"ALIEN TO THIS WORLD"

POLITICO-ONTOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE QUESTION OF ALIENATION IN APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVES

Valerio D'Angelo

ABSTRACT: The article aims to explore the concept of *world* as it has been formulated in some Western apocalyptic narratives. I will tackle the notion of world from what Taubes has defined as a keyword of apocalypticism: alienness or exile. Although barely explored, the notion of alienness runs through the main Western philosophic-political traditions, from ancient Gnosticism to modern revolutionary movements, and still echoes today as the feeling of estrangement in an ecologically devastated earth. However, far from being a unified and all−encompassing concept, alienness is two-sided. On the one hand, it expresses the Gnostics' hatred of the world as well as modern apocalyptic nihilism based on a dualistic ontology that completely separates man from the world; on the other hand, it represents a certain *Stimmung* that is also typical of the apocalypse but, unlike the first, signals the need for an ontological restructuring between man and the world. Against the first narrative, which has been majoritarian in Western metaphysics, I will explore the posthumous work of the Italian anthropologist Ernesto de Martino *The End of the World* as a way to rearticulate the relationship between the man and the world on a non-dualistic metaphysical basis. Lastly, I will frame the feeling of alienness inside our current ecological catastrophe, showing that while a Gnostic understanding grounds the hatred toward the world and nature, the second one provides, on the contrary, a broader view of being-in-the-world that asks for a community reunion with the surrounding nature and the fellow nonhuman beings.

KEYWORDS: Alienation; World; Apocalypse; Gnosticism; de Martino; Ecology

INTRODUCTION

In the well-known 1959 article *End-Times and the End of Time,* the German-born philosopher Günther Anders urged to think about what he called naked

apocalypse.[1] While Christian eschatology and the enlightened faith in progress, have traditionally discarded the notion of apocalypse in favor of that of Kingdom, the atomic era calls us to shift this paradigm. It is now time to reflect upon an apocalypse without Kingdom, where the end of the world will not be followed by a redemptive time-to-come but only by a "wordless world" insofar as the destruction of this world coincides with the disappearance of all that exists. For Anders, the era of the total catastrophe is the first and only one, which radically erases any possible outcome, that is to say, any "other" world following the end of the world. Philosophy and thought altogether, has to keep up with this unsettling certainty.

Seventy years after Anders's publication, his provoking call has been recalled not only by those scholars of various disciplines who made the risky effort to think about the world without us, but especially by the entertainment industry, that has transformed the spectacle of the apocalypse into one of its most lucrative businesses[2]. Undoubtedly, our social imaginary has been colonized by the recurring images of decaying cities, where skeleton buildings have been taken over by wild plants, and wrecked cars are all that is left on deserted highways. Despite this exercise of imagination, what remains highly elusive is the very notion of the *world*. What is the world that ends in the narrative of the end of the world is not clear at all. Philosophical, religious, and political narratives of doomsday, which were supposed to be a privileged "place" for investigating the notion of the world, have nonetheless failed to do so. As the famous purloined letter in Edgar Allan Poe's story, the world is that thing that is immediately visible but also hidden from our view. Elusive, indeed. In this essay, we will try to bring this concept to light not so much in a direct way −by answering the question of what is the world that is about to disappear− but by analyzing the way in which, from late Christian antiquity to recent contemporaneity, apocalyptic narratives have reflected on the relationship between man and the world[3]. Although often

[1] Günther Anders, 'Apocalypse Without Kingdom', *E−Flux Journal*, accessed May 15, 2023 https://www.e-flux.com/journal/97/251199/apocalypse-without-kingdom/

[2] Among the most valid attempts to reflect upon this notion, see. Ray Brassier, *Nihil Unbound. Enlightenment and Extinction.* New York: Palgrave Mc Millian, 2007; and Alan Weisman, *The world without us*, Thomas Dunne/St. Martin's Press, New York, 2007.

[3] What is at stake in many doomsday narratives that have crossed the religious and political history of Western culture, is a "visceral" relationship between the man and the world. Apocalyptic narratives have never disjoined the world from the subjectivity that is called to endure –or rather accelerate− the end of

far apart, all those narratives have been concerned with a specific *Stimmung*, a way of being-in-the-world at the end of times: alienation.

I. ALIEN MAN IN ALIEN WORLD. GNOSTICS AND NEO-GNOSTICS AT THE ASSAULT OF THE WORLD

In his study of Western eschatology, Jacob Taubes puts the word alienation among the fundamental, and foundational, words of the entire apocalyptic and Gnostic tradition: "Alienness or exile [*die Fremde*] is the first great base world of apocalypticism, and is completely new in the whole history of human speech"[4]. According to Taubes, we owe to the Gnostic tradition this peculiar world, *alien*, which refers to a feeling of estrangement and non-belonging to the world: "to be alien mend: to come from elsewhere, not to be at home in this world"[5]. Even before being a theological concept, alienness describes a specific attitude toward life, characterized by a feeling of homesickness[6]. Man is *alien* to this world insofar as he does not recognize in it the familiar and domestic home (*Heimat*) and perceives the world as ugly, meaningless, and hostile. Thus, alienness must be understood as a synonym of detachment from the world, which appears to be other than man's home. Man has been thrown into an unintelligible environment, to which he does not belong. Hans Jonas goes so far as to define this peculiar feeling as "the primary fact" that marks the Gnostic's experience of the world, the most basic and true relationship between man and the world. Man is, for Jonas, *ontologically stranger* to this world:

> Anguish and homesickness are a part of the stranger's lot. The stranger who does not know the ways of the foreign land wanders about lost; if he learns its ways too well, he forgets that he is a stranger and gets lost in a different sense by succumbing to the lure of the alien world and becoming estranged from his own origin.[7]

---

times. If Apocalypse has always been a call to an indeterminate subject, as Derrida would put it, then the question of the end of the world is enmeshed with existential expectations, feelings, fears, etc.

[4] Jacob Taubes, *Occidental Eschatology*, trans. David Ratmoko, Standford University Press, Standford, 2009, p. 26.

[5] Ibid.

[6] As already Taubes did, throughout the article, I will use the words alienness, foreignness, estrangement and alienation as synonyms, as they all indicate exactly the same concept.

