

NIETZSCHE'S ILLUSORY TRUTH AS *DECEPTIVE* ACTUALIZATION

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ABSTRACT: The idea of truth requires a sense of actualization which is necessarily illusory yet dynamic in nature. Exposing the tension between Nietzsche's supposed naturalism and his inclusion of the will as a spiritual force behind every activity, it is argued that Nietzsche's prime concern was to enhance the height and power of humanity's spirituality.

KEYWORDS: Nietzsche; naturalism; spirituality; illusion; deception

Nietzsche's critique of Being is founded on the ancient precept that the world is filled with things which continually pass-away and come-forth. This would be a simple cosmological principle were it not for the inclusion of a significant non-cosmological cause: the will or spiritual force behind every activity and anthropic metamorphosis. Nietzsche harbours a metaphysical principle which alloys these two important components of continual change: what moves the cosmos in a continual order-forming process while simultaneously giving rise to soul-perceptions that intervene in this process and create 'perspectives'. What exponents of Nietzsche's claimed naturalism¹ miss in their anti-metaphysical interpretation of his work is the fundamental intensive tension between the *philologist* of value and the *naturalist* thinker of power and overflow. By uniting the Wagner – Schopenhauer - Ree axis with the Heraclitus-Boscovich-Spir constellation², Nietzsche attempts a theoretical synthesis which, firstly, is non-dialectical; and, secondly, is perspectival while preserving the fundamentally Greek *agon* of the *pathos* of life. He concludes with neither appearances nor Leibnizian

¹ Exponents of naturalism abound, however, Leiter (2002, 2009), Clark and Dudrick (2004), Hussain (2004) and Richardson (2004) are keynote in respect of recent debates over methodological suppositions. I take Richard Schacht's formulation nonetheless to be independent and more eloquent than others'.

² See Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2001.

elemental substances; and shifting time-points of force are ultimately unsatisfactory too. I shall argue instead that Nietzsche needs an *extra*-consciousness, non-substance of sorts to maintain his theoretical position on the discernibility of self-deception. (A fuller argument would ostensibly point to the necessity of a monadic ‘soul’ concept through which Nietzsche could sustain his double-sided thesis of deception and transvaluation). The argument consists essentially of the proposition that Nietzsche discloses a dimension of the Real once he uncovers a law of necessity: we *necessarily* deceive ourselves whilst continually willing to *form* a world out of (meaningless) chaos. To know this as an axiom of anthropic coming-to-be is to disclose a truth – a truth beyond that of the moralist-ascetic’s horizon. Thereto ‘actuality’ consists of the *actualization* of necessary illusory forms i.e. decadent truths, in amongst the very swirling dynamic of the ‘will to life’ known as *becoming*. What belies appearance is this most fundamental of truths – one which Nietzsche clearly thought he had grasped, or, rather had a right to grasp. It means the illusory is ubiquitous and yet still discernible in the stream of tumultuous becoming. Error thereby becomes denial of this inexorable fact.

The repose to this line of argument ordinarily is that all this too is merely ‘interpretation’. And this would be right, to a point: the philosophical philologist who also embraces evaluation understands that seeing, perceiving, interpreting, arranging, measuring, apportioning, weighing and believing are all essential aspects of being human – not God. But an interpretation is no different to what nature and its elementary (mystical) particles do when they move: cells, sub-organisms and sub-atomic packets of energy also ‘perceive’ in their specific actualizing modes. A scientist partakes in the same activity and yet wishes to dismiss it because their objectivating prejudice precludes them from the admission, ‘dare to be honest’, that *laws* are only anthropic projections³. Where the human stands – and not God, or Apollo/Dionysus – is necessarily spatio-temporally located and thus drenched in perspective-seeing. Our weakly *human-all-too-human* nature wants to find ‘being’ only where there is becoming; and yet ‘There are no durable ultimate units, no atoms, no monads: here, too, “beings” are only introduced by us (from perspective grounds of practicality and utility)⁴. Positioned in the cosmic chaos and flux we see from different interested, value-orders or levels what appears to us as unstable flux lacking the desirable property of permanence – Being. The phantasmatic imputation of Being onto a purposeless flux of quanta of power is attributable to the psychology of value-interpretation in which

³ George Stack, *Nietzsche's Anthropic Circle, man, science, and myth*, New York, University of Rochester Press, 2005.

⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Wille zur Macht. Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York, Vintage Books, 1968, §715. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as WP.

weak and strong kinds of willing attribute to nature what is most useful and purposeful from the standpoint of one's self-preservation. This, however, entails another level of perception; one that affords the interpreter the capacity to reflect upon the human activity of phantasmatic projection – the 'will to self-deception' as Nietzsche calls it. Perceptual angles or standpoints are held in view and the synoptic philosopher – Dionysian Nietzsche⁵ – is able to perceive-within-the-moment of perspective what visual, material or spiritual attribute we can effectively foist onto an animated, moving reality. Such a relation of perceiving, which is internal to seeing the multiple lines of time-perspectivism, points us in the direction of inner, minute workings without necessarily going down the Fichtean pathway of capacities for 'self-positing'. An overly psychologistic reading of Nietzsche's position vis-à-vis essentialism (Poellner 1995⁶, Jaspers 1979⁷, Klossowski 2005⁸) misses the point that drives too only interpret perceptually (and not 'determine') through inner directions which then also manifest themselves outwardly. The labyrinth of the soul is by no means an inner sanctum as per Christianity since it moves in and through time; and thereto moving through affect, thought and philosophizing as *vita* activity. It is in effect the nexus between 'inner' and 'outer' phenomena akin to a Leibnizian *monad* only that it is not a unitary 'substance' as such.

This therefore means 'perspective' occurs in a mobile, self-recurring and self-extending way where inward relations of dominance and subordination shape and mould the particular perception 'outwards'. *Dynamis* internally affects the apprehension (and thus alteration) of *dynamis* externally. We can never obtain the fixed centre-point of 'things in themselves' – not because of a deep agnosticism – because it is always in the ongoing process of being formed, of coming into existence, shifting, altering and hence being *re-created* continually. Configured relations as opposed to shear 'quanta' in chaotic atomic collisions with each other, can therefore be said to exist in both the inner and outer worlds – planes or even 'lanes' in which time moves toward the past and future. For there to be a conception and thus perception of events 'past' and of moments still to unfold (future) in the flurry of quanta of force, it is reasonable to think contingent matrices of force and energy can only be said to move

⁵ This places Nietzsche in a Heraclitean 'realist' position that defies Heidegger's deductions and Anglo-American analytic conceptions of realism. My claim here is that Nietzsche can identify 'illusions' as clearly discernible phenomena even whilst we come to truth within their midst. There is a necessitarian idea of illusions underlying his complex Greek conception of becoming as self-actualizing.

⁶ Peter Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.

⁷ Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, Southbend, Regnery/Gateway, 1979.

⁸ Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel Smith, London, Continuum, 2005.

(i.e. motion) in directive paths or lanes if a *thesis* (position) of apprehending perception exists within those lanes of time. Of course, no ‘matter’ as such pervades such passages just as there are no atoms moving through the void. And yet amongst the generative non-matter/void, there are *relations* of perceiving – inner-outer, outer-inner – since some monadic points of perspective-seeing are weaker and subordinate (e.g. decadent, lowly) while others are stronger and superordinate. We can assert at this point – at least theoretically since Nietzsche never obtained the opportunity to provide such a quadratic formulation – that ‘vertical’ relations of ‘height’ and ‘gravity’ also attend the ‘horizontal’ plane or laneway of time’s becoming (e.g. past and future). Every temporally contingent *thesis* is henceforth instantiated by the specificity of a constellation of power, force, seeing, evaluating and resistance comprising of both vertical-horizontal lines of monadic-perception (acting, willing, valuing). With respect to perspective, it is not mind or a ‘consciousness’ (finite objects of limit) which are the seat of such monadic perspectives but those forms in historical time which prove intelligible, affectual and self-extending all at once. Part of its charm is its perennial will to self-deception, causing all kinds of illusory appearances to be thrown up before its own world picture. Within every perspectival axis which the experimental-creator may discern there abounds error and truth in a mutual dance; from other perspectival lines the apparent distortions or one-sidedness of any one world picture becomes more apparent. For instance, the constellation that gives rise to ‘decadent’ subjects and objects can be appraised by the evaluative stance of the ‘higher one’ who is not engulfed by its particular ‘order of value’.

