

## DELEUZIAN VITALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

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**ABSTRACT:** What I have tried to do with this paper is to present Bergson as Deleuze takes him up as an inspiration. This was done to depict what Deleuze builds on in his philosophy, namely the topic of difference and differentiation. This fed into an examination of Deleuze's critique of the dialectic as evinced in 'Nietzsche and Philosophy'. I then sought to present a preliminary response from the dialectician's camp via an account of Althusser and his concept of 'determination in the last instance' which in my view answers to an extent the charge that Deleuze levels against dialectics (that it is unable to think the singular determinative principle in an encounter or multiplicity). Subsequently I represent Deleuze's deeper problem that is his critique of representation itself, and specify that his real target in critiquing the dialectic is Hegel. This warrants a brief look at Hegel and the process of negation that his dialectic enters into which is very much what Deleuze wants to distance his art of concept creation from. In what a possible alternative to Hegelian negation may be, I present Bergson's examination of aesthetic sense or beauty and its suggestiveness as an example. In way of a response I try and show how Hegelian expressive causality as depicted by Althusser is also capable of representing aesthetic and political relations and perhaps in a more determinate manner. I end with presenting Žižek more contemporary critique of Deleuze.

**KEYWORDS:** Vitalism; Dialectics; Henri Bergson; Gilles Deleuze; Louis Althusser

### BERGSON AND DELEUZE

Vitalism in my own words, philosophically speaking is the belief that there may be a surplus to life that guides philosophical analyses intuitively. This presents itself in a way that cannot be accomplished by a purely conceptual exposition. In this regard I may be following Benjamin Noys in the distinction he makes in his

paper 'The Poverty of Vitalism' in 2011<sup>1</sup>, between 'philosophies of life' and 'philosophies of the concept'. Another angle to this is provided by the 'Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy' where vitalism is defined as "...a belief that starts from the premise that living organisms are fundamentally different from non-living entities because they contain some non-physical element or are governed by different principles than are inanimate things<sup>2</sup>."

What then, is this surplus that we may be speaking of that vitalism perhaps seeks to rescue from any brute physicalism? The contours of my argument so far may appear to be guiding the reader in the direction of the notion of vitalism being a kind of spiritualism, and there is indeed a danger of that, particularly if the alterity of us biological beings (or even treading on not strictly biological turf, as beings endowed with a soul) is emphasised in our difference from an animal life. Bergson himself has been called a spiritualist<sup>3</sup>, though this is not what I would like to emphasize here.

What is fascinating about Bergson, taken as an example of the vitalist tradition (itself a label that we should treat with some trepidation given that the vitalists are not self-consciously as much of a school as the dialecticians) is his seeming jump out of the history of metaphysics consisting of names such as Plato and Hegel, to formulate a metaphysics of sensation. This is characterised by an appreciation of the degrees in which sensorial affection move us, and also by an understanding of the way in which stronger intensities of sensation encapsulate weaker ones, presenting a scale of intensity<sup>4</sup>.

There is at the base of it something to be said about Henri Bergson's method of intuition that seeks to do away with symbols altogether<sup>5</sup>. According to him, the

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<sup>1</sup> Benjamin Noys, 'The Poverty of Vitalism', Presented at 'TO HAVE DONE WITH LIFE: Vitalism and Anti-vitalism in Contemporary Philosophy', MaMa, Zagreb (17-19 June 2011), retrieved from academia.edu, [https://www.academia.edu/689255/The\\_Poverty\\_of\\_Vitalism\\_and\\_the\\_Vitalism\\_of\\_Poverty\\_](https://www.academia.edu/689255/The_Poverty_of_Vitalism_and_the_Vitalism_of_Poverty_)

<sup>2</sup> Bechtel, William; Williamson, Robert C, "Vitalism". In E. Craig (ed.). *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Routledge, 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Giuseppe Bianco, *Bergson and the spiritualist origins of the ideology of creativity in philosophy*, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Issue 5: French Spiritualism in the Nineteenth Century. Guest editors: Mark Sinclair and Delphine Antoine-Mahut, Volume 28, 2020

<sup>4</sup> Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An essay on the immediate data of consciousness*, trans F L Pogson, New York, Dover Publication, 2001, Pg 3-4

<sup>5</sup> Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans T E Hulme, New York and London, G P Putnam's Sons, 1912, Pg 9.

intuitive method grasps what is essential and unique in the object, and it does this without recourse to an attempt to conceptualise the object which is said to result in a mere reconstruction that also threatens to impersonalise the object as it generalises at the same time as it abstracts<sup>6</sup>.

