

## MEMORY ASSEMBLAGES: A MESSIANIC APPROACH TO SPECTERS ON THE COSMOPOLITICAL TABLE

Moysés Pinto Neto

**ABSTRACT:** This article presents a critical and dialogical analysis of the spectral project developed by Shajara née Hilan Bensusan in her work *Memory Assemblages*, examining her onto-epistemological and cosmopolitical positions. It assumes that Bensusan adopts three postulates: (a) a pan-mnemonic conception; (b) an objective spectral realism; and (c) a logic of addition. It highlights the transformations in relation to her previous work, *Indexicalism*, which still had a strong conception of interiority, now abandoned, as well as paradoxical metaphysics, which also abandoned paradox in the name of a "sufficient consistency." It also presents a critique of the association between transcendence and exteriority, drawing on Denise Ferreira da Silva, in order to contrast the image with that of an immanent exterior. Finally, it links, in cosmopolitical terms, Bensusan's project to Jewish messianism, understanding it as a "fever for justice" to specters.

**KEYWORDS:** Specters; Immanence; Transcendence; Exterior; Cosmopolitics.

### I. PROLOGUE

The friendship and dialogue with Shajara née Hilan Bensusan for about 13 years, when I met her at the *Ontological Turn in Philosophy event* in 2012 at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, is a gift. Her generosity in reading, constant interest, and vigorous dialogue make our relationship an entanglement of friendship and debate. Since then, I have been following her experimentalist texts, many of them seminal—such as *Los partidos cosmopolíticos del paraíso artificial y de la infancia de las maquinas* and *Geist and Ge-stell*—as well as the profusion of books, such as *Linhas de um animismo futuro*, *História sul-americana da imortalidade*, *Indexicalism*. and now this one that concerns us, *Memory Assemblages*.

In this text, I will seek to analyze some points of convergence and divergence in relation to Bensusan's spectral project, crossing with some of our reference philosophers, in addition to problems of a cosmopolitical nature that arise from

certain ontoepistemological positions adopted.

## 2. MAIN ELEMENTS

There are so many similarities with Bensusan's text that I will focus on the differences. First, it's worth highlighting some common points that stand out in the book:

### a) A “panmnemonic” conception

Bensusan describes his position as “pan-mnemonic”, comparing it to Alfred North Whitehead's “pan-perceptualism”. Similarly, we could also compare it to Derrida's “pan-scriptural” conception, in which memory occupies the space of a “motor schema”, to use Malabou's term<sup>1</sup>, or metonymy, of a movement that operates *in reality*<sup>2</sup>. There is a certain—let's say, “postmodern”—interpretation of Derrida's thought in which writing occupies the place of language in terms of an epistemological-transcendental image. The world-forming character of language — the “house of Being”, according to the Heideggerian antecedent, which serves as the basis for this operation — would involve the process of giving meaning. From its replacement by writing, the giving of meaning would be subject to the infinite remission of difference (*différance*), establishing a gap between an inaccessible transcendental instance (the trace recedes to infinity) and whatever we might call “real,” “material,” “thing in itself,” “thing itself”. The phenomenological parenthesis becomes the entire text, generating a kind of “ultracorrelationism.”

We seek to move away from this interpretation, which emphasizes correlationism, to consider writing not as an external, or prior, or unattainable transcendental condition through the empirical, but as the empiricity of the transcendental. In another possible play on words, the fiction of reality is less important than the reality of fiction. Therefore, graphematics, or grammatology, traverses the divisions between subjective and objective, operating beyond a

---

<sup>1</sup> See Bensusan, 2024, pp. 36-39.

<sup>2</sup>“The *Stimmung* of realism requires it to reject the overarching importance sometimes given to humans — either by deflating the role of their correlations with the rest of the world or by adopting a resolute stance against all kinds of human exceptionalism” (Bensusan, 2024, p. 12).

strictly epistemological model:

