

## THE LOGIC OF CONTRADICTION

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**ABSTRACT:** This essay investigates the implicit foundation of classical logical principles — identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle — showing how they presuppose the original distinction between being and nothingness. The analysis of intuitionistic, fuzzy, and paraconsistent logics reveals that, despite their attempt to go beyond such principles, they structurally depend on them. The inquiry revolves around the fundamental question: «why being rather than nothing?», and extends to the meaning of self-referential paradoxes and cosmogonic myths that express the primordial indistinct. In this perspective, contradiction is not an anomaly to be avoided, but the original structure from which all determination emerges. The essay thus proposes a first step toward a logic grounded in contradiction, understood as a speculative and ontological principle.

**KEYWORDS:** Contradiction; Classical logic; Nothingness; Foundation; Ontology

### I. INTRODUCTION

From its very beginnings, Western thought has grounded its language and logic on the distinction between being and non-being. The fundamental principles of classical logic — identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle — express this structural necessity: to make determination, difference, and opposition possible. But is it legitimate to assume such principles as self-evident? Is it possible to think distinction without already founding it? And what does such founding imply, if not the absolute exclusion of nothingness and contradiction?

This essay departs from such questions to investigate the original bond between logic and ontology. Through a critical analysis of non-classical logics — intuitionistic, fuzzy, and paraconsistent — it shows how even theories that aim to overcome classical principles end up presupposing them. The reflection then

moves beyond the technical form of formal systems, questioning what makes any determination possible: the original structure of being. Here the fundamental speculative question arises: «Why being and not rather nothing?», in Leibniz's formulation and in its ontological radicalization by Heidegger.

From this question, the text traverses the key moments of philosophical tradition: the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz, the *Ungrund* in Schelling, the dialectic of being in Hegel, the event of nothingness in Heidegger, and the unbroken identity in Parmenides. Even Gorgias, through the logical absurdity of predication of non-being, reveals the limits of absolute distinction. This brings to light how the attempt to exclude contradiction entails its hidden assumption.

From this perspective, contradiction is no longer an error to be avoided, but the very foundation of the distinction between being and nothingness. It reveals itself in the structure of the great logical paradoxes — from Russell to the liar — and in cosmogonic myths narrating the birth of being from the indistinct. The essay thus follows a double trajectory: on one side, it shows how the formal structures of logic are grounded in an ontological demand; on the other, it proposes a speculative foundation of logic in contradiction itself, understood as a generative principle.

The goal is not to negate the classical principles, but to understand them as the results of an original scission in which coherence and incoherence mutually imply each other. The path that follows intertwines formal logic, the history of thought, self-referential paradoxes, and mythical figures to outline a first step toward a logic of contradiction — a logic capable of thinking itself from its own limit and of grounding truth as that which arises from the truth of its opposite.

## II. THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDATION

Every logical system is ultimately founded on three fundamental principles: the principle of identity, according to which every entity is itself ( $A = A$ ); the principle of non-contradiction, which states that it is impossible for the same thing to both be itself and not be itself simultaneously and in the same respect ( $\neg(A \wedge \neg A)$ ); and the principle of the excluded middle, which holds that for any proposition, the alternative necessarily applies: either it is true, or it is false ( $A \vee \neg A$ ), with no intermediate possibilities.

These principles do not function as isolated axioms, but as convergent

articulations of a single original act: the affirmation — or thought — that something «is», that is, that it possesses a specific determination, distinguishable from all others. To affirm that something is means simultaneously that it is identical to itself (principle of identity), that it does not coincide with its own opposite (principle of non-contradiction), and that it necessarily falls within the alternative between being and non-being (principle of the excluded middle). If something is thought as both identical to itself and, at the same time, to its opposite, it becomes indeterminate — and therefore unthinkable as a «something»: it takes the form of absolute indifference, that is, the dissolution of being.

A basic example clarifies this structure: to say that a car is blue implies (i) that it is identical to itself as a «blue car» (principle of identity); (ii) that it is not, simultaneously and in the same respect, «not blue» (principle of non-contradiction); (iii) that necessarily something either is a «blue car» or it is not (principle of the excluded middle). No entity can be posited outside this original structure of identity and opposition, except at the cost of contradiction — that is, of losing all determination: in such a case, what is affirmed is no longer an entity, but corresponds to indeterminate being — that is, to absolute nothingness.

Already Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, recognized in the principle of non-contradiction the «first principle» ( $\pi\rho\tilde{\omega}\tau\sigma\tau\eta\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\dot{\eta}$ ) and the «firmest of all archai» ( $\beta\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\eta\ \dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\dot{\eta}$ ), observing how anyone who attempts to deny it inevitably presupposes it. Every attempt at denial in fact implies an act of distinction, and therefore an implicit recourse to the very structure it seeks to reject. To say that something «is not» already establishes a discrimination between being and non-being, making it impossible to escape the validity of the principle. In logical terms, it is not possible to deny the possibility of negation without contradiction: in other words, one cannot choose not to choose, think without thinking, be without being.

The possibility of the entity, as expressed by the fundamental principles of logic, finds its foundation in the impossibility of absolute nothingness. Within this onto-logical horizon, nothing can be posited without the exclusion of nothingness — understood as the pure negation of being. And there is no place or time in which the opposite can be demonstrated: that nothingness might appear as an entity among other entities, since every time and every place is determined by

the logical truth of being — this time and not another, this place and not a different one — while nothingness, as the negation of all distinction, and thus of every time and place, is by principle unplaceable within any physical or non-physical reality. At the beginning of Western thought, Parmenides affirmed: «Being is and nothing is not», emphasizing the impossibility of speaking or thinking nothingness without at the same time affirming it in its being. To think nothingness means, in fact, to confer upon it a determination, an identity — to recognize it as a «this» and not an «other» — thereby removing it from the very conception that defines it precisely as the negation of all predicative possibility.

But if nothingness is, ultimately, unthinkable, if its presence is by principle negated by the horizon of being, what makes this very thought possible — that is, its determination as absolute negation? And if determinate being, in constituting itself as difference, were the most universal horizon, beyond which nothing can appear, in what sense could nothingness be excluded from it without, by that very act, being reintegrated into it?

How can nothingness be said to differ from being, if the very category of difference belongs to being? What meaning can there be, then, in the idea that nothingness is distinct from being, if such distinction cannot be thought without reproducing the very conditions that nothingness is defined as excluding? Nor is a «different difference» conceivable, since every attempt at distinguishing remains an act of differentiation. And the difference of difference, as the negation of difference itself, finally resolves into contradiction: that of a difference that denies itself as such, becoming the indifference of all difference.