My goal in this paper is not an appraisal of Bergson himself per se but rather a brief survey of what struck Deleuze to be useful in Bergson and how he modifies his model in presenting his own transcendental empiricism. So let us move on to Deleuze himself. What is a transcendental empiricism? Deleuze's method of philosophical analyses is transcendental in a sense which is different from Kant's transcendentalism. By this I mean that he does not seek as much to underpin the conditions of philosophical analyses by way of positing fundamental categories that we cognise the world through, as much as he tries to present the conditions of actual experience as arising in an immanent field which can harbour experimentation and reflection. It is empirical in the sense that it pertains to the gamut of sensorial perceptions, intensities, and movements that animate a subject.

To really understand how Deleuze augments Bergson's intuitive method we should explain what he means by virtuality, or the virtual. The virtual, according to Deleuze is like a nebulous cloud that hangs over the actual. It is present with possibilities for the actual but is also like a repository of its memory. There is an interaction that takes places between the virtual and the actual which is said to be shorter than the shortest datum of measurable time<sup>7</sup>. The actual and the virtual are said to be conjoined in a circuit of interaction. This is perhaps why Deleuze insists that a thing differs first - immediately from it itself, a point of view he emphasises in his essay 'Bergson's Conception of Difference'<sup>8</sup>.

In trying to explain Deleuze to myself, a difficulty I had was in thinking what difference in itself could mean. That is, a difference which does not rely on a specific object, position or worldview that it differs from, and is hence consequently freed from that referent. One way of thinking about this is to

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<sup>6</sup> Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans T E Hulme, New York and London, G P Putnam's Sons, 1912, Pg 18-19

<sup>7</sup> Gilles Deleuze, and Claire Parnet. *Dialogues II*, trans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, Pg 148

<sup>8</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands: And Other Texts, 1953-1974*. Edited by David Lapoujade, trans Mike Taormina, Los Angeles, Semiotext (E), 2004, Pg 42.

consider something more amorphous from which this difference is determined, such as perhaps the state of the situation. This would be in keeping with Deleuze's later lexicon of 'becomings'.

We are however presented with a luminous example when Deleuze asks us to imagine something which differentiates itself from something else, but that something else does not differentiate itself from the first something. Concretising this example he cites lightning flashing in the night, like an eruption that carves out its own line as against the indifferent blankness of the sky.<sup>9</sup> This does make it appear as though the act of differentiation is in itself more of an agential activity, as opposed to an observation made between two referents. This is intricately tied to how Deleuze thinks about determination as he states that "Difference is this state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction." (Ibid) In this sense we can say that difference is not dependent on what it differs from, for it makes itself. This is not unrelated to how Deleuze thinks of individuation too which can be noticed in this gesture; as that which makes itself one by creating a unilateral and precise relation to the indeterminate. This gesture is itself singular.

I do have a tangential comment that I would like to make here however for Deleuze also does seem to present another kind of determination which is not in the form of a unilateral differentiation and that is what he calls nuptials. These are by definition double binds and not acts of unilateral differentiation. The example he provides is of a wasp and an orchid. Here when the wasp goes to the orchid to suck nectar it inadvertently serves as the reproductive organ of the orchid by spreading its pollen when it goes to other flowers. The wasp itself gains sustenance by feeding on the nectar of the flower. This is the relation which Deleuze calls a nuptial, characterising it as asymmetrical evolution<sup>10</sup>. This act of determination does seem different from how Deleuze characterises differentiation which is presented as not act of kindness clearly, but closer to cruelty. Elsewhere, as an act which creates monsters<sup>11</sup>.