[7] Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion. The message of the alien God and the beginning of Christianity*, Beacon Press, Boston, 2001, 49.

Being the world something other than man's home, the latter cannot but live his life as a foreigner, a stranger. That of the stranger −and its correlate notions of exile and foreignness, as well as the recurrent images of "Stranger Life" or "Stranger God"− are indeed the most commonly used metaphors in the Gnostic vocabulary and the very beating heart of Gnostic cosmogony. In short: Gnostic life could be defined, as Taubes correctly notes, as a "life in exile" inasmuch as "the homeland of life is beyond this world"[8]. The theological roots of the Gnostic pessimistic attitude toward life, and the following mismatch between man and the world, are well known. The Creation, far from being the loving act of the true God, is the product of an evil and blind deity, to whom Gnostics oppose a true and good deity, the *deus alienus*, according to Marcion's famous formulation. The *Gnōsis*, as an esoteric knowledge that offers salvation to those who access it, enlightens the initiates on both their origin and ultimate destination as well as the mysteries of the higher world. This knowledge cannot be achieved through reason, science, or faith, but is a kind of revelation on the following contents: "What makes us free is the knowledge who we were, what we have become; where we were, wherein we have been thrown; whereto we speed, wherefrom we are redeemed; what is birth and what rebirth"[9]. The binary structure of the sentence highlights the dualistic character of Gnostic thought: the fall of man from his divine beginnings to the world; and the liberation from slavery toward salvation. Gnosticism promises, through the revelation of supernatural knowledge, the liberation of the soul and the victory over evil cosmic powers. Evil lies precisely in the mixture of soul and body, spirit and matter; so salvation is a matter of separating the one from the other. It is therefore not surprising that throughout history, Gnostics have fluctuated between extreme asceticism, as was the case with the Cathars of France, who refused to have sex as well as any food obtained from copulation −since it would only perpetuate the slavery of the spirit to materiality− and some forms of libertinism that south to transgress the nomos of this world, which is inherently evil[10]. Asceticism and transgression are the two seemingly opposed existential attitudes that have depicted the conflictual relationship between the world and the "I", who detaches himself from the

[8] Taubes, *Occidental Eschatology*, p. 27.

[9] Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, p. 334.

[10] For a more extended analysis of the gnostic influence in the Middle Ages, see Robert I. Moore, *The Origins of European Dissent*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1985.

meaningless world. Nonetheless, this cosmic pessimism is inextricably linked with anthropological optimism, as Man, and only Man, holds dear the divine light and is destined to one day join the primordial wholeness through knowledge:

> man is superior to all nature, his unique distinction, mind, no longer results in a higher integration of his being into the totality of being, but on the contrary marks the unbridgeable gulf between himself and the rest of existence. Estranged from the community of being in one whole, his consciousness only makes him a foreigner in the world, and in every act of true reflection tells of this stark foreignness.[11]

This "absolute rift" between man and the world, as Jonas calls it, grounds the very negation of the world that will cross Western history and especially Western political doctrines. By creating a mismatch between human longing for the lost whole (*pleroma*) and this earthy world as a place devoid of meaning and order, Gnostic and Gnostic-like movements have created a void in the way the "world" is understood. Once the unity of the cosmos is broken, between man and the world there can only be an unbridgeable chasm, "the two are torn apart, and a gulf never completely to be closed again is opened: God and world, God and nature, spirit and nature, become divorced, alien to each other, even contraries"[12]. The world is no longer a meaningful environment or the natural home for man, but a senseless land that is not worthy of salvation. In Gnostic eschatology, one must abstract himself from this dark world as the only way to find unity with the original God of light, who transcends creation. Even the Gnostic alien God is the negation of the world and "has a nihilistic function concerning all inner-worldly attachments and values"[13]. Therefore, nihilism is not a modern phenomenon, as Sholem claims[14], but the inevitable consequence and the indelible blueprint of Gnostic dualist metaphysics that negates the world and its inner values. The Gnostic pessimistic cosmogony is at odds with many other Christian doctrines that conceptualize the relationship between man and the world in a radically different way. Yet in the Old Testament, for example, the so-called anthropic principle affirmed the existence of a providential design as a key feature of Creation. Though humankind was commanded by God to "fill the

[11] Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, p. 327.
[12] Ibid, p. 251.
[13] Ibid, p. 252.
[14] Gershom Scholem, "Der Nihilismus als religiöses Phänomen," in Adolf Portmann and Rudolf Ritsema, (eds), *Norms in a Changing World*, Brill, Leiden, 1977, p. 1-50.

earth and subdue it" (Genesis 1:28), Christian tradition has always hosted holistic visions of the co-existence of man and the world. A clear example is Francis of Assisi's *Canticle of the Creatures*, where all living things are endowed with meaning. The birds, the sun, the fire, and the moon are blessed as part of God's creation[15]. The world is made for man, but also man is made for being in this world. More recently, Jürgen Moltmann has gone even further by proposing a theory of Creation that is strikingly anti-gnostic in its search for an immanent meaning of the world. The world, for Moltmann, is not the useless and futile creation that the Gnostics used to think, but God himself is immanent to the world and part of his creation. Stressing "the recognition of the presence of God *in* the world and the presence of the world *in* God"[16], Moltmann advocates the redemption of the whole creation, since "both in creation and in *redemption* [italics mine], the human being is not isolated, nor he is seen in confrontation with the world. He [God] is viewed as belonging within an enduring cohesion of the whole Creation."[17]

Although Gnosticism never disappeared from the religious realm and, still today, its ghost haunts the Catholic Church[18], its strange combination of cosmic pessimism and anthropological optimism has been casting a long shadow on modern and contemporary political ideologies. It is possible to see the contours of "political gnosticism" already in Paul's criticism of the Gnostics. The apostle opposed Gnostic exoteric, transcendent, knowledge to an earthly "transvaluation of all values", since "it isn't *nomos*, but rather the one who has nailed to the cross by *nomos*, who is the imperator"[19]. For both Paul and the Gnostic, the *nomos* of this world is evil and stifling, but while for the Gnostics the only redemption comes from an appetite for destruction and transcendence, for Paul, the Messiah

---

[15] Saint Francis of Assisi, *Cantic of the Creatures* (2022), 37 accessed May 20, 2023 http://franciscanseculars.com/the-canticle-of-the-creatures/

[16] Jürgen Moltmann, *God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation: The Gifford Lectures, 1984–1985*, SCM Press, London 1985, p. 13.