The problem thus shifts to the ground of foundation: what makes possible the very affirmation of logical principles? And what condition makes the original opposition between being and nothingness thinkable — the opposition from which they derive their meaning and necessity?

## 1. INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC

Intuitionistic logic, developed by Brouwer and formalized by Heyting, differs from classical logic in its rejection of the law of the excluded middle as a universally valid principle. For the intuitionist, mathematical truth is not an objective property, but a subjective act of construction: a proposition is true only if a constructive proof can be exhibited. It follows that the statement  $\langle\varphi \vee \neg\varphi\rangle$

is not always valid, but only when a proof for either  $\varphi$  or  $\neg\varphi$  is known.

For example, the statement «There exists a prime number greater than  $10^{100}$  whose final digit is 7» cannot be considered true or false until a construction either confirms or refutes it. The law of the excluded middle therefore does not hold in the absence of a constructive proof.

However, the very rejection of the automatism of the law of the excluded middle implies an oppositional logical structure: the core intuitionistic statement («a proposition is true only if it is constructible») implicitly denies that a proposition can be true without construction. This denial presupposes the exclusion of its opposite, thus invoking the very principle it seeks to reject in its universal validity, that is, independently of the possibility of an actual construction. The distinction between constructive and non-constructive truth implies a determined form of opposition, grounded in identity and coherence.

Once a construction is provided, the intuitionist accepts that  $\varphi$  is true and  $\neg\varphi$  is false. In such determinate cases, the operational use of classical principles re-emerges: the law of non-contradiction and, indirectly, the excluded middle. The suspension of judgment never means that both  $\varphi$  and  $\neg\varphi$  are true; rather, it expresses an epistemic inability to decide. Coherence is not denied, but made conditional on the availability of a construction.

Even in the empirical domain, intuitionistic logic maintains its oppositional structure. If one states «It will rain tomorrow», the truth of the proposition cannot be assigned now — but this does not mean that the alternatives are equivalent: one of them will be true, even if we do not yet know which. The intuitionist rejects unfounded truth, not logical coherence.

In conclusion, the intuitionist's rejection of the excluded middle does not abolish the distinction between truth and falsehood, but makes its application conditional on proof. Intuitionistic logic, while criticizing classical bivalence, continues to operate within its fundamental oppositional structure.

## 2. FUZZY LOGIC

Fuzzy logic, introduced by Lotfi Zadeh in 1965, goes beyond the rigid true/false dichotomy of classical logic by introducing a continuous range of truth values between 0 and 1. Statements such as «This room is warm» can be 70% true, allowing for a graded representation of vague or indeterminate situations.

In this context, the principle of the excluded middle loses its absolute function: both  $\varphi$  and  $\neg\varphi$  can be partially true. For instance, one might say that «Marco is young to a degree of 60%», expressing a judgment that cannot be formulated in classical terms. Fuzzy concepts thus find a more experience-congruent logical expression.

However, even this flexibility is governed by a coherent structure. To assert that « $\varphi$  is true to 70%» implies that it is neither true to 100% nor false to 0%, thereby establishing a distinction between logically incompatible states. This distinction is grounded in the principles of identity (each value is identical to itself), non-contradiction (no value can both be and not be to the same degree and in the same respect), and an attenuated form of the law of the excluded middle (for any given value, it either holds to a certain degree or does not hold to that same degree).

The consistency of fuzzy logic is ensured by well-defined algebraic operations: t-norms (for conjunctions) and t-conorms (for disjunctions). A t-norm such as the minimum function determines that the truth value of « $\varphi$  and  $\psi$ » equals  $\min(\varphi, \psi)$ ; a t-conorm such as the maximum function assigns to « $\varphi$  or  $\psi$ » the value  $\max(\varphi, \psi)$ . Although more flexible than Boolean operations, these functions adhere to fundamental properties (commutativity, associativity, monotonicity, and identity element) that guarantee the system's internal consistency.

Ultimately, fuzzy logic, while rejecting bivalent truth, does not abandon the foundations of classical logic but reformulates them in gradual terms. Every distinction between truth values, every meaningful operation, requires a differential structure that presupposes the principles of coherence and opposition: what enables fuzzy logic to function is the very structure that classical logic has formalized.

### 3. PARACONSISTENT LOGICS

Paraconsistent logics were developed to avoid the principle of explosion, according to which any proposition follows from a contradiction. To prevent this destructive consequence, they allow that a proposition  $\varphi$  and its negation  $\neg\varphi$  may both be true in certain contexts, without causing the entire inferential system to collapse.

Among the main examples are:

- LP (Priest): admits the coexistence of truth and falsity, but restricts inference rules;
- RM<sub>3</sub>: introduces an intermediate truth value to represent contradiction;
- C<sub>n</sub> (da Costa): allows degrees of consistency and controlled contradictions;
- PAL: distinguishes informational states through formal annotations.

In many cases, the admitted contradictions are more apparent than real. A lightbulb that «works and does not work» at different times does not constitute a logical contradiction. A genuine contradiction implies that  $\varphi$  and  $\neg\varphi$  are both true simultaneously and in the same respect. To manage such cases, paraconsistent logics define internal domains in which contradiction is tolerated without invalidating the system.

Yet the very distinction between admissible and inadmissible contradictions implies a regulatory framework that selects among them. Not every contradiction is accepted as true: if it were, no distinction could be maintained. Coherence is thus preserved as the ultimate criterion, even where one seeks to surpass it. Paraconsistent logics do not assume contradiction as an absolute principle, but rather delimit it, operating within a horizon that still differentiates between contradiction and non-contradiction.

Priest's dialetheism represents a more radical position. In *Contradiction*, he argues that the liar paradox («this sentence is false») is not an anomaly, but a genuine contradiction. This perspective acknowledges the real coexistence, in certain cases, of truth and falsity, making contradiction a central philosophical and ontological theme. However, even in this case, the distinction between ordinary and paradoxical propositions remains necessary: the exception is thinkable only within a context that isolates and distinguishes it.

In conclusion, paraconsistent logics show that it is possible to tolerate some contradictions without causing logic to collapse. But in selecting, delimiting, and controlling contradictions, they demonstrate that contradiction cannot be assumed as a principle without dissolving the system itself. Coherence remains the indispensable regulatory criterion: any logic that aims to preserve validity must distinguish what contradicts from what does not.