I bring these up here because to me this does not seem unrelated to how

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<sup>9</sup> Deleuze, Gilles, *Difference and Repetition*, trans Paul Patton, London and New York, Continuum, 2001, Pg 1

<sup>10</sup> Deleuze, Gilles, and Claire Parnet. *Dialogues II*, trans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, Pg 2.

<sup>11</sup> Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*, trans Paul Patton, London and New York, Continuum, London and New York, 1994 pg 28

Deleuze mounts his critique of dialectics in 'Nietzsche and Philosophy'.

### DELEUZE'S CRITIQUE OF THE DIALECTIC

To begin presenting Deleuze's diatribe against the dialectic, I would like to focus on two elements that seem to characterise it drawing from 'Nietzsche and Philosophy' 1) dialectic's alleged ignorance of 'the will to power' 2) the inability of the dialectic to answer sufficiently the question 'which one'.

Allow me to furnish quotes that demonstrate how this criticism is levelled. "In fact, to the eye of the genealogist, the labour of the negative is only a coarse approximation to the games of the will to power."<sup>12</sup> This is related to the second criticism as well, but first let us say that it may be true that the dialectic does not raise to an ontological principle - a drive in the subject characterised as 'a will to power'. The dialectic, as the name suggests is fundamentally dialogical, and it remains thus even when philosophy itself is characterised as not a dialogue.<sup>13</sup>

Categories (and indeed emotions) such as reconciliation, reek far too much of the dialectical compromise to be meaningfully staged for Deleuze, and those associations and affectations related to it are discarded as so many instances of 'bad conscience' by which he means the 'reactive conscience'.<sup>14</sup> This sense of unilateral determination seems to work as an echo of Bergson in a sense, as Bergson has been called the most Darwinian of all philosophers, and Deleuze himself, the most Bergsonian.<sup>15</sup>

The second quote that I would like to present, also from 'Nietzsche and Philosophy' "Nietzsche's work is directed against the dialectic for three reasons: it misinterprets sense because it does not know the nature of the forces which concretely appropriate phenomena; it misinterprets essence because it does not know the real element from which forces, their qualities and their relations derive;

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<sup>12</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson, Althone Press, 1983 pg 5

<sup>13</sup> Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek, trans Peter Thomas and Alberto Toscano, *Philosophy in the Present*, Cambridge, Polity, 2009.

By this I mean that even when philosophy is not *in* dialogue, as in when two philosophers may be in dialogue with each other, it may yet be dialogical as in producing a point which draws upon its own diachrony in construction.

<sup>14</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans Hugh Tomlinson, New York, Althone Press, 1983 pg 39 - 71

<sup>15</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, 'Deleuze, Bergson and the Concept of Life', *Revue internationale de philosophie*, vol. 241, no. 3, 2007, pp. 287-300.

it misinterprets change and transformation because it is content to work with permutations of abstract and unreal terms. All these deficiencies have a single origin: ignorance of the question "which one?"<sup>16</sup>. The reason that I say that this second quote is related to the first is because it hinges on the edge of asking which or rather who is the determinative principle in a decision, appropriation, or selection.

#### PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

Here, one must ask the question - is this true? Are there not dialecticians who would try and point to a primacy of a particular factor in what orients a situation? On the face of it one could cite the orthodox Marxist position of the base (or infrastructure) determining the superstructure. There are however more nuanced positions such as Althusser's 'determination in the last instance' coupled with his emphasis on the relative autonomy of the superstructure from the base<sup>17</sup>. The Althusserian position of determination in the last instance is cited to present an example of what Deleuze seems to be driving at ie. an answer to the question 'which one'. For Althusser and his notion of structural causality, what is singular and the underlying deep structure itself is the mode of production. Politics, economy, legislature etc. are modes of its expression, or its symptoms if you will.