Critique and overcoming are therefore integral to non-positivist natural knowledge because multiplicity in becoming facilitates a perspectival seeing which no singular authority-bearer can monopolize. If this also includes Nietzsche-the-philosopher – one who eschews the classic Aristotelian ‘non-contradiction’ principle’ as implausible – an interpretation of moving ‘centres of force’ as opposed to the centre of Being must also encompass an account of the shifting *thesis* of the astute critical observer. Nietzsche recognized the point when he stated since ‘Mere variations of power could not feel themselves to be such’ hence there ‘must be present something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow’ (WP643). Whether organic or inorganic, every monadic configuration ‘interprets’ other individual centres or souls moving in time via its perception of formed entities. The interpreter – who is implicated in the relativity of this eternal *agon* of moving perceptual points – is cognizant of two things which spirit-less, non-existent ‘matter’ cannot be: first, the problem of the necessity of the ‘fable of the world’ that issues from ‘a meagre sum of observations’ (WP 616); secondly, the metamorphoses of these constellated relations ‘as

something in a state of becoming' invokes the additional (twofold) problem of time: 'regressus in infinitum' for the past and the 'utterly unrealizable concept of a finite progressus up to the present' (WP 1066). As we have already seen, perceptions and interpretations are not the sole preserve of human agents in the cosmic cycle; yet finite human centres or 'souls' are rather different to the ontological make-up of indifferent elements of force-extension. This is not the classic problem of the 'doer versus the doing' or of the 'subject versus willing'. It concerns rather the ambiguity around the concept of 'soul' used tirelessly by the devout son of a Lutheran pastor (Nietzsche) who finds the universe moving by a kind of paganised-Christian *thumos*.

In other words, the soul-individual that traverses time with all its *pathos* holds faith in the divine eternal nature of the *kosmos* as it becomes. Such a faith in the eternal and the divine is thoroughly punctuated by the Platonic insight that self-deception attends every moment of being or existence. It is not only true that appearances saturate our senses; we also intensively will to follow those forms and shadows that give finite human beings security and happiness. Above mere appearances is the heightened wisdom – 'tragic wisdom' – that every act of creation and measuring also acquires at the same time a deceptive quality; to know of the intrinsic desire to deceive oneself is not radically nihilistic but fundamentally Platonic. Was Nietzsche deceived in thinking the will to deceive is integral to finite existence? A lack of truthfulness in this regard would only preclude him from making such astute observations and that is undesirable because he would want to maintain that the fable of ascetic moralization is merely a negation of life and not its affirmation. On both counts, the perceptual and the critical, what is in *appearance* is only ever partial. Whereas Goethe the revered nobleman properly understood the significance of aiming for the *whole* in all things. Discerning a will to deceive oneself requires one to rise above it, to obtain what Nietzsche called a *height* e.g. a vertical distinction. Height it is worth remembering allows seeing below, farther and synoptically – what *gnosis* actually entailed in ancient thought before it encountered *scientia*. The noble 'height' of *logos* and *theoria* took aim at more than chaos and empirical description which might explain why Nietzsche always wrestled with the great Plato and not Aristotle the empiricist. Less counter-intuitively this approximates the vision of the nobler Plato, the one whom neither Socrates nor the Church debased, and who surpassed and transcended 'Platonism'. For Plato the Pythagorean poet-philosopher was greater than any Darwinist, chemist, physicist or priest – he overcame and at the same time valued that which elusively slipped from appearance and constantly *passed away* and returned once again through the *coming forth* of *to enai*. In this light, Nietzsche was never wholly Wagnerian, Schopenhauerian or Boscovichian; and his love for the height of philosophy, for looking beyond the fables of self-deception,