### III. BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: THE ORIGINAL CONTRADICTION OF DETERMINATION

#### *III.1. Classical Logic as Ontological Structure*

The validity of the fundamental principles of classical logic is not confined to the theoretical or formal domain; it constitutes the necessary condition for semantic determination, linguistic coherence, and operational effectiveness at every level of experience — discursive, practical, and emotional. Any content that aspires to be understood, communicated, or acted upon presupposes, explicitly or implicitly, the distinction between what is and what is not, and the exclusion of contradiction as a condition of intelligibility.

In ordinary language, this structure is expressed in the requirement that every statement refer to coherent states of affairs. Saying «I am cold» and «I am not cold» only makes sense if the two statements are not equivalent. Even the affective sphere, however fluid, is articulated in determinate states: feeling pain and not feeling it are not interchangeable conditions. The possibility of experiencing and communicating internal states depends on the stability of the oppositions that make those states recognizable.

One might object that inner life is often traversed by opposing tensions — one can love and hate the same person, desire and fear the same event. However, this does not constitute logical contradiction: rather, it is the coexistence of distinct affective states or judgments directed at the same object from different perspectives. Even emotional ambivalence presupposes the coherent distinction between the poles involved.

In formalized languages and scientific practices, logical coherence is even more essential. A theory is meaningful only if it is free of internal contradictions; a model works only if it operates on coherent relations among its variables. In symbolic or computational contexts, contradiction is not merely a conceptual error: it is the error par excellence, as it undermines the inferential and operational validity of the system.

Even in literary and philosophical contexts, where paradox and contradiction serve as expressive tools, they are never assumed as fully determinate states of reality. When such an assumption appears, it results in a logical short-circuit that reveals the impossibility of such a reality. Rather, contradiction operates as a

critical threshold, capable of challenging established structures of meaning.

In Orwell's *1984*, the concept of «doublethink» does not normalize contradiction; it portrays it as an extreme tension that exposes the implosion of meaning and coherence. Contradiction is never a determinate state, but a means of pushing thought beyond its limits, while preserving the distinction between the determination of reality and the ultimate meaning of contradiction.

Nonetheless, throughout the history of thought — from ancient philosophy to mysticism, from idealist dialectics to Eastern traditions — contradiction has often been recognized as an expression of the deepest truth. In Heraclitus, as the unifying tension of opposites; in Nāgārjuna, as the radical emptying of reified identity; in Cusanus, as coincidentia oppositorum at the peak of negative theology; in Hegel, as the dialectical principle of truth itself; in Taoism, as dynamic balance within the unity of the Tao; in Zen, as experiential paradox dissolving conceptual dualism; in Meister Eckhart, as mystical experience of the One embracing opposites; in Heidegger, as an abyssal opening between being and nothingness. In all these perspectives, contradiction is not rejected but welcomed as the ultimate threshold of thought, the place where being reveals itself as irreducible to univocal determination.

However, it does not present itself as a stable content: it cannot be logically determined or preserved without dissolving. To admit it means to negate all identity and distinction, thereby dissolving the very condition of possibility. For this reason, classical logic is not a convention, but a transcendental structure in an ontological sense: the constitutive principle of every articulation of being and meaning.

Only in fully recognizing this necessity can the most radical question arise: where does this necessity originate? What is the ultimate foundation that allows being to appear as distinct, as determined, as opposed to nothingness?

### *III.2. The Foundation of Being in the Original Contradiction*

#### *III.2.1. Reason, Foundation, and the Impossibility of Ultimate Justification*

«Why is there something rather than nothing?»

This is the question first explicitly posed by Leibniz and later radicalized by Heidegger, especially in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*. It is not a mere curiosity or

one problem among others: as Heidegger affirms, it asserts itself as the most vast and originary question—one that concerns being in its totality, not asking how or why something in particular is, but why there is anything at all. In Heidegger's formulation, this question does not seek an explanation, but opens an abyss: it shows that being, in its occurrence, rests on nothing—or more precisely, that it lacks any foundation that does not itself reopen the very question: why is there something like a foundation rather than nothing?

In Leibniz's thought, the question is formulated explicitly for the first time and assigned a central role in a metaphysical system. In the *Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison*, he writes: «The first question one has the right to ask will be: why is there something rather than nothing? For nothing is simpler and easier than something». Nothing, lacking all determination, requires no justification; being, instead, calls reason into question. The inquiry therefore concerns not any particular entity, but the very possibility of being in its radical opposition to nothingness.

For Leibniz, the answer lies in the principle of sufficient reason: nothing exists or occurs without a reason why it is so and not otherwise. He distinguishes between two orders of truth: contingent truths of fact, which require an external cause (e.g., «it is raining in Bologna today»), and necessary truths of reason, whose negation implies contradiction (such as « $2+2=4$ » or « $A=A$ »). The former point to further explanations; the latter admit no possible alternative and are self-evident.

If everything that is must have a reason, then even the totality of being, insofar as it appears as something, must have one. Thus arises, within Leibniz's system, the need for an entity whose essence implies existence: a being that cannot not be, that depends on nothing else to exist. This entity is God: the necessary being, in whom everything that exists finds its foundation.

But it is precisely this assumption—that the totality of being is «something»—that must be called into question: what is totality is not simply an entity, but the contradictory entity, which grounds itself through negation, wherein the impossibility of separating foundation from abyss, reason from nothingness, is revealed.

Leibniz's concept of God contains its own reason, not in the Spinozist sense of *causa sui*, but as a necessary being whose essence implies existence. In this way,

the contradiction of a foundation that grounds itself seems formally avoided. Yet precisely because divine necessity refers to nothing else, but is fully justified within its own essence, the self-implicating structure reemerges. That which is to ground everything else ends up grounding itself as well, reiterating the tension between foundation and founded. How can a foundation be valid in itself without falling into contradiction? And above all: why this essence that necessarily implies existence—and not nothingness? If nothing can escape the question of why, then not even the necessary being can elude it without reintroducing, in another form, the original contradiction.