Graphematics — the science of writing — is a hypothesis that allows us to think formally and materially, empirically and transcendently, simultaneously. For it, what exists is inscribed, thus constituting a grapheme. The grapheme is not an atom, but a body of infinitely divisible relations. Its process of individuation, therefore, does not occur from an essence (as old metaphysics thought), but is immanent to the inscription itself, to its tracing as an economy of difference. The grapheme therefore refers to a “past that was never present”, a transcendental condition that is not expressed in categorical terms, but only retroactively, once materialized. Therefore, this difference [*differance*] is *nothing*; it does not exist, it is not embodied, it is the possibility of all corporeality. This effect is what leads to tympanization or the “visor effect”, from which a specter can only be seen obliquely, never *facéd*, seen face-to-face as a presence. The condition of appearing, therefore, is itself invisible. It only allows itself to be seen - and everything that is seen is seen because of it - from its diagonal effect (...) (Pinto Neto, 2013).

b) **“Objective” spectrology**

The spectrology supported by Bensusan, contrary to the correlational tradition from Kant to Heidegger, operates on an “objective” level, which in the book is associated with “spectral realism”. This is where the concept of spectrum, if we can even call it a concept, enters the scene. Where the distinction between objective and subjective loses ground, escaping correlation, what we call “real” must be something else. In line with speculative thought, Bensusan rejects the finiteness of knowledge as an explanation for variation. It is not a finite element that lacks the cognitive tools to account for an ordered totality, thus remaining under the spectral half-light. The brightness of the white light that illuminates everything, typical of the tradition from Plato to Hegel, does not account for spectrality, as a zone of variable visibility whose differential movement is not explained solely by limitation, but by its very way of operating as an ultratranscendental. Thus, “spectral realism does not enable a look into the interplay from an outside point of view that would place spectra on one side and the living presences on the other; rather, it conceives reality from the point of

view of the revenance” (Bensusan, 2024, p. 15).

Despret, in his work on the dead, specifies what kind of trap spectral thinking sets:

Our tradition generally captures and paralyzes the problem: that of dividing ways of being into two categories, that of physical existence, on the one hand, and that of psychic existence, on the other—either this pertains to the material world, or it arises only from subjective productions. This threatening choice leaves the dead only two possible destinies, both equally miserable: that of non-existent beings, or that of fantasies, beliefs, hallucinations. On the other hand, to affirm that the dead have “ways of being” that make them very real beings in their own register, that they manifest modes of presence that matter and whose effects can be felt, is to be interested in the fact that there was, each time, a “being to be made” and a living being who accepted this request (Despret, 2015, p. 18, my translation).

Bensusan, like me, is also an enthusiastic reader of Fabian Ludueña Romandini, whose main thesis in Ludueña seems to consist precisely in the “objectivity” of specters, since the space in question is completely independent of subjectivity. Based on the philosophy of the *Outside*, which is understood as “a threshold where the disjunction in Being takes place that makes it possible to conceive of a territory whose geography escapes the confines of both the science of beings and the postulate of Being as a primordial event” (Ludueña Romandini, 2016, p. 185, my translation), Ludueña Romandini thinks of spectral space as the space of indistinction between material and immaterial, permeated by a reversible becoming between both. As Derrida had laconically done, Ludueña Romandini brings spectrology (hauntology) closer to the realm of dreams, taking them as an arch-original form (the expression is extremely treacherous) or, in his words, “dreaming carries a radical exit from every realm of the interior to enter the cosmic Outside whose royal road is the dreamy domain” (2016, p. 124). This is what is taken up here in the form of spectral realism.

### c) **The concept of “addition”**

Another central component of the book is addition, an idea close to Derridean supplementation that involves what adds up as being-part-of, that-which-exceeds-without-which-something-is-not, which connects with the appropriation

of the Deleuze-Guattarian concept of “assemblage” (*agencement*) (Bensusan, 2024a, p. 45). It is not about juxtaposition or completeness: the sum of the parts does not result in a total figure. It is rather about confronting this image, allowing addition to be guided by what *makes a difference*, in an asymmetrical condition. This real difference is also an anti-immune signal, a sign of a hospitality that welcomes the Other without establish a closure: “Addends are the common factor between the fragility of anything ever determined in the world and the insufficiency of any allegedly justified determination we claim to access” (Bensusan, 2024a, p. 22). Addition, it is worth remembering, indicates not only addition, but also *vice* – and precisely here we could imagine a series of possible parallels with the *pharmakon*, a variation of the supplement, in Derrida. The paragraph below it could compose *Plato's Pharmacy*:

On the Other hand, if the psychic archive emerges as an explicit hypomnesis , it is itself neither a *mneme* nor an *anamnesis* ; a memory is always a prosthesis, an archiving, an inheritance, a trust in something else. There is no internal memory that can in any sense be relevantly built in. Memory is a creation in the sense of an external consignment – to place something in an archive is a gesture of trust (Bensusan, 2024, p. 42).