placed him closer to the nobler Greeks than to empirically minded *modernes*. To see through to the ‘will to deceive’ – the spirited force which reckons existence to possess a higher Apollonian splendour - is to see perspicaciously and thus see through the necessity of suffering (Schopenhauer). It is able, quite independent of the reason of mind, to gather the illusory appearance and drive it back into the ground of infinite illumination *and* transmutation. As with Wagner, that which is made accessible by tragic vision presupposes the covering over power of appearances or illusory states. Absolute becoming performs this dual operative act of formation and illusory deception. There arises arguably a point in time in which unfolding appearances become *understood* as integral to the historical process of forming, where deception and the constant will to deceive oneself is no longer completely mysterious to the experimentalist’s seeing-perspective. For instance, before Isaac Newton the perspective of light did not encompass either waves or waves of colour within ‘white light’. After Newtonian mechanics the deception of light’s uniform white colour was revealed – it appear as uniform and white, yet light passes and diminishes through a variegation of wave-lengths. In time’s becoming a point of alteration is instantiated; it is not posited as per Fichtean philosophy through a self-positing subject. Light cannot simply be posited or posited negatively (annihilated). This instantiation can be understood, following Nietzsche, as an ‘event’ in accordance with the great ‘Event’ of European nihilism.

The subject of the event can itself be seen through the perspectival-seeing (perception) of its own spatio-temporal configuration which is furthermore shaped by such ‘events’. Nietzsche frequently appears to reduce this to power effects or quanta yet on occasions where his strong French-Greek philological mind prevails we find the *episteme* and *logos* of seeing as a highly complex and elaborate affair, one that exceeds the bounds of even a strong *will to power* thesis.⁹ For ultimately Nietzsche is never fully convinced a truth stemming from a ‘will to power’ monism is justifiable. This explains why most of his major works, particularly the later works, are remiss of any concentrated effort to propound a ‘truth’ expressed in terms of an omnipresent will to power. Growth and self-extension – the rudiments of such a will – are central to the enhancement of power for any given entity or subject; yet neither can happen without

⁹ See Maudemarie Clark ‘Nietzsche’s Doctrine of the Will to Power: Neither Ontological nor Biological’, *International Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 32, no. 3, 2000, pp. 119-135; and Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, London, Routledge, 2002. Treatments prone to reducing life to the ‘shorthand’ of will to power (e.g. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain) importantly misunderstand the German hermeneutic of spirit and its coequal *Seele* (soul) in the apprehension of actualization as a *prozess* (see ‘The Role of Life in the Genealogy’, in Simon May (ed.), *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: a critical guide*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011).

the force of ‘perception’ (broadly conceived) and its actualization. Sensualism on its own would be simply inadequate (because it relapses into the ‘givenness’ solipsism of organs creating their own sensations) and yet it affords a connection between an inner and outer state so that the episode of perspectival-seeing is then temporally connected to an event such as the ‘death of God’. It is therefore untrue to assert the primary attribution of ‘unconscious states’ or drives is where Nietzsche’s entire logic leaves the argument¹⁰: either an ontology of power or an ontology of fundamental drive-effects which mediate and drive all experiences of the world ultimately remains insufficient on theoretical grounds. The latter, for instance, would falter in explaining why time-lanes are posited in the universe of Zarathustra and why the exhortation for a physics of actuality vis-à-vis eternal regeneration is connected to the incessant law of self-overcoming (and not power per se). More significant is the forementioned *problématique* of arriving at the insight that the constant will to deceive oneself is no longer completely mysterious to the experimentalist and his perspectival synoptical ‘eyes’. Beyond the drives and power is the *locus* of points of view known as ‘souls’¹¹.

We turn now to the question of the inner – outer relation as it pertains to this problem. Nietzsche propounds each of these systemic ideas not as an account of nature and the other as an account of immanence. We see through the affect-lenses of immanent states and these states in turn are affected by relative quanta of power expressed in the form of commanding – obeying capacities. What connects the two realms – inner states (of soul) and constellated relations of actual appearances – is the interpretive force of the ‘basic will of spirit’; it gathers fluctuating, chaotic and seemingly unintelligible illusory processes into an amenable *schemata* that the human animal can use to raise the sufferable ugliness of this world into something more beautiful and with measure¹². Reality only exists in the act of breaking through some veil which both the senses and history throw up before our very own eyes in order to give us orientation, that is value, in an essentially valueless world. The value does not inhere in (non-existent) atoms, matter, mind or chaotic *physis* but in the demonstrable need to create and recreate (implying destruction) a meaningful *taxis* within the temporal register, one that will be annihilated yet signify eternity. Every ‘arrangement’ of chaotic matter (in fact only shifting forces and elements in a process of becoming

¹⁰ John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004.