Thus, the principle that claims to ground everything collapses back upon itself, opening a threshold where the distinction between grounding and grounded dissolves into contradiction. The fundamental question, taken in its radicality, no longer merely demands an account of the contingent world, but affects the very structure of the thinkable. It no longer asks simply why A rather than not-A, but why the very alternative A or not-A should hold—an alternative in which the totality of being is already implied. The question thereby comes to interrogate the principle of the excluded middle, which for Leibniz—alongside identity and non-contradiction—constitutes a truth of reason, self-evident. These principles do not admit external foundation: their validity is rooted in the rationality of the first cause, which coincides with God.

However, if the nothingness opposed to «something» is contradiction itself—A and not-A together—the question reopens: why something, and not contradiction? Why logical truth, and not its negation?

Nothingness is no longer mere absence, but the possibility that something might also be its own opposite. The original question transforms: why determined being, and not contradictory being?

On one hand, the principle of sufficient reason demands a reason for everything; on the other, logical principles appear as limits beyond which only contradiction is possible. But if even these limits require a reason, then contradiction reveals itself as their implicit foundation.

The fundamental question turns against the very theoretical framework that produced it, exposing a contradiction internal to metaphysical foundation itself. From here, a new speculative path opens: no longer to seek a cause of being, but to interrogate the possibility of the original distinction between being and

nothing—a distinction that must be rethought from a dimension prior to logic.

This is the direction in which Schelling's reflection develops, marking a decisive turn in post-Kantian philosophy. After Kant and Fichte, the dualism between spirit and nature demands a rethinking of the very foundation of distinction: neither subject nor object can be entirely reduced to the other. For Schelling, one must trace back to that which precedes all separation: a principle prior to the distinction between being and nothing, positive and negative.

This principle is the *Ungrund*, the groundless ground, devoid of all determination, in which being and nothing are not yet distinct, but co-originate as powers in tension. Here, origin is not unity, but split—an as-yet formless contradiction. As he writes in the *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*, in God there must be a ground that is not his essence, but that from which the essence arises. The origin, then, is not identity, but latent conflict.

However, in attempting to think the *Ungrund* as what precedes all form, Schelling ends up conferring on it a distinct status, effectively turning it into an entity. Thus, the undifferentiated is once again differentiated, and the foundation remains tied to the structure it seeks to transcend. This is Hegel's objection, who criticizes the idea of an absolute devoid of determinations as «the night in which all cows are black»: a hollow abstraction incapable of generating reality.

For Hegel, by contrast, the indeterminate is the point of departure precisely insofar as it determines itself. Pure being, being absolutely without content, is indistinguishable from nothing. This identity is not a negation of logic, but its originary act: it is from the contradiction between being and nothing that becoming arises. Every determination emerges as a negation of the indeterminate but retains the negative as a constitutive moment.

In this sense, truth is not identity with itself, but movement through its opposite: *Aufhebung*. Every concept is such only insofar as it negates and mediates itself. Contradiction, far from being an error, is the very law of reality. Hegel writes: «Contradiction is the root of all movement and all life; it is only insofar as it contains a contradiction that something moves, has impulse and activity».

Heidegger too resumes the fundamental question, but to show that it is not resolved in an answer, but opens an abyss. Being is not an entity nor a cause, but that which manifests by withdrawing: nothingness is not simply the opposite of

being, but its condition of possibility. In *Was ist Metaphysik?*, Heidegger writes: «The nothing nihilates» (Das Nichts nichtet): nothingness suspends all determination, making the openness to beings possible.

Heidegger does not explicitly speak of contradiction, but describes a structure in which being is what it is only by negating itself. Its truth cannot be grounded but is given in withdrawal: it is in nothingness that being manifests itself as such. In this sense, he resumes and deepens what Schelling had intuited with the *Ung rund*, going beyond the distinction between foundation and abyss.

Whereas for Leibniz contradiction is to be avoided, for Hegel it becomes the very structure of the thinkable, and for Heidegger, the truth of being opens precisely as negation. The fundamental question does not lead to a resolute principle, but to the recognition that every foundation is division, every truth traversed by the nothing that grounds it.

### III.2.2. The Contradictory Being as the Origin of Logic and Being

After posing the fundamental question — «why something, rather than nothing?» — this chapter delves into its radical nature, tracing back to the origin of ontological thought to rediscover that primordial gesture in which being asserted itself as an absolute principle. From this assertion — which excluded nothingness as an impossibility — emerged, centuries later, a question that no longer takes being for granted but interrogates its very self-evidence. Thus, the apparent obviousness of being is suspended, along with its claimed absoluteness: being no longer imposes itself as an undisputed starting point but as a possibility that, precisely because it opposes nothingness, demands to be thought in its necessity.

This original gesture belongs to Parmenides of Elea, the first to conceive of being as that which is unconditionally, excluding nothingness not as mere absence but as the absolute absence of being — as that which, if affirmed, contradicts being and implies its annihilation. «Being is, nothingness is not»: from this opposition arises the fundamental structure of Western thought, founded on absolute distinctions — between true and false, good and evil, logical and illogical.

In Parmenidean thought, being is one, eternal, immutable, and full: a totality devoid of becoming, admitting neither otherness nor negation. However,

precisely in this absoluteness lies a limit: if being is everything, nothing can exist outside it; but to affirm that nothingness is not still means to think of it, and thus to refer to it. Every exclusion implies a reference and, in this sense, reintegrates nothingness into the sphere of being. The paradox is that, by saying «being is» and «nothingness is not», one ends up treating both as if they were something — two distinct realities — transforming the original opposition into a pair of entities. In doing so, however, one forgets that nothingness does not simply designate something that does not exist but the very negation of anything; and that being, in turn, is not an entity among others but the absolute affirmation of the possibility of something.

The tension becomes clearer by distinguishing two fundamental senses of being: on one hand, predicative being — saying that something is; on the other, substantivized being — the unconditional totality of what is. The former corresponds to the Parmenidean intuition: wherever thought turns, it finds something that is. But when being is thought of as an absolute totality, it no longer refers to an entity but to the entirety of entities, to that which admits nothing outside itself.

Parmenides oscillates between these two senses but continues to treat the totality of being as an entity, a predictable whole. Being is identified with what is, while nothingness remains excluded as absolute negation. In this transition lies the root of Western metaphysics: being is affirmed as determined presence, opposed to nothingness as its equally determined absence. In this identification of substantivized being with predicative being arises metaphysical reification: being is objectified, fixed as a stable identity, forgetting — as Heidegger has shown — its own ontological difference, an irreducible difference that testifies to being's belonging to nothingness.