### 3. WHERE IS IMMANENCE?

I will focus on one specific aspect, which seems to me to be the same issue from the inverted angle that I separated in *Indexicalism* (immanent interiority x transcendent exteriority). If, in the first part, specifically of indexicalism, I subscribed to each part, to the point of *assuming myself* as an *indexicalist*. The concept of indexicalism is: “The universe is deictic or indexical, and therefore demonstratives are better equipped than substantives to deal with it, and ultimately to provide some sort of account of it”, or “any metaphysical account of the universe are neither substances nor actual entities, nor objects (or subjects) nor material items, nor neutrinos nor forces, but rather this, that, in, out, same, other, here, there, horizons and other indexicals” (Bensusan 2021, p. 16). But, in the second part, *Metaphysics of Others*, I had some disagreements. While recognizing position as the condition of what we are heading towards, Bensusan maintains two postulates:

- a) A concept of interiority-in-reserve, which seems to me to be quite tributary to the debate with OOO, by the same Harman who signs the book's preface: "Similarly, Harman's ontology clearly makes room for interiority, as each object has an interior life independent of any connection with the totality formed by everything" (Bensusan, 2021, p. 61);
- b) The idea of "paradox" as constitutive of the Metaphysics of Others. The "paradox" would allude to the fact that the *index* is the "ultimate furniture of the universe."

Both notions still seem tied to ontoepistemological commitments typical of the tradition: in relation to *a*), the founding notion of Modernity<sup>3</sup>, the Interior subject, as a condition for thinking singularity. From Descartes to Harman, passing through Levinas and Heidegger, interiority is a condition of singularity. Interiority is not a substance, nor does it tend to subsist, but can be compared to a body, as "positions" mapped by demonstratives and as such they are partly determined from outside, from others positions" (2021, p. 22). Thus, assuming Levinas' position, Bensusan states: "the predication of something, the 'is P' of a predication, requires a subject" (2021, p. 23). In relation to *b*), the notion of "ultimate", associated with the idea of an ultimate (or first) ontology, which, however, collapses paradoxically insofar as position precedes substance.

Now, Bensusan gives up both.

Interiority is replaced by an additive exteriority, which makes an immune relationship of the *assemblage impossible*. with its supplementary surroundings. This opening constitutes what could be called the "interior" as spectral, subject to continuous transformation, such that its central idea—its *arché* —is simply irrelevant. The beginning dissipates in the sorcerous cauldron of supplements.

The metaphysics of paradox, on the other hand, doesn't matter here either: Bensusan abandons consistency and thereby erases the paradoxical question. I had already raised this point in some of our meetings, when I affirmed the possibility of thinking of parts without wholes — as Marilyn Strathern and Donna Haraway (2015, p. 65) do — and, therefore, not seeing self-contradiction in the affirmation of a metaphysics without wholes. This, however, has a price to pay:

---

<sup>3</sup> Among other references, it is enough to mention Denise Ferreira da Silva, to whom I will return in the discussion.

the return to infinity, which leads us to an endless return that prevents the closure and completeness of consistency, potentially leading to the dreaded relativism<sup>4</sup>. But, as a perspectivist, I affirm that relativism is not enough<sup>5</sup>: partial worlds effectively multiply infinitely, without any Hegelian Good Infinite that allows us to establish a meta-point of view, a “point of view from nowhere”, an *Aleph* —in short, all that Shajara reports, inspired by Denise Ferreira da Silva, as “transparent consciousness”<sup>6</sup>: “spectral overturns presence to the extent that it is at odds with any landscape that can be made fully transparent” (2024, p. 17).

But here we are now, faced with our disagreement. It comes from an almost classical, but in my opinion completely mistaken, definition of immanence by Negri<sup>7</sup>. According to him, immanence is *the absence of an outside – everything has its place within*. Literally :

Antonio Negri, in his attempt to counter what he identifies with the politics of transcendence, defines immanence as the absence of the outside — everything takes place inside. Immanence appears not as a taste for horizontal landscapes involving some sort of self-standing retention, but an explicit commitment to the exorcism of exteriority (Bensusan, 2024a, p. 99)<sup>8</sup>.