¹¹ Demystifying the illusory whilst simultaneously stressing a dynamic process of actualization is needed – with the assistance of Leibniz – is arguably unique to this *problématique*. Furthermore, it is in train with a post-secular analysis (forthcoming) which questions the fundamental rationalist penchant behind contemporary Analytic treatments of Nietzsche.

¹² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jenseits v. Gut u. Böse. Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, §230. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as BGE.

and deforming) indicates the perception in time and space of any soul-interpreter (not a *subjectum* or *I* but a singularity of manifold *energeia* states) who must wrestle with illusions of self-deception. In accord rather than discord with Plato, Nietzsche's thinking uncovers the creator's dilemma of philosophizing beyond the contested deception of imagery and thought. *Noesis* without perception in the perspectival sense would be impossible. There is within the manifoldness of the world, Plato's *plenitude*, deceptive moments of appearance of the present as well as eventual moments of becoming which prove significant. Every moment of becoming is both naïve and cunning because self-deception lurks wherever innocence slips into and becomes creative appearing and force ('force' not being a determinant but an effect relation). Within his naturalistic materialism (physics) it often sounds as though all there is meaningless action-reaction-action and so and so forth (c.f. WP567). However shear voids of collision do not account for two things in Nietzsche's writings.

Firstly, the *subject* of self-deception comes under *noesis* the moment he or she perceives it as a 'deception' within time's unfolding. In *Beyond Good and Evil* (4), Nietzsche states: 'To recognise untruth as a condition of life – that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way'. To understand the co-existence of truth and untruth is to reveal the falsehood of the supposition that Being equals truth. For Nietzsche, the *occurrence* of this philological perspective – the basis of all (e)valuation – is a significant marker of perception extended, wherein the pervasive lie that 'soul-atoms' are behind everything is revealed as counterfeit truth. Knowing deception or untruth requires a source of valuation or measuring which is, at a notional meta-level, distinctive from the illusion itself. When, for instance, philosophers act as scientists by thinking their concepts are attached to objective phenomena or laws they overlook (they deceive themselves of) the fact that concepts are merely members of a wider web of conceptual lineage. This illusion or untruth remains imperceptible until such time as the constellation is overcome and new (different) perspectival-seeing reveals the 'untruth' or masks of extant constellations of 'value-feelings'. To give an example which naturalism would fail to address properly. Within the emergent constellation of relations of 'bad conscience' supported by religious ascetic-worshippers' values and axioms, a demonstration of its inherent untruth was not viable. The event of an arrival of bad conscience was the episodic moment of actualization within the fable of truth and becoming's genesis. Only with time, with the unfolding of differential perspectives onto inner experiences did it become viable to interrogate this untruth as an effect of 'interiorization'. Hence Nietzsche's justified reserve for the saliency of (Kantian) self-consciousness; German 'development' apropos Hegel's philosophy eventually won the day. While

constellational shifts are notable it something still more, critical and vital: height and noble freedom are prized above all other (lowly) perspectives. Only those noble higher ones who understand perspectival-seeing to involve eschewing mechanical laws and linear time will be capable of incorporating liminal points into their own philosophy. These are the so-called ‘genuine philosophers’ and ‘true artists’. Seeing as perspectival-perception is otherwise impoverished and susceptible to decadence i.e. bad faith.

We have now arrived at our second point: namely, the *post facto* understanding of unfolding perspectives within becoming as itself constituting a part of rendering ‘world’ with significant presence, an activity (and value) of soul as it manifests in the world. Such an actualization is not dependent upon the idea of Being or its correlate, the metaphysics of substance-presence. Nietzsche is rather concerned with a processual account of things coming into being and vanishing away, the real individualities that assume a soul and force while resembling the Whole of the universe. In a late notebook Nietzsche wrote (WP1032) ‘For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event’. Following Leibniz Nietzsche thinks the present moment of the soul as a constellation of inner-outer elements; these elements are the *sum* of all other monadic singularities or unities that simultaneously perceive other soul-monads in ‘motion’ (although technically both *motion* and *duration* are denied in Nietzsche’s schema). Leibniz had earlier declared that every individual element (monad) owed its constitutive figuration to the whole of the universe of existing individual unities of potentiality. He declared: ‘Now this *connexion* or adaptation of all created things with each, and each of with all the rest, means that each simple has relations which express all the others’ (1973, 56¹³).