Now, if nothing exists outside of being, nothing can delimit it. Being, therefore, has no boundaries, nor can it be situated relative to something else: it is infinite. Every determination is already included within it, and no otherness can define it from the outside. Upon this intuition, the reflection of Melissus of Samos is grafted, who states: «It has neither beginning nor end, but is without limits». Being, not being generated nor corruptible, is eternal and limitless: it cannot be born nor perish, thus it cannot be circumscribed.

Gorgias of Leontini pushes this perspective to its extreme consequences. In

the treatise «On Non-Being or On Nature» he writes: «If [being] is eternal, it has no beginning; if it has no beginning, it is infinite; if it is infinite, it is in no place; if it is in no place, it does not exist». Being, thought of as absolute totality, thus dissolves into an indeterminacy that equates to non-being: the absence of any limit renders it devoid of identity, and therefore unassimilable to an entity.

It follows that only a determined entity can properly be or not be. But being as such — as well as nothingness — exceeds this opposition: it includes and simultaneously suspends it. Nothingness is thus not simply the opposite of being but its internal truth. When being is thought in its absolute indeterminacy, it coincides with nothingness: not two opposing terms, but a single original reality, structurally contradictory.

The figure that best expresses this truth is not the closed and perfect sphere of Parmenides but that of an open totality: a sphere that, in attempting to close itself, ends up reintegrating what it sought to exclude; that, by including everything, dissolves every distinction, to the point of no longer comprehending anything in a determined way. The truth of being, then, is not the identity of an entity coherently opposed to its opposite, but a contradictory identity: an identity that, in affirming itself, can only negate itself, and that precisely in this coincidence of affirmation and negation renounces any stable form of itself.

This paradoxical structure — in which being, in seeking to close itself, opens to its own opposite — finds its most rigorous formulation in Hegelian dialectic. As Hegel writes in the *Science of Logic*, «the first being is determined as indeterminate being»: being, as infinite, cannot posit itself except by determining itself, that is, by entering into opposition with what is finite. But this opposition, at the very moment it constitutes itself, is sublated: absolute being affirms itself only by negating itself as such, and precisely in this act of self-negation reaffirms itself as a dialectical overcoming (Aufhebung) of the opposition. However, this overcoming does not erase the contradiction but preserves it as its own foundation: being, in attempting to surpass every opposition, ends up opposing the opposition itself, thus it opposes and does not oppose — and so determines itself, once again, within contradiction.

The indeterminate — that is, being grasped in its totality, which coincides with nothingness — becomes determined only by reflecting upon itself, in a movement that is at once immediate, as absolute, and mediated, as relative.

Nothingness, in this dynamic, opposes predicative being — the individual things we say "are" — but includes it as its own essence: it opposes and at the same time does not oppose, founding in its contradiction the very principle from which the coherence of determined being emerges.

But precisely because every determination arises from this original opposition, it is never autonomous: it defines itself only in relation to what it negates. In this sense, being itself reveals itself as a network of differences and relations, in which every entity is intelligible only insofar as it is contextualized. The principle of sufficient reason is rooted here: not as a simple causal link, but as a structural requirement of understanding. Every determination is constituted by opposition, and every opposition implies a relation.

Since every entity is founded in a network of relations, the question of the ultimate foundation arises: does a first principle exist that does not refer to anything other than itself? If it exists, its existence cannot depend on anything else; otherwise, it would not truly be first. And yet, precisely to not refer to anything else, it must split within itself and found itself upon itself, positing itself as the origin of every division starting from an original division. But a foundation that founds itself is, at the same time, identical to itself and distinct from itself: it is both origin and result, distinction and negation of distinction.

Only such a truth — which posits and negates itself in the same act — can respond to the necessity of a foundation of being. Here, then, is the argument in its most essential form: if a first principle can only be contradictory, then contradiction is the first principle. It constitutes the only non-derived starting point — and, as such, the origin of thought, logic, and being.

#### IV. MYTH AND THE ORIGIN OF DISTINCTION: THE SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE OF THE INDISTINCT

The two truths of being — the relative truth of the differentiated entity and the absolute truth of the undifferentiated — were already present in ancient cosmologies, long before the birth of philosophy. In various creation myths, a recurring symbolic structure emerges: multiplicity arises from the indistinct, the determinate from what is still formless. The origin is never represented as an already formed reality, but evoked as abyss, chaos, void, darkness — symbols of a pre-logical totality, still suspended between being and nothingness.

In the *Rgveda* we read: «Then even nothingness was not, nor existence, / There was no air then, nor the heavens beyond it. / What covered it? Where was it? In whose keeping? / Was there then cosmic water, in depths unfathomed? // Then there was neither death nor immortality / nor was there then the torch of night and day. / The One breathed windlessly and self-sustaining. / There was that One then, and there was no other. // At first there was only darkness wrapped in darkness. / All this was only unillumined water. / That One which came to be, enclosed in nothing, / arose at last, born of the power of heat. // In the beginning desire descended on it — / that was the primal seed, born of the mind. / The sages, searching in their hearts with wisdom, / discovered the bond of being in non-being. // Who really knows? Who can declare it? / Whence was it born, and whence came this creation? / The gods are later than this world's formation. / Who then knows whence it first came into being? // He, the first origin of this creation, / whether he formed it all or did not form it, / whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, / he verily knows it — or perhaps he knows not.»

In the *Enuma Elish*, the primordial mixture precedes every differentiation: «When above the heaven had not been named, / and below the earth had not been called by name, / and Apsû, the first, their begetter, / and Mummu-Tiamat, she who bore them all, / mingled their waters together, / and no pastures were formed, nor reeds visible, / when none of the gods had appeared, / nor had been named, nor had destinies been fixed — / then in their midst the gods were created.»

In the *Book of Genesis*, the beginning is a scene of indistinction: «In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. / And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. / And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. / And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. / And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness. / And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. / And the evening and the morning were the first day.»

In the Norse *Ginnungagap*, the first being arises from the contact between two indistinct regions, *Niflheim* and *Muspelheim*; in Hesiod's *Theogony*, *Chaos* is the first entity to appear: «First came *Chaos*; then broad-breasted *Gaia*, / the secure seat of all the immortals / who dwell atop the snowy *Olympus*. / And dark *Tartarus*, in

the depth of the earth, / and *Eros*, the fairest among the deathless gods, / who loosens limbs and overcomes the mind / and wise counsel of all gods and all men.»