There is also at least one other way in which we can see a dialectician trying to prefigure the essential crux in a situation via the use of a concept, here I am referring to the Leninist idea of 'the weakest link'. When for instance we chart out the fortunes of nations after the first world war, and take into account the protests against the imperial war that took place in Germany and Hungary leading to revolutions, and the mass strikes in Italy and France, we are also confronted by the reality of where the revolution actually succeeded; a largely still feudal Russia. Why is this? Did not Marx predict that it would be the most industrialised nations that would see the revolution? Lenin seeks to account for this development via his conception of the 'weakest link'. In the theatre of European empires, each an imperialist state - Russia was the weakest link, in terms of progress estimated to be a century behind western European imperialist states. It had accumulated the

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<sup>16</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans Hugh Tomlinson, New York, Althone Press, 1983 Pg 158

<sup>17</sup> Louis Althusser, 'Contradiction and Overdetermination', *For Marx*, trans by Ben Brewster, Verso, 2005, Pg 105 -III.

most contradictions in a way which the ruling class could no longer avoid or solve. In this way, I would argue that we can see fairly well accounted for instances where dialecticians very much do attempt to theorise the singularity of a situation and thus, in their own way, answer the Deleuzian question of 'which one'.<sup>18</sup>

This is not to say that their methods are the same as Deleuze's. Indeed in tracing these contours of the materialist dialectic a point of remarkably different orientation does surface. Deleuze, true to his vitalism, emphasises the affirmationist impulse in the creation of concepts, ideas, problems and situations. He is careful to distinguish what this may mean in its difference from the Hegelian notion of the beautiful soul by emphasising that "when difference becomes the object of a corresponding affirmation, they release a power of aggression and selection which destroys the beautiful soul by depriving it of its very identity and breaking its good will".<sup>19</sup>

This seems to be a consistent position that Deleuze holds on to as he appears to be greasing a similar groove in 'Nietzsche and Philosophy' as well, written four years earlier (1962) - "It is sufficient to say that dialectic is a labour and empiricism an enjoyment. And who says that there is more thought in labour than in enjoyment? Difference is the object of a practical affirmation inseparable from essence and constitutive of existence. Nietzsche's "yes" is opposed to the dialectical "no"; affirmation to dialectical negation; difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical labour; lightness, dance, to dialectical responsibilities. The empirical feeling of difference, in short hierarchy, is the essential motor of the concept, deeper and more effective than all thought about contradiction."<sup>20</sup>

In contradiction to this, the dialectic and the work of negation appears to come at philosophy from the opposite direction, enmeshed as it is in history. To quote Althusser from his essay 'Contradiction and Overdetermination' again "What else did Marx and Engels mean when they declared that history always progresses by its bad side? This obviously means the worse side for the

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<sup>18</sup> Louis Althusser, 'Contradiction and Overdetermination', *For Marx*, trans by Ben Brewster, Verso, 2005, Pg 95-98

<sup>19</sup> Gilles Deleuze, Preface, *Difference and Repetition*, trans Paul Patton, London and New York, Continuum, 1994.

<sup>20</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans Hugh Tomlinson, New York, Althone Press, 1983, Pg 9

rulers, but without stretching the sense unduly we can interpret the bad side as the bad side for those who expect history from another side ! For example, the German Social Democrats at the end of the nineteenth century imagined that they would shortly be promoted to socialist triumph by virtue of belonging to the most powerful capitalist State, then undergoing rapid economic growth, just as they were experiencing rapid electoral growth (such coincidences do occur . . .).” As time tells us this was not to be. And we see a very different history unfold independently of these visions with the rise of Nazism in Germany and the success of the revolution in Russia instead. Marxian inspired dialecticians have sought to overturn hierarchies, particularly those of class, rather than creatively produce one. This is not a dismissal of hierarchy per se, but I do wish to chart out the divergent positions vis a vis it as reflected by Deleuzian vitalism and Marxian dialectics respectively.