In contradistinction to Kant’s seat of judgement prejudice, Nietzsche prefers to place active organic and soul individuations on the same plane as Leibnizianism: on the plane of cosmic, terrestrial dimensions of self-realization. Leibniz had shown that *vita* was dependent upon not only intensive bundles of moving energy (*vis viva*) but individualized soul-monads that reflected the ‘outer’ universe as well – a particular perspective is gleaned (and conditioned by their unique organic and trans-organic constitution) in and through its ‘perpetual living mirror of the universe’ (1973, 56). Difference in ‘perception’ is therefore equiprimordial in relation to constitutive elements and their extension within the ‘mirroring of the universe’. What is perceived through monadic processes of biologic-physical processes of formation and extension occurs through the necessary lines of micro, intra-constellational transmission of

¹³ Gottfried Leibniz, *The Monadology*, trans. Mary Morris & G.H.R. Parkinson, London, JM Dent & Sons, 1973.

informational commands and reactions. Active-reactive, inner-outer, commanding-receiving, assimilating and dispersive are all integral to the process of perception (defined in such a way). Perception is a kind of actualization through a transmitting of information or of fractal commands to other monadic assemblages. Even their inner ensemble unity requires perspective-seeing from different organo-micro vantage-points so that the whole ‘organism’ or living element is contiguous with other cells and galactic bodies. Soul perception is distinctive because of its foundation in ‘notions’ as opposed to mere ‘expressions of the soul’ called ‘ideas’ in Leibniz’s writing. Here notions possess the denotation of active elements interpreting sentient life in motion and not the Anglophonic connotation of ‘ideas’ as mentalistic constructs which presuppose a cogitating *I* substance.

What comes forth in *appearances* is not per se deceptive since the world of phenomena – potentialities that are actualized through moving lines of perspective-force ‘seeing’ – is the real world bereft of any Watchmaker designer. We return to the question of what gives independence to the cosmically formed and endowed *soul* monad, that non-matter which is not a substance and yet is simultaneously multiple and One (i.e. monadic individual). Every divisible element in the universe, the ancient pre-Socratic Anaxagoras had shown, is in fact derived from mixed elements of a definite magnitude that continually recur. If something stands before the Gateway of two opposing lanes (‘past’ and ‘future’) as presented by Zarathustra in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*¹⁴, then is it not something more than a mere apparition? If we can say the will to deceive is omnipresent and appearances in the form of Being are merely errors, then we could rightly ask whether this moment of presence *before* a conjuncture of past-future is an error? The metaphor of *Zarathustra’s* Gateway is used in a specific way to capture the problem of co-temporal existence in momentary time-points of experiencing life. ‘Becoming’ is not of its own enough, as Plato had previously observed. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a book undoubtedly replete with symbolism and metaphors yet it also contains an analytic of time where ‘past and future’ and present and moment feature in very significant ways, as Small¹⁵ has effectively demonstrated. Nietzsche is concerned with what makes time appear before us as something moving ‘forward’ and backward. And yet the moment in which individual presence confronts both Past and Future appears distinctly individual and original. Humans are temporal creatures who live according to the appearance of successive moments passing through countless durations of time-points in linear fashion. They need, he says, deception in

¹⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra. Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Ringwood, Penguin Books, 1966. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as *Z.*

¹⁵ Robin Small, *Time and Becoming in Nietzsche’s Thought*, London, Continuum, 2010.

order to have *faith* in the fictive world of ‘being’, time-space succession, ‘soul’ and ‘cause-effect’ *behind* phenomena.