[17] Ibid, p. 189.

[18] Pope Francis apostolically exhortation *Gaudete et Exultate* –"Due nemici della santità" is indeed devoted to the neo-gnostic and neo-pelagiarian drifts in contemporary Christianity. See: Francis I (2022). Apostolic Exhortation Gaudete et exsortate, accessed 05/03/2023 at https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20180319_gaudete-et-exsultate.html

[19] Jacob Taubes, *The political theology of Paul*, trans. Dana Hollander, Standford University Press, Standford, 2004, p. 24.

who dies on the cross with the two burglars is all the opposite of the Gnostic image of perfection. He never appears as an ascetic, detached from the body or the material reality. The Messiah who comes to "make all the things anew" reveals that the Rein is already here, in this world and now, and not –as in Gnosticism– in a far reign of light, so far from this world and our present time. So, while Paul and the upcoming Christianity sought to live the Reign here and now by revolutionizing one's own way of living and taking distance from the vane and harmful tendencies of this world, the Gnostic mind denies the world altogether. Even if, as Tubes remarks, the difference between Paul and Marcion is not that neat[20], nonetheless, the two "existential" dispositions toward the world (and politics) seem incompatible. If the disciples of Jesus Christ feel do not belong to this world but are still part of it (the Pauline *hos me*), Gnostics opt for a radical break between man and the world, which waves from ontology to politics.

According to the Austrian political theorist Eric Voegelin, this hostility toward the world, together with the faith in humans' exceptionalism, has indeed been inherited by many modern political movements that are nothing but disguised forms of Gnosticism[21]. Although seemingly incompatible, Comte's positivism, Marx's classless society, and Hegel's realm of freedom, share the same Gnostic vision of the world and a frenetic work to revolutionize it. As the "old" Gnostics, the modern ones –as Voegelin labels them– disjoint the world from human consciousness and share the same feeling of estrangement or foreignness but, differently from the former, the latter strive for achieving the new world here and now. So, while ancient Gnostics maintained the vertical dimension, that of transcendence, insofar as this world was not worthy of salvation, modern Gnostics look for a historically immanent order. What is new in modern Gnostics is the obsession to change here and now this evil world, by means of scientific knowledge, revolutionary action, etc.:

> The aim of parousiastic gnosticism [as in Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger] is to destroy the order of being, which is experienced as defective and unjust, and through man's creative power to replace it with a perfect and just order. Now, however, the order of being may be understood '…' it remains something that is given, that is not under man's control. In order, therefore, that the attempt to create

[20] Ibid, p. 56-57.
[21] Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, Duke University Press, Durhan, 1975.

> a new world may seem to make sense, the givenness of the order of being must be obliterated; the order of being must be interpreted, rather, as essentially under man's control.[22]

Parousiastic Gnosticism runs through political modernity as a subterranean river and is fueled by an insane search for redemption on Earth. The "old" Gnostic hatred toward the world turns now to an immanent overcoming –or overturning– of it by means of human action. Referring to Marx, Voegelin states that the "old world of corruption and iniquity" shall be followed by "a new world of freedom", so the revolution will have a function of "purification" of the spirit"[23]. Marx, as well as Bakunin, Comte, Nietzsche, and the Nazis, share the same Gnostic feeling of lack of satisfaction toward one's own condition and endeavor to transform it. Displacing salvation into the secular realm, they "inmanentize the eschaton", investing Man with the task of radically transforming the world. The Italian political sociologist Luciano Pellicani is even more adamant than Voegelin in comparing the modern revolutionary mindset to the Gnostic "man of negation" or "man of resentment". The modern revolutionary is someone who is not simply hostile to the order of being but who also wishes to overturn it and build "the Kingdom of God on earth, but without and against God '…' so that humanity will attain the happiness promised by religions of salvation"[24]. Albert Camus also saw modern political apocalypse as a form of Gnostic resentment towards the world that needed to be destroyed and transformed[25]. Positivists, revolutionaries, and fascist-like ideologies as well share the Gnostic attitude of negation of the world as such and an insane will to fabricate a new one. All those ideologies are nihilist insofar as they erase beauty, meaning, and values from the

---

[22] Eric Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism. Two Essays,* Regnery Publishing, Washington, 1968, pp. 35-36.

[23] Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, p. 241.

[24] Luciano Pellicani, *Revolutionary apocalypse: ideological roots of terrorism*, Praeger, Westport, 2003, p. 273. For Pellicani, Marxism resembles Gnostic feeling of estrangement since "humanity fell into a world of need, of impotence, of alienation and moral corruption but will regain 'paradise lost' thanks to the total revolution achieved when Great Universal Harmony overturns the existing" (Ibid, p. 158).

[25] Albert Camus, *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism*, trans. R. Srigley, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2007, p. 75. The book just mentioned is actually Albert Camus's doctoral thesis, directed by Jean Greneier, where he compared the two theological and existential postures of Neoplatonism and Gnosticism.

world and, doing so, open it to human manipulation[26]. Incidentally, the current ecological catastrophe could also be interpreted not only, as it is usually done, in terms of the mastery of modern Cartesian subjectivity over all other species-beings, or as the byproduct of capitalist exploitation of natural resources, but also primarily in terms of a tainted relationship with the world, which is deprived of its inner meaning and beauty.

Nowadays, the spirit of Gnosticism has not faded away completely. Quite the contrary. Transhumanist utopias could be seen as forms of contemporary Gnosticism inasmuch as they also preach a flight –less theological and more technological– from the world and its earthly limits. This is what the notion of "singularity", created by the former chief engineer of Google Ray Kurzweil, points to: "an event that will take place in the material world, the inevitable next step in the evolutionary process that started with biological evolution and has extended through human–directed technological evolution" and adds that "it is precisely in the world of matter and energy that we encounter transcendence"[27]. Kurtzweil's notion of singularity closely resembles ancient Gnostic dualism, since it relies on the idea that the world has to be overcome and that man, an exceptional creature in the universe, will and has to transcend its organic condition. The soul finds itself trapped in the earthly world, so salvation could but not be an act of disembodiment that creates –as Francis I writes– "an intellect without God and without flesh"[28].Technology is what will make this utopia real and palpable. As in the case of Kurtzweil's singularity, or Elon Musk's experiments in cryogenics, technology is endowed with a salvific power since it will "free" man from the burden of the world[29]. In the transhumanist scenario,

[26] Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Herbert Read, The Time of India Press, Bombay, 1960, pp. 196-203.