Let us note here the configuration of Negri's definition:

---

<sup>4</sup> “The book is therefore about a defective universal – or, rather, a non-grounding principle” (Bensusan, 2024, p. 20).

<sup>5</sup> “Viveiros de Castro emphasizes that while Amerindian thought stresses these deictic relations with the surroundings, multiculturalist relativism understands perspectives as partial viewpoints on an otherwise inaccessible totality. The core of multiculturalism is that there is an ontological totality beyond any subject's grasp, something alien to any interiority and accessible only from the point of view from nowhere” (Bensusan, 2021, p. 87).

<sup>6</sup> In *Indexicalism*, Bensusan uses the Noys' expression “*drone metaphysics*” to characterize one philosophy that “postulates a traveling eye of God capable of distancing itself from everything” (2021, p. 66).

<sup>7</sup> This makes Bensusan, in my view wrongly, associate indexicalism and transcendence: “A central element of an indexicalist position is the transcending Other” (2021, p. 78). The considerations on perspectivism that the book explores in the following pages, based on the works of Viveiros de Castro (2017) and Valentim (2018), are immanentist.

<sup>8</sup> This definition, in my view, explains a lot about the politically bad direction that Negri's heirs are heading towards: on the one hand, we see a desperate Lazzarato returning to the *roots of Marxism*; on the other, a Macronism that, based on the “*inside*”, throws itself entirely into neoliberalism, doubles down on the European Union, and, since the Multitude has stopped speaking the language of communism, begins to echo scattered and powerless Eurocentric noises.

Immanence	Within
Transcendence	Outside

In fact, the opposition drawn by Negri leads Bensusan to associate his spectral realism of memories assemblages to transcendence, thinking of it as *exteriority*. The passage follows:

If we consider Negri's account, the philosophy of memory assemblages has thus little to do with immanence. here could perhaps be some sort of horizontality or even latness , but one where the outside as such is constitutive. In each coupling of memory and addition there is an opening not only to other components—not only to other memory assemblages—but to the outside in the form of addends. Exteriority breaches immanence; it is perhaps as if a plane of composition is associated to ubiquitous instances of the outside so that complete immanence is discarded.

(...)

Exteriority transcends. It is not the same transcendence as enjoyed by a principle, a rule, a ruler, or a prince. (Bensusan, 2024a, p. 100).

I have absolutely no doubt in saying that Negri's perspective, however heretical it may sound, is a *pre-Deleuzian definition* of immanence. And it is precisely this that Bensusan adopts when he takes the side of transcendence, understanding it as the openness that implies the supplement.

#### 4. TWO DERRIDAS

I understand that Shajara is consistent with Derrida here, but I also – like Malabou – think that *there are two Derridas*.

In a joint text with theologian Clayton Crockett, Malabou (2010) separates two currents, one more immanentist and the other messianic, in contemporary French philosophy. The first would be Deleuze, Foucault, and *the early* Derrida. It would be Derrida who conceives of difference as *the spatialization of time* and *the temporalization of space*, that is, *difference* as an ambivalent movement that Malabou, in his early writings, approximates to dialectics. The second Derrida, on the other hand, would be precisely that of specters, of messianity without messianism, claiming an open, eventful future, beyond all that can be given, the openness of

*faith* —the only attitude, according to Derrida himself, that can be maintained in relation to the Other (also Pinto Neto, 2024)<sup>9</sup>. Crockett and Malabou (2010) say:

So long as one thinks time in relation to its end — the end of metaphysics, the end of the West, the end of Christianity, the end of time itself — it is thoroughly messianic and inherently Christian. And furthermore, deconstruction has shown that this end never arrives; it is infinitely and indefinitely deferred, and we live off of the messianic power that forever takes time to its end. On the other hand, if time is thought as spacing, and as birthing or hatching, this is a plastic understanding of time that is, we suggest, non-messianic. It brings nothing to an end. Messianism as ending, and in a sense the entire structure of Christian and western thought, is obsessed with death. For Derrida, as for any thinker responsible for the enormity of the western tradition, whether one is trying to reform, transform or renew it, the world wears and weighs upon a thinker. This is an enormous and extraordinary burden, and Derrida experiences the death in and of the West as mourning. We do not want to trivialize this mourning or this responsibility. At the same time time, quoting from a novel by Margaret Atwood: “they think I should be filled with death, I should be in mourning. But nothing has died, everything is alive, everything is waiting to become alive”<sup>10</sup>.