These narratives speak in images, but they reveal a deep speculative structure. The One of the *Rgveda* is life without distinction, breath that precedes breath, an inner movement not yet shaped. Like the Spirit hovering over the waters in *Genesis*, it represents a mute and indistinct generative force: the principle of all becoming, not yet differentiation.

Water, in various cosmogonies, is the figure of the indistinct: transparent and motionless, it reflects nothingness; agitated, it ripples, producing foam, matter, form. These primordial waters are not just a natural element, but the symbolic ground of the undivided. In archaic imagination, the sky itself was conceived as a vault restraining the upper waters, while the earth appeared as an island floating in the waters: a concrete image of the total indistinction from which all things arise. Breath, pulse, desire: these are symbols of the first gesture of separation, which transforms the indistinct background into visible form.

*Apsû* and *Tiamat*, like *Niflheim* and *Muspelheim*, embody the primordial polarity, the tension between clarity and darkness, order and chaos. Yet there is not yet form, only an implicit dynamic that precedes every completed opposition. Hesiod's Chaos, far from being mere disorder, is — as Jean-Pierre Vernant interprets it — a symbolic expression of a yawning openness (chasma) from which every determination arises. Myth, then, represents in chronological form what is co-original: it narrates as sequential the originary movement of distinction. In this sense, the first is not the first in time, but the principle that grounds all temporal and ontological distinction.

It is particularly significant that the *Rgveda* affirms that “not even the void” was present in the beginning. This denies not only being, but also nothingness conceived as the opposite of being: it shows that the very distinction between full and empty, between being and nothingness, had not yet arisen. The indeterminate is not a simple backdrop, but begins to determine itself as such: the first movement is not the appearance of an entity, but the self-distinction of the indistinct. Likewise, the Chaos in Hesiod, which appears as the first, reveals that origin is not positive being, but a constitutive contradiction: a being that exists only insofar as it denies all stability and founds every order as its own overcoming.

Thus, the myths of origin do not describe a beginning in time, but allude to a principle that precedes every distinction. Where being is not yet distinct from nothingness, the indistinct reveals itself as a contradictory totality, source of every form and destiny of every return. Chaos, the Abyss, the Waters, Darkness: these are not merely primordial images, but different names for the same original reality — one in which every difference is generated by negation and every order emerges from an irreducible tension. In this silent and fecund depth, thought rediscovers the echo of what founds it: not coherent identity, but its incoherent negation; not being simply, but the being that, by opposing nothingness, opposes nothing — and thus is itself nothingness.

## V. CONTRADICTION AS STRUCTURAL FOUNDATION

Contradiction, in whatever form it manifests, is never merely a logical error or an argumentative flaw. When intentionally formulated, it appears as an expression of the absolute: as the identity of every content or truth — that is, as the negation of diversity at the very heart of diversity itself. The identity of difference, in fact, is not, as Severino claims, an identity that fails in its attempt to constitute itself, but an identity that is realized precisely as the negation of every identity, including its own. Certainly, as Severino himself notes, contradiction presupposes difference; otherwise, it could not be stated as the identity of difference. However, the negation of diversity it declares does not amount to a coherent annulment, but implies the affirmation of all diversity within the indistinct unity of its manifestation: every different reality is identical precisely in being different.

This structure clearly emerges in self-referential paradoxes, especially semantic and structural ones, which reveal the original coincidence between being and nothingness. A semantic example is the liar paradox: «This statement is false». Here, language, referring to itself, in attempting to deny its own truth, ends up simultaneously affirming and denying the same proposition. If the statement is true, then it is false, as it asserts; if it is false, then it is true. This generates an oscillation without stability, not as a secondary anomaly, but as a structural limit that arises whenever thought attempts to ground itself. This is a semantic contradiction: it becomes impossible to univocally assign a truth value to a statement. The self-application of language shows that every self-referential

negation operates on a level where true and false reciprocally imply one another, and the predicative horizon can no longer be reduced to either one or the other.

An emblematic example of structural contradiction is Russell's paradox, formulated within naive set theory. It considers the set of all sets that do not contain themselves. The question is: does this set contain itself or not? If it does, then by definition it should not. If it does not, then it should. In both cases, a contradiction arises. Unlike the liar paradox, this one does not concern the meaning of a statement but the formal coherence of the logical system. It shows that even rigorously formalized languages, if they allow sufficient self-reference, expose themselves to irreducible contradictions.

To prevent this, axiomatic theories such as Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) were developed, which exclude pathological sets through axiomatic constraints. For example, the axiom of separation allows the construction of subsets only from given sets, preventing the formation of a «set of all sets». But although these constraints preserve the system's internal coherence, they do not eliminate the core of the problem. On the contrary, they confirm it: to construct a coherent system, one must externally delimit what cannot be internally generated without contradiction.

Thus, contradiction is prevented but not overcome: it is operationally excluded, but remains structurally implicated. The very fact that it must be forbidden indicates that without such prohibition, the system would spontaneously fall into it. More profoundly, the exclusion reaffirms the contradiction: to deny it, one must presuppose its possibility. Contradiction is not an error to be avoided, but the condition that makes its very exclusion necessary.

Logical principles and axiomatizations remain indispensable within the boundaries they themselves define. However, this delimitation shows that they cannot remove the original paradox: they prevent contradiction only from within, but cannot deny that their own foundation implies it. The foundation of logic reveals itself as a gesture that, to be possible, must hide the contradiction from which it arises.

The paradoxes of the liar and Russell reveal that contradiction does not stem from error but from the very attempt to found a system. Whether it concerns truth (language) or membership (sets), every self-referential system breaks the balance between what is included and what is excluded. Contradiction is not a

marginal pathology but an internal threshold that activates whenever thought tries to close off its own foundation.

These paradoxes do not merely undermine the coherence of classical logic: they unveil its contradictory origin. Logic is born from an act of exclusion: it affirms the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle to defend coherence. But this affirmation implies what it denies: the possibility that the identical is not identical, that the true is also false, that being coincides with nothingness. Logic presents itself as foundation, but is already the effect of a gesture that, by removing contradiction, presupposes it.

Self-referential paradoxes show that logic is founded on the exclusion of a contradiction which, by its nature, cannot be eliminated without being reactivated. The attempt of classical logic to constitute itself as a coherent system reintroduces, in another form, what it seeks to exclude. Contradictory self-reference shows that logic is born from a fracture it tries to erase but cannot separate from.