[27] Ray Kurtzweil, *The singularity is near. When Human transcends biology*, Vikings, London, 2005, p. 283.

[28] Francis I. *Apostolic.*

[29] The Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro correctly describes this techno–utopianism as a religious sect whose millenarian goal is to make the human obsolescent by transfiguring it "in the reign of Man, where humanity will be absorbed by a technologically improved humanity emancipated form the world" Danowski Deborah and Edoardo Viveiros de Castro *Há mundo por vir. Ensaio sobre os medos e os fins*, Cultura e Barbarie Editora, Florianopolis, 2014, p. 66. Interestingly, also on the "left" side, there is growing concern about how it is possible to ultimately separate man from the world to become a technically advanced subject. This is the case, for example, of the so–called accelertionists who advocate speeding up the capitalist system until it collapses. Accelationists also

the current ecological catastrophe could be easily solved by taking off from the earthly world and its physical limits. Paradoxically, in an impoverished and increasingly inhabitable world, alienness and the feeling of foreignness become the only possible *Stimmung* of being-in-the-world. And taking off from it, thanks to technology, is the only solution.

II. THE "OTHER" END OF THE WORLD. ERNESTO DE MARTINO AND CULTURAL APOCALIPSES

At the heart of Gnostic and Neo-gnostic cosmology there is, as we have just seen, a peculiar relationship between man and the world, where the latter is, in Hans Jonas' worlds, "a vast prison whose innermost dungeon is the earth"[30]. Captivity is the only modality of being-in-the-world, since man is imprisoned in a world where beauty, meaning, or freedom have no place, for it has to be abandoned. The anti-terrestrial turn of contemporary versions of Gnosticism has granted technology a salvific power that will eventually free humankind from the limits of its earthly condition. The transhumanist "solution" to ecological catastrophe is consequent to its ontological position: if man and the world do not belong to the same ecosystem, but are two opposing and antagonistic forces, then salvation can only be possible as an escape from the world, nor does nature deserve to be saved but only transformed for human purposes. However, the Gnostic sentiment of estrangement should not be discarded too easily. For the Gnostics, strangeness was the inevitable emotional outcome, or *Stimmung*, of an ontological impossibility, that is to say, the belonging of man and world. This self-alienation can be overcome only once the soul recognizes "its superior state in the original homeland [Heimat]"[31]. Thus, it is precisely because we are thrown into an inhospitable world that we have to find a way home and des-alienate ourselves. Taubes puts this concept in clear terms:

> The mixture inherent in this world enables the drama of redemption, because the mixture is caused by the Fall which is synonymous with self-estrangement. '…' Being thrown (das Geworfensein) is one of the most powerful symbol of

rely on technology as a tool that will liberate humanity from the physical and mortal worlds, and enable the emergence of a new post-human species. (Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek. *Accelerate Manifesto. For an Accelerationist Politics*, Gato Negro Ediciones, 2014).

[30] Jonas, *The Gnostics Religion*, p. 43.

[31] Taubes, *Occidental Escathology*, p. 26.

> apocalypticism and Gnosis and means that mankind is placed in a situation deprived of choice.[32]

Here, Taubes correctly underlines the link between throwness as the ontological condition of man's captivity in the "vast prison" (the world), and self-estrangement. Apocalypticism, as that which "negates the world in its fullness"[33] just comes along. Thus, at the heart of the (Gnostic) concept of estrangement, there is a fundamental ambiguity: it expresses at the same time the distress of having been thrown into a hostile world but also the search for the original *Heimat*. Ancient as well as modern Gnosticism eventually "solved" the tension between *Unheimlickeheit* and *Heimat* by resorting, as we have seen, to a dualist cosmogony that ended up devaluing *this* world as a useless thing. However, it is still possible to perceive that tension between the feeling of non-belonging and the longing for a lost whole in later apocalypticism, especially in many contemporary literary works. A clear example of that can be found in Albert Camus's well-known notion of the absurd:

> A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.[34]

Already in this short excerpt, overfilled with Gnostic metaphors, it is possible to hear the echo of the feeling of estrangement: the absurd describes "a divorce" between man and the world that happens each time the latter turns unintelligible and unrecognizable to the former. What was once familiar and meaningful turns strange; when the world remains mute to the human quest for meaning, then the absurd emerges. The absurd is neither a property of the object (the world), nor a feeling of the subject (the man), but precisely as a relationship −one of divorce indeed− between the two; or, as Blanchot once noted, a logic of our mental mechanisms, a rational aspiration towards a unity that nonetheless slips away from us[35]. Camus's conceptualization of the absurd closely resembles Gnostic

---

[32] Ibid, p. 29.
[33] Ibid, p. 9.
[34] Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O' Brien, Penguin Randomhouse, London, 1979, p. 13.
[35] Maurice Blanchot,'Le Mythe de Sisyphe' *Faux pas,* Gallimard, Paris, 1943, p. 66.

estrangement, as it also reveals man's feeling of unhomeliness but, contrary to the estrangement, it longs for a totally immanent and in-worldly meaning. It is no surprise that Camus was profoundly influenced by Gnostic philosophy −as the main titles of his masterpieces clearly show (*L'étranger, La chute, L'exile et le royaume*)− and thus coined the concept of the absurd starting from the Gnostic feeling of foreignness. However, the French philosopher eschewed Gnostic dualism and its contempt toward the world, which is typical of Gnostic-like modern political doctrines, which submit the world to a teleocratic logic of fabrication (of a revolutionary society, the Arian race, etc.). Against them, Camus affirms meaning and beauty as in-worldly and immanent values[36]. Once the world is finally freed from the tyrannical search for the *telos* we impose upon it, shows itself as dense of meaning and beauty:

> at the heart of all beauty lies something inhuman, and these hills, the softness of the sky, the outline of these trees at this very minute lose the illusory meaning with which we had clothed them, henceforth more remote than a lost paradise […] that denseness and that strangeness of the world is absurd.[37]

The discomfort and mismatch the absurd brings about do not lead to a withdrawal from the world but call for a (neo-platonic) re-conjunction and sensuous, ecstatic unity. The Italian anthropologist Ernesto de Martino has also emphasized the dual nature of the Camusian absurd as that feeling that stretches between "the irreducible chaos of the worldliness, the sovereign contingency of situations", on the one hand, and the "desire for unity and the need for clarity and cohesion", on the other[38]. Camus, along with Sartre and Moravia, is one of the contemporary heralds of what de Martino labels "apocalyptic sensitivity". For de Martino, at the heart of the Camusian absurd, Sartre's nausea or Moravia's ennui there is a certain feeling of strangeness to this world, which is typical of the apocalyptic sensitivity that runs through contemporary literature, philosophy, and visual arts. In the posthumous, book *The End of the World. Contribution to the*

---

[36] Samantah Novello, *Albert Camus as a political thinker. Nihilism and the politics of contempt*, Palagrave McMillian, New York, 2010, pp. 64-68.

[37] Camus, *The Myth of Sysiphus*, p. 20.

[38] Ernesto de Martino, *La fine del Mondo. Contributo all'ananalisi delle apocalisi culturali*, Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi, Turin, 2002, p. 488. There is also a recently published translation of the book: Ernesto de Martino, *The End of the World. Cultural Apocalypse and Transcendence*, trans Dorothy Zinn, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2023.

analysis of cultural apocalypses, de Martino devotes a meticulous attention to the phenomenon of apocalypse but, unlike previous scholars, approaches it from the perspective of the ethnographer, integrating it with positive existentialism and literary studies. This unorthodox and highly original methodology nonetheless provides a more than accurate description of the relationship between man and the world that ends in the end of the world narratives. We will therefore turn our analysis to the Italian anthropologist, whose insight may open the space to overcome Gnostic dualism man-world and rethink our relationship with the "outside" world in the current climate apocalypse.

For de Martino too, what most closely defines an apocalyptic era is primarily a certain feeling or *Stimmung* of "estrangement from the world" (*spaesamento dal mondo*), of which contemporary literature provides many examples. Not only the already mentioned camusian feeling of the absurd, but also Sartre's nausea, describe the sudden shift from a familiar world (*mondo appaesato*) to an unfamiliar and strange one. Roquentin, the main character of Sartre's well-known novel, experiences in first person this feeling of estrangement where:

> The relationship with reality is here characterized '…' by the fact that the objects become strange, bizarre, weak, gratuitous, uncertain, indecisive, artificial, arbitrary, superfluous, absurd, in the act of separating themselves from their name and meaning and plummeting into the opaque thickness of a 'naked' existence, with no memory of human domestication.[39]

This feeling emerges when the world, once meaningful, domestic, and obvious, quickly becomes "monstrous". To the eyes of Roquentin, the clothes start looking alive, the tongue becomes a living centipede, and new things appear in the world, such as the stone eye, the large tricorn arm, the spider-jaw, etc. for new names have to be found. This loss of familiarity and intimacy with the world is precisely what de Martino calls apocalypse. Apocalypse is then the collapse of the world meant as a *cosmos*, that is to say, a meaningful and ordered totality. When daily life loses the symbolic points of reference and the world no longer "works" as a *Heimat* for the subject, then an apocalyptic feeling takes over him. A remarkable ethnographic case of apocalypse that de Martino insists on, is that of the peasant of Berna, a young worker hospitalized due to a schizophrenic delirium of the end of the world. What brought the young man to the edge of the

[39] Ibid, p. 691.

collapse was a "pejorative and threatening change in the world, a radical disruption of the cosmic order and that of community relations"[40]. The daily life of the young man underwent small but nonetheless "shocking" changes: during the previous spring, he uprooted some shrubs, while during the fall his father uprooted an oak tree and sold it, and his father's farm front door was colored and reshaped. Although apparently insignificant, those little changes disrupted the worldliness (*mondanità*) of the young peasant, meant as a relationship of domesticity (*domesticità*) and habitability (*abitabilità*) with its surroundings. Worldliness is, for the Italian anthropologist, "a fundamental character of normality", as "its designable intersubjectivity, its belonging to a socially and culturally conditioned perspective of operability"[41]. This is also the reason why, for de Martino, the most pertinent terms to designate the normality of the world are drawn from the life in a community, "whereby the normal world is 'domestic', 'familiar', 'mine' insofar as communicable to 'others'"[42]. As already for Heidegger[43], also for de Martino the world has first a communal meaning: it is not an outer object, something external and distant from the knowing subject, but a shared meaning with others. As a result, one of the modalities of the "end of the world" consists precisely of the dissolution of the ties between the social actors and the civilization that forged them. When the world as a shared understanding is lost and one does not feel at home in her surroundings anymore, then the feeling of unhomeliness (*unheimlichkeit*) makes its appearance*:*

> The 'bewildered' (spaesato) is the one who can no longer feel that he is in a 'country', 'domestic', culturally related and meaningful, at home, in the land of the fathers or homeland (Unheimlich, nicht-zu-Hause, etc.)[44]

As far as we have seen until now, de Martino retains the same feeling of estrangement typical of previous apocalypticism, as the Gnostic', but turns it upside down: it is not the mark of the unbridgeable chasm between and the world but rather the signal of a loss of the word as a meaningful environment. Thus, being foreign or alien to the world is not, in de Martino's philosophy, the ontological condition of man for having been thrown into the world but rather what follows the collapse of an ultimate ground for human thinking and action.

---

[40] Ibid, p. 125.
[41] Ibid, p. 126.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stanbaugh. State University of New York, Albany, 1996.
[44] de Martino, *La fine*, 636.