And we can say — it would take a long time to do so — that early 20th-century French philosophy had to articulate the problem of *History* and *Freedom* from the subject and, as a result, was divided between those who postulated immanence (Kojève, Hyppolite) and those who postulated transcendence (Levinas, Marcel).

---

<sup>9</sup> “The challenge is that we can think of the absolute or pure form of time in terms of messianicity (Benjamin, Agamben, Badiou, Derrida) or as plasticity (Deleuze, Derrida, Malabou). Here is the confrontation, the payoff, the stakes of the confrontation over the deconstruction of Christianity. So long as time is understood as literally formless, it inevitably takes the form of the messianic, which is a pure force, even if it is thought as a weak force rather than a strong force (a messianicity without messianism). Plasticity allows the necessary form to be thought as giving, taking and destruction of form, in a branching that is creative rather than simply responsive or passive. Contrary to what Levinas asserts, all traces are convertible into forms, even though we cannot think of form in terms of “presence” any longer. By “form,” we understood the form of philosophy after its deconstruction” (Crockett & Malabou, 2010).

<sup>10</sup> “This temporality other, which does not raise for the messianism, is then associated with immanence: “We would resist this term neo-vitalism, and insist that what Deleuze calls “a life” in his last essay, “Immanence: A Life” extends far more broadly than what we usually think of as life in a biological sense” (Crockett & Malabou, 2010).

The problem of historical determinism, very much alive with Stalinism, divided the defenders of Big History—not coincidentally, Hegelians—and the defenders of the irreducibility of Spirit (*Esprit*, often badly translated as *Mind* in English<sup>11</sup>), the dualists who, in general, were linked to the Judeo-Christian heritage. *The entire immanence/transcendence problem is, then, articulated from this perspective.* I recall, here, Derrida's texts in *Writing and Difference* (1967), precisely about Bataille and Levinas, who perfectly address the issue. Levinas would repeat Kierkegaard's objection to Hegel: *there is something that transcends History, existence.* But, when asked about the Danish thinker, Levinas responds something like: in Kierkegaard, the existence that separates itself from History is the Self. For me, it is *the Other* (Levinas, 1971, p. 30). The Other interrupts History, as a transcendence that is *exterior to totality*. It suffices to observe the title of his first treatise: *Totality and Infinity: Essay on Exteriority*. Then, we understand that Levinas's image is the same as Negri's: immanence as a Great Inside and transcendence as a Great Outside. The difference is that Negri rejects transcendence, while Levinas affirms it.

In Bataille, things are more complicated. This is what Derrida explains in his diptych with which he addresses Levinas. In the face of Hegel, the affirmation of an Outside, says Derrida, is merely the pretext for a future encompassment by the human subject and his freedom. Bataille follows *another strategy*, which is the attempt to “mimic” absolute knowledge — following its historicity — but *tracing a furtive tangent*<sup>12</sup>. In other words, in Bataille there is no longer the Great Inside of Negri and Levinas, but a circle that is torn apart by a tangent. In other words: Bataille, even starting “from within,” tears apart the circle in order to trace an *immanent Outside*.

Once again, I would need many quotations to demonstrate this, but isn't this

---

<sup>11</sup> “Mind” resonates “psyché”, cognition; “Esprit”, on the other side, in French, can be Hegelian *Geist* or human subjectivity (transcendence), that is, *freedom itself*, as it is in Levinas and Gabriel Marcel. It depends on the context.

<sup>12</sup> S'efforçant vers le sans-fond de la négativité et de la dépense, l'expérience du *continuum* est also l'expérience de la différence absolue, d'une différence qui ne serait plus celle que Hegel avait pensée plus profondément que tout autre : différence au service de la présence, au travail dans l'histoire (du sens). La différence entre Hegel et Bataille est la différence entre ces deux différences. (...) Et *l'instant* - mode temporel de l'opération souveraine - n'est pas un *point* of presence pleine et inentamée : il se glisse et se *dérobe* entre deux présences ; il est la différence comme dérobement affirmatif de la présence. Il ne se donne pas, il *se vole*, s'empporte lui-même dans un mouvement quis est à la fois d'effraction violente et de fuit évanouissante. L'instant est le *furtif*" (Derrida, 1967, pp. 386-387).