As time and space do not in themselves exist even ‘changes’, says Nietzsche, ‘are only appearances’ and as such cannot be considered ‘causes’ (WP 545). This is not to say that causes are paramount because in a decidedly non-causal account of generation and formation we cannot technically speak of a Cause; effects can be both effects and ‘causes’ and the interpretation is – in any *event* – more important that what *moved-what-along-a-succession* of time-points. The apparent shows things to be changing and yet at the same time perception of change itself incorporates the deception of a Cause. Appearances are true in showing alteration; that altered states are visible or apparent to the rational senses of human beings. Human beings see change but they impute, necessarily, onto those appearances the law-like mechanisms of causation which are only fictional – and man, says Nietzsche, needs fictions because as Plato had already indicated, living in the world of shadows is more real than in the starkest moment of midday. For Nietzsche, shadows are seen by way of tangible causal forces and their symptomatic-effects hence they also depict our wish to defy change and reduce wilful form-giving power to successive moments of spatial extension. Importantly shadows appear, as the will to appearance has it, in the guise of a past being dissociated from the present just as it too is dissociated from the future. Another way to illustrate the decisive directional force of an event is the invention or discovery of ‘good’ and ‘bad’: once priestly precepts are constructed it is impossible to return to the same naïve existence of a pre-moral herd-consciousness¹⁶. The priests helped to transform (natural) life into a problem; life became an interesting venture into unknown questions, quandaries and puzzles. The ‘soul superstition’ proved vital in this regard as the human animal was now – thanks to these proto-teachers – endowed with a vertical height and depth of spirit which it previously lacked owing to the preponderance of its strong drives¹⁷. Eternal return means not the Same of all things conceivably possible since all futures would then be *apriori* determined. The Necessity of the universe – as Plato had already understood – consists of quasi-lawlike patterns in which the indefinite manifests itself through cycles of regeneration; but the *futural* nature of time – something better represented by Judaeo-Christian metaphysics in Nietzsche’s case – is necessarily full of possibilities because the Events foresaid always require ‘interpretation’, and interpretation is of necessity always re-interpretation.

¹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift, On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage Books, 1989. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as GM.

¹⁷ For an account of Nietzsche’s philosophic anthropology, see John Mandalios, *Nietzsche and the Necessity of Freedom*, Lanham/Oxford, Lexington Books, 2008.

That means past moments are within future moments, moments which are revealed in the twinkling of the eye of the Present.

Part of the temporal movement of soul can also be gleaned from its entry into the moralization of the world as inaugurated by the powerful transcendence of a priestly caste of 'slaves'. Nietzsche accepts this historical necessity but only to find its transcendence in the forementioned eternity of momentum and *spirit* of force in phenomena themselves. To not restrict the monad-soul of inner-outer forces and to not bound it by a specific historical form or agent, is Nietzsche's utmost concern; a concern intertwined with his philosophy of freedom. Yet the point to be established here is the presence of infinite and finite life, their necessary intertwinement. It is not 'finitude versus infinitude' but rather how finitude exemplifies and embodies the processes that form all phenomena in dynamic interactions with one another. For instance, though infinity is present in indefinite processes it gathers its manifest form in the temporalizing effect of the event. No monistic element predominates in the universe as the infinity of time and the finitude of quanta dance together to make the divisible constituents of experience – past, present and future – apparent in temporal existence.

The temporality of *Wesen* (coming-to-pass) is investigated by creators who examine the world (of appearances) and find that concepts only exist according to the logic and syntax of human communicability. The creator understands the necessitarian nature of finite concepts and their illusory permanence; and she comprehends the virtue of appearances abiding by the moving temporal force of becoming. The creature on the other hand is subject to the obligatory reality of such concepts, believing that anthropomorphic projections are getting to things themselves and Being more generally. 'Creatures' by contrast will see logic, concepts, Being and the immortality of souls as defining the actual world. The will to deceive is superordinate in this case because creatures such as they fail to muster the mastery will or power of the Creator. Souls of creator-creatures experience and comprehend each dimension of (Nietzsche's) truth while simultaneously remaining vulnerable to creatural inclinations – the human-all-too-human aspect. Overcoming the latter is the provenance of the noble soul; it is essential for the nobler ones to accept self-deception yet within their soul-perspective there lays a seeing and hearing which is superior to temporal errancy. That is, a certain vertical tension of the soul affords them a particularly different perspectival-seeing that from a semi-transcendent standpoint of temporality gives a contradictory, perhaps even untimely, value-interpretation. Unlike Leibniz's windowless monads, these vertical-horizontal planed soul-singularities are entwined with (other) creatural, finite souls that believe in the grammarian's logic and the ascetic

Christian's 'soul-atomism'. Just as past and Future are unified in the Moment of the Gateway's time, so too the nobler and lower souls are undergoing the flow and concatenations of time's becoming in a mutual struggle – a conflict of sorts.