This way, de Martino is subverting the traditional apocalyptic narrative: man is not ontologically alien to this world for the mere fact of having been thrown into it, but becomes alien precisely when the world does not make sense to him anymore. Here, the category of throwness is key to understand the difference between de Martino and previous apocalypticism. According to the Italian anthropologist, the Heideggeian notion of *Dasein* as that being who is thrown into a world as a totality of significances that precedes him, does not adequately take into account the complex relationship between man and the world. The notion of throwness as a mere fact, the same that stood as the theoretical basis of Gnostic dualistic cosmogony[45], is a highly insufficient category to explain the world as a shared meaning between subjects who live in the same environment. It is because, in de Martino's philosophical anthropology, the relationship between man and the world cannot be something given once and for all: neither the world is an object (or totality of entities), immediately accessible to the object, nor the subject is a pure Cartesian individuality detached from the world. On the contrary, our being-in-the-world is something that must be constantly "guaranteed" by the *culture* we belong to, is an ought (*dovere*) and not merely a fact. As de Martino states:

> Being-in-the-world as a formal determination is insufficient insofar as it makes the having-to be-in-the-world (doverci essere nel mondo) through intersubjective valorization and the not being-in-any-possible-world disappear as a radical risk.[46]

The Heideggerian category of being-in-the-world (*in-der-Welt-sein*) is thus lacking insofar as it passes by the fact that the world is not something that exists prior to man, but an ongoing cultural construction of meaning. As far as we have seen, de Martino's notion of the world –and its disappearance– neatly departs from Heidegger's "negative" existentialism toward a peculiar form of "positive" existentialism[47], where man, in order to be, has to transcend the world of immediacy –that of animality– and, doing do, create *the* world, meant as a shared cultural understanding of the common environment. This construction is possible

---

[45] Among the many studies on gnostic influence on Heidegger's thought, see Elliot R. Wolfson, *Heidegger and Kabbalah: Hidden Gnosis and the Path of Poiēsis*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2019.

[46] de Martino, *La fine*, p. 636.

[47] While Heideggerian –and Gnostic– negative existentialism relies on being-in-the-world as a mere fact, due to man's throwness in the world, for de Martino's positive existentialism, which he inherits form his master Enzo Paci, existence in never a mere deed, but an "ethos", that is to say, a vital impulse which lets the human to overcome, or transcend, facticity through culture. See Enzo Paci, *Il nulla e il problema dell'uomo*. Taylor, Turin, 1950.

due to a vital impulse that de Martino calls the *ethos of transcendence*, since it is an ethical impulse to transcend or overcome what is merely given and enter into history[48]. Disparate cultural manifestations such as art, morality, politics, rituals, science, and philosophy, are expressions of this leap from nature into culture. All of them contribute, at a time, to take the man out of the natural immediacy and dragging him to the world as a shared and intersubjective meaning. Neither traditional biologicism nor Heideggerian existential analytics has been able to adequately address the central question of the place (or presence) of man in the world, the former by reducing it to a biological and natural deed, the latter by heralding throwness as an accomplished overcoming of the subject/object dualism. They both forget that the world is not something that existed prior to man, but an endless effort, achieved through rituals, politics, morality, etc. to guarantee the presence of man in it and avoid his falling back into nothingness. Indeed, worldliness can be pulled back at any time: "the collapse of presence, the falling back of the energy of transcending, the collapse of transcending as a task, is thus the collapse of the world"[49]. For de Martino, we are constantly exposed to this *crisis of presence* –and so to the apocalypse– especially in those critical moments where our existence is jeopardized by the inhuman, such as the forces of nature. As it is the case, for example, of the peasant in front of the storm, the hunter in front of the beast, the shepherd in front of the loneliness, the warrior facing the enemy, we in front of a dead body, the citizen in front of the law, etc.[50] In all those situations, what one needs is culture as a set of rules that work to make the world meaningful and save man from the *radical risk* of falling back into nothingness. This is the reason why de Martino used the word cultural homeland (*patria culturale*) as a synonym for the world itself: culture is the familiar and domestic background of intimacy with the world, made up of habits and shared historical memories acquired by humanity in earlier times, and that the individual learns through the education. Culture, in short, rescues man from that catastrophe, which is the crisis of presence, and seeks to make the world familiar (*heimlich*) once again. This is what happens in Proust's *À la recherché,* where the character finds himself in a situation of disorientation and unfamiliarity (*unheimichkeit*) with the

[48] For a full argumentation on the relationship between presence and crisis of the presence, see Ernesto de Martino, *Primitive Magic. The Psychic Powers of shamans and sorcerers*, trans. Dorothy Zinn, Prism Press, Dorset 1988.

[49] de Martino, *La fine*, 275.

[50] Ibid, p. 637.

world, but is able to take over the world as a familiar cosmos by smelling the Magdalene, which literally makes sense of the world[51]. However, the rescue provided by culture is not automatic, and may never happen or be a failure, as in the pathological case of the peasant of Berna. In the picture just taken, the feeling of estrangement plays a liminal role, being a sort of borderline feeling, where the world starts trembling under one's foot as the familiar cosmos one used to inhabit:

> One is not 'bewildered' because one experiences pure worldliness as a possibility, but because one loses the ethos of worldliness, and one experiences the impossibility of being able to be in a cultural world.[52]

Here the anti-Heideggerian, and implicitly anti-Gnostic, polemic is manifest. The feeling of homeliness (*spaesamento*) arises not because one is thrown into a world and has to cope with it as a pure possibility, but because culture has failed in its commitment to guarantee the world as a meaningful environment and the world has become too narrow in its significance, too artificial, and rigid.