Outside precisely what Foucault, Deleuze, and Derrida seek in their works, which seek an *immanent exteriority*? Instead of the Great Inside, the Great Outside. Not transcendent, because transcendence — and here is my central point — *presupposes duality*. The idea of transcendence, beyond all the senses that Bensusan so rightly highlighted, drawing attention to its “principal” character, presupposes an *otherworld*.

##### 5. HOMO MODERNUS AND THE CRITIQUE OF TRANSPARENCY

Denise Ferreira da Silva shows in *Homo Modernus* that Modernity was divided into two stages: interiority and exteriority. Interiority is the world of white people, guided by the device of historicity — which places time as the ruler of space — and the thesis of transparency, which receives its most perfect version in Hegel's transcendental poesis. The perfect circle of the Good Infinite is the coincidence between transcendence and immanence — that is, between *Geist* and Nature. Hegel creates a totality that is both immanent *and* transcendent, considered the Great Interior-without-Outside. Nature, according to Hegel, is the "bride" of Spirit (*Geist*), this marriage taking place through the latter's self-revelation in history — human and European, of course — until the integral transparency of Absolute Knowledge. In her words:

The move here is to rewrite Nature and History as stages where the play of engulfment is enacted. For engulfment is nothing but a productive and violent act of spirit, the process through which the mind relates to itself and to what lies outside (here including other consciousness) as it continually engages exterior things, which it recognizes as a moment of itself (as an exteriorization/actualization), which it takes back (through interiorization/recognition) until it finally realizes that universal reason (thought or science) and freedom (action or history) are one and the same thing. To repeat, the solution here is a reconciliation produced by the resolution of the universal nomos into universal poetry that results from actualization, which transforms the particular into the exteriorized universal, and recognition, in which the particular is interiorized, resulting in a transformation of the (“pure”) universal into the “truly universal,” that is, the transcendental. In other words, in “world history” the homo historicus, the free, rationally acting individual consciousness, is a thing of “Spirit.” (Silva, p. 88)

Let us return, then: if we saw that the affirmation of transcendence, the

difference between the Inside and the Outside, was the defense of the dualism between Spirit and Nature – and, therefore, the stage of interiority – how can transcendence be identified with the Outside<sup>13</sup>?

On the contrary: Denise shows us, in my view correctly, that *the Outside, the racialized, the Other*, is precisely the opposite of transcendence: it has been scrutinized, objectified, transformed into an affectable subject by philosophical and life science discourse. In other words, this is an immanent subject. Now: in Ferreira's terms, wouldn't the alternative of associating Transcendence and the Outside simply be a repetition of the *historicity device she discusses at the beginning of the book*?

## 6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: JEWISH MESSIANISM AT THE COSMIC NEGOTIATING TABLE

It seems to me that this problem doesn't begin with Bensusan, but with Derrida himself, who, every time he traced the impossibility of the event, escaping more immanent categories like “iterability”, every time he flirted messianically with the totally other, needed, as a counterbalance, to affirm his commitment to liberalism, human rights, the European Union, in short, all the institutions of his time—so as not to incur *irresponsibility*. I ask whether our relationship with otherness necessarily needs to involve this desire for the totally other, for transcendence<sup>14</sup>. Because, I won't be able to demonstrate this here, it seems to me that among indigenous peoples, in a broad sense, spectrality is not associated with transcendence. I would have to show that, in these cases, spectrality is not associated with the *dual*, but with the *double*. There is a Great Outside folded in on itself, like a mass of a thousand layers that can be traversed like half-open, penetrable dimensions, as if one were penetrating *Hades*, as if one were visiting the human side of the Jaguar, as if one were communicating with *Órum*.

Finally, I apologize profusely for asking permission to use my categories (Pinto Neto, 2024) and say that, unlike the *South American History of Immortality*, I see

---

<sup>13</sup>Transcendence is the "intrinsic difference" that constitutes the Spirit in post-Enlightenment Europe. Denise says: "Spirit is the 'inner [transcendental] force' guiding his history and that self-determination is its nature and purpose" (Silva, p. 89).