#### DELEUZE’S CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATION

Deleuze however seems to have a deeper problematic as his issue is with representation itself. He asserts, in the conclusion of his book, that the greatest effort in philosophy has been exerted in making representation infinite or what he refers to as orgiastic. To quote - “It is a question of extending representation as far as the too large and the too small of difference; of adding a hitherto unsuspected perspective to representation - in other words, inventing theological, scientific and aesthetic techniques which allow it to integrate the depth of difference in itself; of allowing representation to conquer the obscure; of allowing it to include the vanishing of difference which is too small and the dismemberment of difference which is too large; of allowing it to capture the power of giddiness, intoxication and cruelty, and even of death. In short, it is a question of causing a little of Dionysus's blood to flow in the organic veins of Apollo.”<sup>21</sup>

A question to ask here however, equally fundamental, is whether we have any other means of depicting thought that is non-representational, like a kind of algebraic injunction (if that is non-representational) - and here Deleuze would answer yes, but only on the condition that we may be willing to break with the

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<sup>21</sup> Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*, trans Paul Patton, London and New York, Continuum, 1994 pg 262



image of thought that has been transfixed in time.

What is Deleuze's interpretation of the image of thought? He presents it to us in its concision in the preface to the English edition of 'Difference and Repetition': "We tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it (from the point of view of the concept or the subject: for example, specific difference presupposes an identical concept in the form of a genus). We also have a tendency to subordinate it to resemblance (from the point of view of perception), to opposition (from the point of view of predicates), and to analogy (from the point of view of judgement). In other words, we do not think difference in itself."<sup>22</sup> These moves are his account of how difference has been subordinated to representation. I think now it would be dawning on the reader that Deleuze's conception of difference is not a conceptual idea of difference but is perhaps more akin to a bodily sensation. Recall he says that empiricism is a joy and dialectics a responsibility. Here Deleuze's way out of the trap of representation lies in trying to think the logic of sensation in its differential advantage from a passive homogeneous construction of concepts. Another way of putting it is by saying that for Deleuze, being is not a category which subsumes the particularity of its empirical manifestations. Rather, the sensing of the latter's differences itself contribute to a lived and non-representational ideation which is the element that Deleuze thinks through.

This is to have major consequences in Deleuze's vision of philosophy as a whole as he attempts to overturn how traditional ontologies such as those of Aristotle seemed to have functioned. He overturns them in his assertion that Being is not a category, for categories tend to subsume the difference of particularities in a manner which supposedly relates their essence in an analogical relation with the conceptualisation of the category itself.<sup>23</sup> This two step procedure is marked as the way dialectics proceeds in formulating its binary of the universal and the particular. This is not to say that Deleuze doesn't use binaries himself, but rather that his conceptual creation is animated by the differential relation between binaries as they are formed that bespeak of a vital relation in thought which is what guides his discursive apparatus, almost as an intuition which Bergson spoke of that animates the real core and stakes of what

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, Preface to the English edition, Pg xv

<sup>23</sup> For this insight I am indebted to an unpublished teaching document by Ray Brassier titled 'Deleuze's Critique of Representation'.

is underway in thinking.

It should be said at this stage that the Althusserian texts quoted earlier was written after 'Difference and Repetition' so Deleuze probably didn't have the advantage of having read it when he characterises dialectics as he does. More importantly Deleuze's target among the dialecticians was not Marx, Lenin or Althusser, but Hegel. Here it would be worth bringing forth what is the Hegelian dialectic which Deleuze militates against.

#### A WORD ON THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC

Remember that Deleuze's chief call for complaint is the ontologisation of contradiction that engenders Hegel's dialectic. This contradiction forces a concept to meet its opposite giving rise to negativity in the philosophical sense. The journey of consciousness then is motored by this encounter with negativity and negation, thus forcing the philosopher to think the compossibility of apparently disparate terms. This is also, as you may imagine, an effort to think the commonality of disparate terms, or at least a commonality in their conditions of production which when brought forth and posited will allow us to view the situation of thought we are in, in new terms and in a new light.

Yet, this is not how Hegel begins his philosophical method however. He begins rather with the analysis of simple universals such as 'this' and 'now' which when thought about reveal nothing more than the bare being of the object or worldview without any predicates. Yet in their truth, such as in the statement 'now is night' we have a postulation in which nothing can change when it is written down. This postulate however meets its negation in the following afternoon bringing to light a scenario where we would have to posit that now is no longer night but perhaps mid-day. Negation then is written into the heart of truth and it is precisely such encounters with negativity that propel the Hegelian dialectic to and past its distinct moments.<sup>24</sup>

The heart of truth then emerges as something like sheer contradiction. This in a nutshell is what dialectical negativity encapsulates. It is not a search for a cause inasmuch as it is the positing of predicates in their radical contingencies,

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<sup>24</sup> Hegel, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans by A. V. Miller, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018, Pg 62

allowing us to historicise and better contextualise our terms. Even Althusser's later critique of Hegel does much in replicating its central concept of contradiction.