The reason the future is open to possibilities is because 'Past' naturally infuses itself in all future souls and yet Chronos' endowment is by no means static, simple or unidimensional. Since futural valuations and re-evaluations are fundamentally indeterminable, Necessity cannot engender souls to a repetition of the same even within cyclical time. What 'returns' is only knowable to the soul constellation of particular tensed 'monads' of perception and force-extension. Every time individual existents of time are exposed to the universal process of *passing away* there inexorably occurs a process of weighing and measuring as well as regulating and assimilating for the purpose of life. This would naturally include in Nietzsche's thinking the assessing and reckoning of deceptive appearances as they veil the moments of 'return' and moments of coming-forth (*genesis*). Consistent with his 'and/with' copula, Nietzsche envisages an intertwined unity of truth-error that attends cycles of return and directionalities carved out by rupturous 'events'. What could at first glance seem or *appear* 'evental' (new direction) may only be a recurring circle of (self-)deception veiled in cloaks of novel creation. While this may appear problematic for epistemologists and logical philosophers the ancient life-philosophy of Nietzsche and Leibniz makes this danger of existence an assimilable aspect of concrete, sensual ensouled life. Spiritual life or *spiritualization* in its multiple facets harnesses this sort of danger and consequently helps to inaugurate (true) Events even while recurring illusion is bound to Event-making/or arranging by noble and ignoble souls. Hence decline may attend each potentiality for enhancement just as (re)generation may be accompanied by potentialities for destruction or degeneration. He calls this fatefulness 'destiny' since the point is to accomplish greatness in and through *ergon kai praxis* without any pessimism (of soul) that demands 'But do I know...?'

What makes an Event a destining (verb) as opposed to merely another moment of (self-) deception is bound up with what Nietzsche continually calls for, in a very Greek vein: it requires a *profundity* of spirit and will, not epistemic clarity, to discern the real kernel of wheat from the chaff. To *see* perspectively the moment of deception is to have discerned, that is, to have rendered 'indiscernibles' as an amalgam of confusing appearances and knowable essences (or evental presences). Indeed, we could argue that Nietzsche allows the moment of truth of knowing such a phenomenon constitutes a historic Event in the development of the curious creature *Mensch*. Discernibility of self-deception as fact, in Nietzsche's long genealogical bow, indicates that other hominoids practiced it but never attained the 'height' of seeing it through extra-moral,

historical eyes. Afterwards, after an Event of this kind, a human creature may tragically embrace the indiscernible within each expression of the ‘discernible’ as they can now surrender old dualistic thinking through the pathos of *profundity*. With profundity, possibility undergoes alteration. Possibility is no longer two-sided henceforth: to experience only illusion or the act of knowing. Futurity is altered by the profundity that a certain kind of Event has demolished old, traditional dualistic categories to make way for the new ‘open seas’ of navigating the shores of becoming. The profundity of those higher ones who overcame stagnancy will expect within every moment of the present, the past’s denial of deception and will see ahead into the distant horizon new types of necessary illusion which help veil the pain, suffering and blissfulness of Isis. The too harsh a light of *seeing* profoundly requires that the veil of Isis never be negated as such; never to be usurped by the deceptive beauty of Apollonian light – *Schein* (illusory appearance). For ‘the profound’ must all be revealed in time, in souls; and this possibility of unveiling the truth of force – the Evental – lies within time’s deceptive transitoriness. We look for Being only to find the momentary unfolding of *all eternity* before our very own sullen eyes. Nietzsche, not unlike the theogonic Leibniz, sought to propel exceptional profundity into the future in order to raise the common cultural reserve of the race, particularly given its state of decline in the nineteenth century. Once non-mechanical science would divest itself of the serious errors of ‘materialistic atomism’ (BGE 12), scientific thought would be able to contribute to the *Bach* of *Bildung* that could then enhance the ‘height and power of his spirituality’ (213). Thus ‘spiritual transformation’ was his meta-science claim to philosophizing, with a Dionysian hammer for tuning the important evental crises that could either elevate or destroy humankind. To this extent, the conjunction of a Judaeo-Christian ethos with a fundamentally Greek conception of life – not to mention insights garnered from modern physics and biology – yields a spectacularly rich, multi-layered enfolding of diverse *points* of view which only Leibniz could have appreciated as essentially multi-directed and multiverse¹⁸: perceiving monadic (shifting) centres.

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¹⁸ See John Gribbin, *In Search of the Multiverse*, Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2009.

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