Faced with this tension, analytic logic has tried to defend the coherence of language by introducing formal devices. In *On Denoting*, Russell proposes the distinction between object-language and metalanguage. But this distinction generates a potentially infinite regression: every metalanguage requires a further metalanguage. The idea of an absolute metalanguage thus reintroduces the very contradiction it intended to exclude.

A similar approach is found in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, which distinguishes between what can be said and what can only be shown. Ethics, aesthetics, meaning, and foundation fall within this realm. The final aphorism — «what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence» — seems to protect language from collapse. And yet, to affirm that something cannot be said is already to say it. The silence that should safeguard meaning turns out to be a contradictory gesture: the unsayable, to be excluded, must be evoked, and thus said.

Every attempt to neutralize contradiction from an external position falls back into it. Russell's metalinguistic hierarchy, to establish itself, presupposes what it intends to found. The absolute metalanguage is not external but part of the system. The same occurs in Priest's dialetheism and in paraconsistent logics, which admit «true» contradictions to preserve a minimal coherence. But to distinguish acceptable contradictions from those to exclude requires a criterion

that, when applied to itself, falls into the same ambiguity. In all these cases, the paradox resurfaces as what both founds and destabilizes all foundation.

Wittgenstein, like Parmenides, also evokes nothingness in the attempt to exclude it. Parmenides, to deny it, is forced to name it; Wittgenstein, to ground meaning, appeals to an ineffable background that is not distinct from language. In both cases, being is thought as an alternative to nothingness, confusing predicative and ontological being, the copula and totality.

This impossibility of definitive foundation is confirmed by Gödel's incompleteness theorems. The first shows that every sufficiently powerful axiomatic system contains truths not provable within it. The second establishes that no consistent system can prove its own coherence from within. These limits logically express what paradoxes discursively show: every self-founded system generates irreducible instability.

Similarly, Tarski's theorem states that the truth of a language cannot be defined within it. A metalanguage is required, but as with Russell and Wittgenstein, every «outside» encounters infinite regressions or implicit self-references. Contradiction, like Gödel's and Tarski's limits, is not an error but the trace of a structural threshold. In it, foundation and surpassing coincide.

Contradiction, in negating itself, founds the possibility of distinction and at the same time overcomes it. It is not only what puts logic in crisis but the very movement that generates it. The limit is not a fixed point, but a threshold renewed with every attempt at foundation. Contradiction, by negating itself, relaunches, multiplies, refracts — and precisely in this return, founds every opposition. Thought cannot escape it: it is born in its tension, structured in its crisis, and in overcoming it, reactivates it. Logic does not close upon contradiction: it is its unstable effect, generated by its surpassing.

## VI. THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF CONTRADICTION AND THE FOUNDATION OF COHERENCE

### *VI.1. Contradiction as the Foundation of Logic*

Contradiction, in the fullness of its meaning, cannot be reduced to a mere false proposition — or, at least, not coherently so. It does not appear as one statement among others but introduces a reflective meta-level: the structural impossibility

of thinking something as determined is itself an act of determined thought. Yet precisely insofar as it expresses this impossibility, such an act implies its own indeterminacy.

Thought, therefore, takes shape through a limit that both posits and negates itself: it is in the tension between determination and indistinction, between self-affirmation and self-negation, that it constitutes itself as thought.

Every affirmation, to be such, must exclude its opposite: to affirm something means to deny its opposite, and thus to deny that its opposite holds at the same time. However, this exclusion is only possible if contradiction is already, in some way, thought and recognized as what must be denied. But to be thought, contradiction must assume a determined meaning — it must be posited as something logically stable, as what is to be avoided.

Yet it is precisely in this act that its contradictory structure reveals itself: contradiction, as simultaneous affirmation and negation, cannot be denied without also being, in the same act, affirmed. It cannot be excluded without its form being reiterated. Its negation always implies a logical duplicity: to be denied, it must be recognized; to be recognized, it must already be given as what affirms and denies at the same time — as what cannot be affirmed or denied without contradiction. To think one could deny it without contradiction is like throwing a stone into the void hoping to hit something.

And yet it is precisely here that the very possibility of negation opens: contradiction, as a void of determination, stands in opposition to determination; it is non-determination, just as every determination is non-indetermination. It is this tension that renders thought possible as a distinct act, and at the same time exposes it to its own impossibility.

This structure constitutes the meta-level of contradiction: it does not present itself as an isolated content, but as what makes opposition itself possible — and thus also its own negation. In this sense, opposition to contradiction is an intrinsically contradictory act: it is an opposition that opposes opposition, and therefore is founded on what it denies.

Logic is instituted as a negation of contradiction, but this negation reveals that what is denied is not incontrovertibly negated: contradiction, precisely in being excluded, eludes opposition and identifies itself with the very horizon of logical possibilities — as what makes every distinction possible, and thus as the implicit

foundation of logic itself.

This internal limit was also shown by Kurt Gödel, who demonstrated that no consistent and sufficiently expressive formal system can prove its own coherence without contradicting itself or relying on external principles. Classical logic, in its very foundational act, thus shows an opening to contradiction that marks its transcendental boundary.

Contradiction, as the annulment of all distinction, even annuls its own opposition to the principles that deny it. Yet precisely in denying these principles, it presupposes them. For something to be identical to itself and to another at the same time, it must still be somehow distinct: there must be a difference for there to be an identity of opposites. Without this original distinction, there would not even be the sense of contradiction.

Contradiction thus implies the very principles that deny it: it not only contradicts them but contains them. The principles of classical logic are not true despite contradiction, but by virtue of it, as what contradiction carries within its very being as contradiction.

Contradiction eliminates every opposition by starting from opposition itself, and for this reason, it reverses into its own opposite: the opposition to contradiction. It is this reversal that founds classical logic as a transcendental structure: not as a negation of contradiction, but as its necessary outcome, as what contradiction produces in its own collapse.

Even the principle of explosion — according to which anything follows from a contradiction — reveals, upon closer inspection, a structurally ambiguous character. If everything follows from a contradiction, then the opposite of that principle follows as well: the explosion cancels itself. Every affirmation is also a negation, every distinction is at once an identity, and thus the absolute indistinct cannot «explode» because there is nothing to distinguish or destroy.

It is through this collapse that the reverse of contradiction appears: it does not dissolve every form, but rearticulates its condition. Classical logic, instead of being negated, is founded — as what contradiction, in its extreme paradox, makes necessary.

