would this angel not be precisely the one mentioned by Rilke in the *Duino Elegies*¹⁴, in the celebrated verse on the beautiful? “For beauty is nothing but the beginning of terror, which we are still just able to endure, and we admire it so because it calmly disdains to destroy us.” Perhaps the angel is, for Rilke, an intensity that exceeds the human measure. Its beauty reveals an order of reality so complete that it threatens to dissolve us in our insignificant existence before the absolute. The beauty of the angel is not comfort, but vertigo. The terrible is that which exceeds our capacity for assimilation, the radical exteriority of which the angel is a messenger. The angel is the presence of this radical plenitude, which, at once, fascinates and destroys, like looking directly at the sun. I think here of the proposal of messianism, taken up by Derrida, of his specters, by Shajara.

The spectral heart of Shajara’s thought¹⁵ may be the concept of necessary messianicity derived from Jacques Derrida¹⁶. Messianicity because without

¹⁴ Rilke, Rainer Maria, *Duino Elegies & The Sonnets to Orpheus*. Translation, Stephen Mitchell, New York City, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009.

¹⁵ Bensusan, Hilan, *Memory Assemblages: Spectral Realism and the Logic of Addition*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2026.

¹⁶ Derrida, Jacques, *Spectres de Marx: L’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale*, Paris, Éditions Galilée, 1993.

messiah, without envoy, without determined end, a messianicity without messianism. This would consist in an openness to the to-come, a radical waiting for the other, for the event, for justice, which never fully arrives but whose possibility must be kept alive. In other words, an openness that is not an act of volition by the subject, but an originary event that determines the very being that is becoming, that determines memory, which is addition. Therefore, there is no chronology, but only the originary waiting, the expectation of the event and its reception, the only possible certainty. I aim to adopt the perspective of justice and the ethical commitment implied by the promise inherent in messianicity, as I have been proposing in this text: a listening, an attention, and a gaze directed towards the ruins, towards the possible forms of their agency and assemblage. If there is justice to come, it will always come from the dead and from apparitions. Only in the apparitions, this is the idea I defend, is it possible to face events and survive them.

It is not possible to face the angel of death, of history, of beauty, or any other, outside its image, its iconology, its fiction — in short, its phantasmagoria. It is the ghost of Hamlet's father demanding vengeance, but it is a beyond-ghost, a disembodied, beyond-human entity. It is an archetypal monster whose fossil can only be recovered through an-archaeology. The ethical gesture of hospitality must be radical — a radical hospitality to what may come from radical exteriority, that is, the absolutely non-human, non-natural. Something that certainly goes far beyond the contingent of Meillassoux: a radical freedom of the kind illustrated by Sade, which can only ultimately lead to destruction. Heidegger's declaration that only a god can save us can be said to fall far short of the radical exteriority perspective. What kind of incorporeal, of indexical, will come with what kind of bodies? What kind of ghosts, apparitions, specters? In short, what kind of ultrasubject? Derrida believed it would be the specter of Marx. Yet this is only a belief at the center of Europe. The *orixás*, the beings of the forests, the undead, angels, devils, and other cosmic gods may have been among us since the first unicellular being. They are more ancestral than Marx, more messianic — indeed, they are by definition messianic; they are the message we must hear, the openness we must assume, with which we must engage, so that thus the specter of Marx, or any other addendum, may come, even that one that may even exterminate us.

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