It is precisely such a dip into negativity that Deleuze wants his art of concept creation to avoid at all costs and which is why he asserts that "The originality of Bergson's conception (of difference) resides in showing that internal difference does not go, and is not required to go as far as contradiction, alterity, and negativity, because these three notions are in fact less profound than itself, or they are viewpoints only from the outside."<sup>25</sup> How then can we get to the roots of the Deleuzian inspiration of his philosophical endeavours? A small detour through Bergson again may be warranted.

#### SUGGESTION AND THE SUBJECT IN BERGSON

In what sense does Deleuze assert that contradiction, alterity and negativity are less profound than internal difference? An example from the realm of aesthetics may serve to illustrate the point. What I believe is insightful in the following example is that it may illustrate how the vitalist paradigm is useful in thinking the autonomy of agents vis-a-vis each other, just as it also suggests a model for their interaction. To quote, "art aims at impressing feelings on us rather than expressing them; it suggests them to us, and willingly dispenses with the imitation of nature when it finds a more efficacious means....It follows that the feeling of the beautiful is no specific feeling, but that every feeling experienced by us will assume an aesthetic character, provided that it has been suggested, and not caused."<sup>26</sup> Implicature is here privileged over explicitness because of its suggestiveness as an impression causing mode, especially in the aesthetic register. This is a far subtler mode of thinking the transitivity of our impressions than any mechanical causality. Though, it may be said that it does not seem to be diametrically different from what Althusser terms as expressive causality in Hegel.

#### EXPRESSIVE CAUSALITY IN HEGEL

Expressive causality may be thought as a model via which we may think causality, and it is a sophisticated one. In essence it is a form of causality that acknowledges

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<sup>25</sup> Deleuze, Gilles. *Desert Islands: And Other Texts, 1953-1974*. Edited by David Lapoujade, trans Mike Taormina, Los Angeles, Semiotext (E), 2004. Pg 39

<sup>26</sup> Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, trans by F L Pogson, New York, Dover Publications Inc, 2001, Pg 16-17.

an inner essence which outward phenomenal forms may be expressive of. The example that comes to mind for instance is a skewed law that discriminates on the basis of religion being an outward expression of the ideology of Hindutva, or Hindu supremacy that has come to preponderance in India in the recent decade. Here are Althusser's own words defining it (expressive causality) - "It presupposes in principle that the whole in question be reducible to an inner essence, of which the elements of the whole are then no more than the phenomenal forms of expression, the inner principle of the essence being present at each point in the whole, such that at each moment it is possible to write the immediately adequate equation: such and such an element (economic, political, legal, literary, religious, etc., in Hegel) = the inner essence of the whole."<sup>27</sup>

I believe such a construction may even be useful in modelling hegemony as a phenomenon. The prime reason I cite this here however is to indicate that Marxians too have made sophisticated models for causality, and even though these forms of causality are explicitly causal and not implicitly solicitous such as the sense of beauty that Bergson invoked I wanted to show how even a Hegelian account of causality may still serve as a sophisticated model for thinking aesthetic (or political) relations.

### ŽIŽEK'S CRITIQUE OF DELEUZE

I would like to round up this paper with Žižek's critique of Deleuze as evinced in 'Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences' (2004). To appreciate this critique however it is important to mention how Deleuze's theory of desire differs from that of psychoanalysis. In psychoanalysis desire always has an object that it lacks. This is substantiated in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory by object *petite à*, which names the object cause of desire.