The principle of explosion, then, is overturned: it does not destroy the system, but implies it; and at the point where logic seems to dissolve, it returns to itself — as the original figure of the threshold where being and nothingness still imply

each other without distinction.

### *VI.2. Towards a Logic of Contradiction*

#### VI.2.1. Explosion as Proof of the Necessity of the Principle of Non-Contradiction

The principle of explosion — according to which any proposition follows from a contradiction — has traditionally been interpreted as a sign of the collapse of the logical system. If  $A \wedge \neg A \vDash B$  for any  $B$ , then every distinction between true and false seems to dissolve. Yet this dissolution is only apparent.

In fact, if  $A \wedge \neg A$  entails any  $B$ , then it also entails  $\neg(A \wedge \neg A)$ : the negation of contradiction itself. And if contradiction entails its own negation, then it not only implodes, but reverses itself, generating a principle of exclusion that negates the indeterminacy from which it arises.

Symbolically:  $\perp \vDash \neg \perp$

$\perp \vDash \top$

Contradiction, precisely because it is all-encompassing, also implies what opposes it. In this sense, explosion does not abolish logical structure but instead produces it as an internal necessity: the moment everything is indistinct, every distinction becomes possible — and among these distinctions, the first and most necessary is that between contradiction and its negation.

Thus, classical logic emerges not only as what precedes contradiction, but also as what contradiction, in its collapse, renders inevitable.

#### VI.2.2. The Self-Implication of Contradiction

To state that everything follows from contradiction is equivalent to saying that the principle of determination is dissolved. However, in dissolving, contradiction also produces its own negation:

$\perp \vDash \neg \perp$

$\perp \vDash CL$  (where  $CL$  = classical logic)

Why does this happen? Because every negation of contradiction already presupposes the distinction between  $\perp$  and  $\neg \perp$ . This original distinction constitutes the embryonic form of logic, from which all classical principles descend.

### VI.2.3. The Emergence of Classical Principles

The negation of contradiction does not eliminate the original indeterminacy but transforms it into a structuring threshold: a limiting form from which classical principles emerge as stabilizations of meaning:

- $A \vDash A$  (identity)
- $\neg(A \wedge \neg A)$  (non-contradiction)
- $A \vee \neg A$  (excluded middle)

These principles, though positively asserted, are not original: rather, they represent the effect of a negation that, while realized as a determined exclusion, constantly refers back to the indeterminate matrix from which it originates — a structure that is not only formal, but veritative in an ontological-nihilistic sense.

Their logical stability does not erase the original movement, but preserves its structural trace: it is contradiction, as expression of absolute truth, that makes possible the distinction between  $A$  and  $\neg A$ , between whole and part, between being something and being nothing.

The principles of classical logic are constituted as a negation of contradiction ( $\neg(A \wedge \neg A)$ ), but in doing so, they presuppose its form: they oppose  $A$  to  $\neg A$  only because this opposition is already given as an original possibility. Contradiction, in fact, is not merely negated: it negates itself, and precisely in this act generates the principles that exclude it. As identity of opposites, contradiction implies identity ( $A \vDash A$ ), non-contradiction ( $\neg(A \wedge \neg A)$ ), and the excluded middle ( $A \vee \neg A$ ), because it determines them as its own internal articulations. Contradiction negates itself and identifies with its own negation, giving rise to a structure in which coherence emerges as an outcome, not as a foundation. In this sense, logic is not grounded against contradiction, but on its constitutive self-negation, which generates the very conditions of distinction and thought.

Therefore, logical coherence is not a starting point, but the result of an original differentiation that is articulated through the negation of the indistinct without ever eliminating it: the indistinct is not other than the distinct, but the distinct itself grasped in its integral and yet undifferentiated form — that is, as totality.

#### VI.2.4. Logic as the Inner Limit of Contradiction

Classical logic is not grounded on a positive principle, but on the movement through which contradiction, in its absolute act, negates itself and articulates itself as difference. Logical coherence is therefore not an original datum, but a result: the necessary product of contradiction that, in its self-vanishing, allows for the emergence of determination.

In this sense, logic takes shape as the inner limit of contradiction: it arises at the exact point where contradiction opposes itself, generating a break in indeterminacy, an opening of meaning. The negation of contradiction, far from eliminating it, affirms its structural function, revealing it as the structural condition of every logical articulation.

Coherence does not eliminate contradiction without also implying it: it is the effect of a contradiction that contradictorily excludes itself, that negates itself only by positing itself.

It is this fractal movement — in which contradiction is simultaneously internal and external to itself — that generates the logical structure as a stabilized form of an unstable origin.

Logic does not suppress contradiction without contradiction: it implies it as its own excluding limit and, at the same time, as the foundation that includes it.

### VII. CONCLUSION

This essay has aimed to show, in an argumentative and speculative form, that the fundamental principles of classical logic do not constitute an absolute foundation, but rather appear as derived outcomes of a more original structure: contradiction. This is not to be understood as a mere infraction of the rules of coherence, but as a primordial generative structure endowed with a constitutive function in a metalogical sense. From it are articulated the conditions of possibility of both deductive architecture and the semantic determination of meaning, understood as the original differentiation between being and non-being, identity and negation, affirmation and contradiction.

In this sense, contradiction is not opposed to logic, but constitutes its genetic ground: the original scene in which thought is formed as an act of coherent signification. To think a logic of contradiction does not mean abandoning coherence, but rather bringing it back to its structural foundation. Classical logic

formally excludes contradiction, but it does so on the basis of a structure that, precisely in attempting to negate it, implicitly assumes its form. The logical impossibility of contradiction is not an original presupposition, but the outcome of a system that constitutes itself from it. What logic removes in order to ground itself coincides with what grants it its very possibility.

Absolute nothingness, as articulated in contradiction, constitutes the primary condition of logically determined being. The truth of being, conceived in its unmediated and therefore undifferentiated identity, does not appear as a self-sufficient correspondence between thought and object, but as a constitutive indeterminacy that contains within itself all possibilities of determination. To think means to cross this threshold — the contradictory being of being itself — not to overcome it in a coherent synthesis, but to recognize it as a structural principle, whose original negativity functions as the matrix of logical coherence and ontological determinacy.

A logic of contradiction does not replace classical logic but rather discloses its hidden foundation. Every determination, in order to be such, implies its own negation, and only in this movement does it become thinkable. Contradiction does not merely make thought possible: it is its original act, the negative and generative core in which the space of truth opens — as the necessary figure of being made thinkable in the form of its own coherence.

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