By re-conceptualizing the notion of the world through positive existentialism, de Martino topples down previous apocalypticism too. To the eyes of the Italian Marxist anthropologist, the Gnostics –whom he surprisingly barely mentions– would remain trapped in an ontological dualism that separates the world from man and thus ignores the fact that the relationship between the two is never a fact but something unstable and precarious. Thus, apocalypse is not, as Gnostics and later apocalypticism believed, an ontological (and political) negation of the world, but rather an ever-present existential risk that every individual and every civilization may run into. This approximation opens the space for re-thinking apocalypse on a daily basis, since the disappearance of the world altogether –or what de Martino calls "not-being-in-any-possible-way" –is always behind the corner. This risk is not *per se* disruptive or unsettling, since *worlds*, as historical-cultural constructions, are eventually doomed to disappear and apocalypse is, in a certain sense, the destiny of every civilization. On the contrary, each destruction could bring a new world, meant as a cultural rebirth (*rigenerazione*). This is, in de Martino's terminology, an expression of "apocalypse with eschaton", as the end brings with it a new beginning: what really ends is not *the* world but only *a* world. When there is a rescue, the apocalyptic experience is not of a

[51] Ibid, pp. 601-605.
[52] Ibid, p. 636.

pathological kind since it shows the inner limits of any cultural project, which is not able to make the world meaningful any longer, and so needs to be overcome. The eschatological moment is "culturally re-integrative and productive"[53] because it opens the space for another world, another array of cultural values, and shows the contingency of each social and cultural system. When, on the contrary, what actually ends is not just *a* world, but *the* world as such, that is to say, any possible horizon for rescue and regeneration, we face an "apocalypse without eschaton". Here, the end is actually a catastrophe, as the collapse of the familiar and domestic, the meaning of life and of all the communitarian and intersubjective relationships. In this "total shipwreck of the human"[54], there is no room for rescue and the radical risk of not-being-in-any-possible-world is not overcome at all. A katabasis without anabasis. As, for Anders –whose work de Martino used to know– naked apocalypse consisted of a "mere downfall, which doesn't represent the opening of a new, positive state of affairs"[55], so, for the Italian scholar, apocalypse without eschaton means the lack of a new start and a new world as a meaningful environment, or the "alienation and disintegration of the human"[56]. For both thinkers, a clear example of that is the nuclear hecatomb, which leaves no space for other than destruction and despair. For de Martino, even the historical experience of colonialism led to an apocalypse without eschaton, as the colonists lost more than their political or economic sovereignty; they have completely lost their world as a family and familiar background,

[53] Ibid, p. 112. However, for de Martino, modern apocalyptic narratives, no such as the Marxian, conservative or bourgeoisie, cannot help but concealing the historicity of the human condition and the radical risk inherent in it. While all other culture in the world have always tried to conceal, or mask, the radical threat posed by contingency, that is, the risk of not-being-in-any-possible-way, and have done so by pointing to a meta-historical horizon –that of myth, for example– which frees us from the insecurity of historical becoming. This has traditionally been, for de Martino, the role of culture, that of protecting human being from the shock of contingency and shield human beings from the existential malaise. On the contrary, western modern culture resigned this fundamental task and exposed man to his contingency and to the risk, as we saw, of not-being-in-any-possible-way. The philosophy of history belongs to this frame, since historical becoming needs some form of metahistorical ground in order to gain meaning. History has a meaning because it has a limit, an end and telos (Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957).

[54] de Martino, *La fine*, p. 106.

[55] Anders, *The end of the World*, p. 5.

[56] de Martino, *La fine*, p. 110.

without this disappearance being followed by a new beginning[57].

CONCLUSION. ALIENATION IN THE AGE OF ECOLOGICAL APOCALYPSE

In this article, we have tried to approach the question of the end of the world from what has been an ineludible element of the apocalyptic mindset: the feeling of estrangement. What closely characterizes the apocalyptic times, as we have seen, is not so much an appetite for destruction, nor the hope in salvation or the fear of damnation, but a certain feeling of dis-ease and homesickness. The world stops being the *Heimat* of man and is increasingly perceived as a hostile, inhabitable place. The ancient Gnostics were among the first who associated alienness with an ontological break between man and the world, thus influencing not only theology but also the religious and political history of the following 2,000 years. This dualistic cosmogony is still echoing nowadays in the dystopian fantasies of those who wish to split man from its natural surroundings and detach life from its terrestrial ground. The natural, physical limits of the world are themselves experienced as an intolerable obstacle that needs to be overcome. Already in the early 1960s, Karl Löwith stated that the loss of the world or, as he called it, "worldlessness", characterized the modern condition of man. By world, Löwith means primarily the natural world, the pre-human and pre-historical physical world of nature: "we miss the *only* world, the one that is more ancient and more lasting than human beings"[58]. The world must thus be understood as a *kosmos*, that is to say, a unity, a co-belonging of man and nature, as it used to be for the ancient Greeks. When this harmonious totality, perfect and beautiful, is lost, then the man find himself literally worldless. The trick of modernity is, for Löwith, the belief that man can "can step out of nature" and *exist* outside it, excluding himself from the totality of the natural world[59]. The era we are living

[57] Along with the fear of losing the word, there is, for de Martino, another fear, that of losing oneself in the world (*Weltverlorenheit*). This is related to both the Judeo–Christian notion of the end of the world and the coming of the Reign, and the secular notion of the end of a particular historical world, as it is the case of Marxist apocalypse and the disappearance of the bourgeois civilization. Here, one may find oneself trapped, or lost, into a limited historical horizon – a world– and thus be unable to generate any novelty at all.

[58] Karl Löwith, *Mensch und Menschenwelt*, in Klaus Stichweh and Marc de Launay (eds.), *Sämtliche Schriften*, Band 1, J. B. Meztler, Stuttgard 1981, p. 295.

[59] Ibid, p. 298.

in, renamed the Anthropocene[60], has not only blurred the boundaries between what has traditionally been considered a human artifice and what the natural environment was, but has all the semblance of a "worldless world". Rather than being a new post anthropic era, finally freed from the Cartesian subject-object opposition, the Anthropocene is the era where the world itself, that is, the natural world, collapses as a bearer of meaning. The ghostly images of desert lands and gutted mountains, (un)living testimony of the Heideggerian provocation of the earth under the force of geoengineering, could hardly be perceived as a *Heimat*, a familiar and domestic environment. On the contrary, it is easy to feel the surrounding world as unrecognizable, distorted, and even monstrous. The Australian philosopher Glenn Albrecht coined the term solastalgia to refer to the psychological effects of climate change, as "a manifest in an attack on one's sense of place, in the erosion of the sense of belonging (identity) to a particular place and a feeling of distress (psychological desolation) about its transformation"[61]. People who do not recognize the once familiar landscape, now devastated by climate change, used to feel a sense of non belonging, a "form of homesickness one gets when one is still at 'home'"[62]. This feeling can be experienced "in any context where there is the direct experience of transformation or destruction of the physical environment (home) by forces that undermine a personal and community sense of identity and control"[63]. As in de Martino's cultural apocalypse, what is at stake in Albrecht solastalgia is the loss of the world meant as a meaningful and familiar cosmos. However, while for the Italian anthropologist, as we have seen, apocalyptic sensitivity is closely linked to the collapse of the sense of belonging to a world as an historic and cultural environment, Albrecht's notion of solastalgia refers to the natural world as *per se* significant. Albrecht's study, which is more focused on psychology than on a rigorous phenomenological and ethnographic analysis, while avoiding a clear analysis of the concept of the word, if not in the generic form of "place", is nonetheless noteworthy. Indeed, we are increasingly witnessing cases of "ecological alienation", where an apocalyptic feeling emerges each time the