Deleuze's theory of desire is however not like this. Here is a quote that illustrates the difference - "There is, in fact, a joy that is immanent to desire as though desire were filled by itself and its contemplations, a joy that implies no lack or impossibility and is not measured by pleasure since it is what distributes intensities of pleasure and prevents them from being suffused by anxiety, shame,

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<sup>27</sup> Louis Althusser et al, *Reading Capital: The Complete Edition*, trans Ben Brewster and David Fernbach, London and New York, Verso, 2015, Pg 256

and guilt.”<sup>28</sup>

This model of desire is read into courtly love as well as a form that finds fulfilment in its own positing and hence lacks nothing. (Ibid)

In coming to Žižek’s critique now, he directly challenges Deleuze’s reading of Hegel, alleging that Deleuze makes a straw-man out of him. Here is Žižek, quoting Deleuze and explaining - “whereas according to Hegel any given ‘thing differs with itself because it differs first with all that it is not,’ i.e. with all the objects to which it relates, Deleuze’s Bergson affirms that a ‘thing differs with itself first, immediately,’ on account of the ‘internal explosive force’ it carries within itself.”<sup>29</sup> If ever there was a straw-man, it is Deleuze’s Hegel: is not Hegel’s basic insight precisely that every external opposition is grounded in the thing’s immanent self-opposition, i.e., that every external difference implies self-difference? A finite being differs from other (finite) things because it is already not identical with itself.”<sup>30</sup>

This act of self-differentiating is, admittedly, excluded by Deleuze in his depiction of Hegel. This is significant for as Žižek underlies, it is probably the point where Hegel is closest to Deleuze himself who speaks about his own process of self differentiating when accounting for the relation between the actual and the virtual as covered earlier in this essay.

There are marked differences however between Žižek’s Lacanian framework and that of Deleuze in their theorisation of desire. Even if we were to entertain Žižek’s suggestion of a substitutability between the Deleuzian concept of desiring machines and the Lacanian concept of drive, desire for Lacan is marked by its impasse. Desire in other words, for Lacan, finds every way in which it can repeat its impasse in its act of expressing itself. For Deleuze however desire at its purest is the free flow of libido.<sup>31</sup> Žižek’s characterisation of this difference is that for Deleuze desire is a ‘body without organs’ whereas for Lacan it is an ‘organ without a body’. He clarifies that what Deleuze is fighting is not organs per se but organism, or the hierarchisation of functions in a body, each in its designated

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<sup>28</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans Brian Massumi, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, Pg 155 - 156.

<sup>29</sup> Deleuze, Gilles. *Desert Islands: And Other Texts, 1953-1974*, trans by Mike Taormina, Los Angeles, Semiotext (E), 2004, Pg 42.

<sup>30</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences*, New York, Routledge Classics, 2012, Pg X

<sup>31</sup> Ibid Pg XII

place. This is a fight against corporatism/organicism. Žižek's question here hence is why body without organs, and not organs without bodies? He accepts that the concept of organ implies a subordination to a goal but his wager is that this is why their autonomization would be all the more subversive.

## CONCLUSION

In summing up what I have tried to do with this paper, I sought initially to present Bergson as Deleuze takes him up as an inspiration. This was done to depict what Deleuze builds on in his philosophy, namely the topic of difference and differentiation. This fed into an examination of Deleuze's critique of the dialectic as evinced in 'Nietzsche and Philosophy'. I then sought to present a preliminary response from the dialectician's camp via an account of Althusser and his concept of determination in the last instance which in my view answers to an extent the charge that Deleuze levels against dialectics (that it is unable to think the singular determinative principle in an encounter or multiplicity). Subsequently I represent Deleuze's deeper problem that is his critique of representation itself, and specify that his real target in critiquing the dialectic is Hegel. This warrants a brief look at Hegel and the process of negation that his dialectic enters into which is very much what Deleuze wants to distance his art of concept creation from. In what a possible alternative to Hegelian negation may be, I present Bergson's examination of aesthetic sense or beauty and its suggestiveness as an example. In way of a response I try and show how Hegelian expressive causality as depicted by Althusser is also capable of representing aesthetic and political relations and perhaps in a more determinate manner. I end with presenting Žižek more contemporary critique of Deleuze.

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