<sup>14</sup>"It faces its heirs and finds among them a messianic force. This kind of redemption is what being awaits from what is to come and what thought expects from the external world" (Bensusan, 2024, p. 53).

Shajara here as less anthropophagic and more messianic, in Oswald's sense. Like Derrida, there seems to be a tragic Edenism here, that is, one that does not promise easy redemption, that does not promise bliss, that does not automatically place the sign of goodness and salvation on the Other: “memory is assigned like one assigns heirs: it is itself within the weak messianic force” (2024, p. 42). But, even so, perhaps the Derridean and Bensusanian critique of utopia – understood as *a strategic anticipation of the conditions of the future* – can be circumvented with a new ecology of the *topos*, understanding it as this multidimensional plane that connects immanently, where the parts circulate through specific passages between planes (see, for example, Nodari, 2024 and Albert & Kopenawa, 2023).

What would lead us, and here perhaps I end enigmatically, is that Bensusan may have achieved another kind of consistency, a *sufficient consistency* — paraphrasing a series that goes from Winnicott and Viveiros de Castro to Alyne Costa (2021) — from the possibility of an ontoepistemology of partial worlds. Perhaps *a possible partial world*, a cosmogrammatic description: a world marked by what I would call the *fever for justice* (Bensusan, 2024, p. 56), which is the very fever of Jewish messianism—of which Benjamin and Derrida are, in my view, indirect adherents—in which ghosts are recurrently resurfacing, challenging and crying out for justice, even if this can only, in itself, be another phantasmagoria, never fully present

An indestructible<sup>15</sup> demand for justice, to be answered by the following generations – composed of memories – a cosmic perspective that sits at the table of cosmopolitical negotiations.

moysespintoneto@gmail.com

## REFERENCES

- Albert, Bruce & Kopenawa, Davi. **O Espírito da Floresta**. Trad. Rosa Aguiar. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2023.
- Bensusan, Shajara néeHilan. **Memory Assemblages: spectral realism and the**

---

<sup>15</sup> "The absence left behind, to some extent, nonetheless, is itself spectral; it indicates something is missing, something that could come back. It is not a full-blown presence, but rather an eventual revenant" (Bensusan, 2024, p. 55).

- logic of addition*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024.
- Bensusan, Shajara néeHilan. **Indexicalism: realims and the metaphysics of paradox**. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021.
- Costa, Alyne. Da verdade inconveniente à suficiente: cosmopolíticas do Antropoceno. **Cognitio-Estudos: revista eletrônica de filosofia**, v. 18, n. 1, 2021.
- Crockett, Clayton & Malabou, Catherine. Plasticity and the Future of Philosophy and Theology. **Political Theology**, v. 11, issue 1, 2010.
- Derrida, Jacques. **L'écriture et la différence**. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967.
- Despret, Vinciane. **Au bonheur des morts: récits de ceux qui restent**. Paris: La Découvert, 2015.
- Haraway, Donna. **Staying with the trouble**. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016.
- Levinas, Emmanuel. **Totalité et Infini: essai sur l'extériorité**. Paris: Kluwer Academic, 1971.
- Ludueña Romandini, Fabián. **Principios de Espectrología: la comunidad de los espectros II**. Buenos Aires: Mino D'Ávila, 2016.
- Nodari, Alexandre. **A Literatura como Antropologia Especulativa**. Florianópolis: Cultura e Barbárie, 2024.
- Pinto Neto, Moysés. **A escritura da natureza: Derrida e o materialismo experimental**. Tese de Doutorado defendida no PPG de Filosofia da PUCRS. Porto Alegre, 2013.
- Pinto Neto, Moysés. Descolonizar os Indesconstruíveis: espectrologia, fideísmo e messianidade em Jacques Derrida. **Dois Pontos**, v. 19, n. 3, 2023.
- Pinto Neto, Moysés. Teoria dos Quatro Cosmogramas. **Cadernos IHU Ideias**, n. 359, vol. 22, 2024.
- Silva, Denise Ferreira da. **Toward a Global Idea of Race**. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.
- Valentim, Marco Antonio. **Extramundandade e Sobrenatureza: ensaios de ontologia infundamental**. Florianópolis: Cultura e Barbárie, 2018.
- Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. **Cannibal Metaphysics**. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.