[60] Paul Crutzen & Christian Schwägerl, 'Living in the Anthropocene: Toward a new global ethos' *Yale Environment 360*, 2011, accessed 08/26/2023 at https://e360.yale.edu/features/living_in_the_anthropocene_toward_a_new_global_ethos

[61] Glenn Albrecht, 'Solastalgia. A New Concept in Health and Identity', *PAN* No 3, 2005, p. 45.

[62] Ivi.

[63] Ibid, p. 46.

natural environment is no longer able to be a home and seems monstrous and distorted. Today, it would be perfectly plausible that the young peasant of Berna would feel a sense of estrangement due to the climate catastrophe. The destruction of the landscape he has been living all his life, the fields and crops, rivers and mountains, his father's house and the secular three in front of it as well, would certainly provoke in the young man a sense of *spaesamento,* of bewildering, which would closely resemble Albrecht's solastalgia. While de Martino could not foresee the existential effect of climate catastrophe, it is still possible to claim that current "ecological alienation" implies the ruin of the world as *both* cultural and natural environment. Today, de Martino's notion of rebirth (*rigenerazione*) may no longer be entirely cultural, for it is enough to search for a new set of cultural –and therefore historical– values, but rather create a movement of biological recomposition, such as what biologist Edward Osborne Wilson (whom Albrecht also quotes) called biophilia: a desire to be connected to life and all living beings.

valeriodangelo@ymal.com
vd2460@nyu.edu

REFERENCES

Albrecht, Glenn. 'Solastalgia. A New Concept in Health and Identity', *PAN* No 3, 2005.

Anders, Günther. 'Apocalypse Without Kingdom', *E–Flux Journal*, accessed May 15, 2023 https://www.e-flux.com/journal/97/251199/apocalypse-without-kingdom/

Blanchot, Maurice. 'Le Mythe de Sisyphe' *Faux pas,* Gallimard, Paris, 1943

Brassier, Ray. *Nihil Unbound. Enlightenment and Extinction*. New York: Palgrave Mc Millian, 2007

Camus, Albert. *Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism,* trans. R. Srigley, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2007.

——— *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O' Brien, Penguin Randomhouse, London, 1979.

——— *The Rebel*, trans. Herbert Read, The Time of India Press, Bombay, 1960, pp. 196-203.

Crutzen, Paul & Christian Schwägerl. 'Living in the Anthropocene: Toward a new

global ethos', *Yale Environment 360*, 2011, accessed 08/26/2023 at https://e360.yale.edu/features/living_in_the_anthropocene_toward_a_new_global_ethos

Danowski Deborah and Edoardo Viveiros de Castro *Há mundo por vir. Ensaio sobre os medos e os fins*, Cultura e Barbarie Editora, Florianopolis, 2014, p. 66.

de Martino, Ernesto, *Primitive Magic. The Psychic Powers of shamans and sorcerers,* trans. Dorothy Zinn, Prism Press, Dorset 1988.

de Martino, Ernesto. *La fine del Mondo. Contributo all'ananalisi delle apocalisi culturali*, Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi, Turin, 2002.

Enzo Paci, *Il nulla e il problema dell'uomo.* Taylor, Turin, 1950.

Francis I. Apostolic Exhortation Gaudete et exsortate, accessed 05/03/2023 at https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20180319_gaudete-et-exsultate.html

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time,* trans. Joan Stanbaugh. State University of New York, Albany, 1996.

Jonas, Hans. *The Gnostic Religion. The message of the alien God and the beginning of Christianity*, Beacon Press, Boston, 2001.

Kurtzweil, Ray. *The singularity is near. When Human transcends biology*, Vikings, London, 2005.

Löwith, Karl. *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957.

—— *Mensch und Menschenwelt*, in Klaus Stichweh and Marc de Launay (eds.), *Sämtliche Schriften*, Band 1, J. B. Meztler, Stuttgard 1981.

Moltmann, Jürgen. *God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation: The Gifford Lectures, 1984–1985*, SCM Press, London 1985.

Moore, Robert. *The Origins of European Dissent*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1985.

Novello, Samantah. *Albert Camus as a political thinker. Nihilism and the politics of contempt,* Palagrave McMillian, New York, 2010.

Pellicani, Luigi. *Revolutionary apocalypse: ideological roots of terrorism,* Praeger, Westport, 2003

Saint Francis of Assisi, *Cantic of the Creatures* accessed May 20, 2023 http://franciscanseculars.com/the-canticle-of-the-creatures/

Scholem, Gershom. "Der Nihilismus als religiöses Phänomen," in Adolf Portmann and Rudolf Ritsema, (eds), *Norms in a Changing World*, Brill, Leiden, 1977, p. 1-50.

Taubes, Jacob. *Occidental Eschatology*, trans. David Ratmoko, Standford University Press, Standford, 2009.

——— *The political theology of Paul*, trans. Dana Hollander, Standford University Press, Standford, 2004.

Voegelin, Eric. *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, Duke University Press, Durhan, 1975.

——— *Science, Politics and Gnosticism. Two Essays,* Regnery Publishing, Washington, 1968.

Weisman, Alan. *The world without us*, Thomas Dunne/St. Martin's Press, New York, 2007.

Williams, Alex and Nick Srnicek. *Accelerate Manifesto. For an Accelerationist Politics*, Gato Negro Ediciones, 2014.

Wolfson, Elliott. *Heidegger and Kabbalah: Hidden Gnosis and the Path of Poiēsis*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2019.