

AN EVALUATION OF MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S POLITICAL ORGANISM

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ABSTRACT: In his *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, Marx states that Hegel achieves a great advance by thinking of the state as an organism. Nonetheless, Marx criticizes the way Hegel presents this political organism and its inner differentiation. He argues that Hegel's account of the state as an organism is a mystified attempt to fit empirical observations into the framework of his logical category of the Idea without providing a derivation of uniquely political determinacies. Also, for Marx, because Hegel does not specify the organic constitution of the state in distinction from the Idea, he cannot differentiate between the animal and the political organism. By focusing particularly on the initial determinacy of Hegel's Idea of the state and the transition to this determinacy from what precedes it, this paper examines the extent to which Hegel accounts for the organic constitution of the state without falling prey to logical reductionism and empiricism.

KEYWORDS: State; Political Organism; Idea; Life; Self-determination

Hegel provides his most detailed theory of politics and the state in his *Philosophy of Right*,¹ where he often refers to the state as an organism.² In his posthumously published critique of this work,³ the young Karl Marx states that Hegel achieves a great advance by considering the political state as an organism and its diverse powers as its organic constituents.⁴ Thus, both thinkers are on the same page when it comes to the fundamental constitution of the state; they both think that

¹ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, Oxford University Press, 2008 [hereafter cited as *PR*, followed by paragraph number].

² See *PR* §46, §49, §267, §269, §270R, §271A, §278R, §286, §302R, §308R.

³ Marx, Karl, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, [hereafter cited as *CHR*, followed by page number].

⁴ *CHR*, 11.

the inner structure and process that constitute the state is organic.

In this early work, Marx does not seem to disagree with Hegel's conception of life, either. For Hegel, organism represents an advanced stage of objectivity that first emerges with life and that cannot be comprehended in terms of mechanism. But in Hegel's system, life is before all a *logical category*. Conceived independently of its natural or social realizations such as the animal or the state, the logical category of life stands for a special kind of purposiveness; a distinctive means-end relationship where the means coincide with the end, or more precisely, where the very activity that realizes the end is itself a self-realizing end. Life is the name for the totality of this kind of activity, which nevertheless involves both a subject and a corresponding objectivity. While the subjectivity signifies the aspect of the unity of life, the objectivity, which Hegel calls the organism of life,⁵ comprises the multiplicity of constituents and the processes that involve them. The fundamental process of life is constituted by the workings of a plurality of members that overcome their mutual externality and sustain one another thanks to their differentiated functions. Given the unity of these members, life attains individuality and subjectivity.

In Hegel's system of logic, the Idea designates the general domain the different forms of which express diverse ways of unification of subjectivity with objectivity, demonstrating their commensurability. Life is the first and immediate form of the domain of the Idea, as it stands for the immediate unity of subjectivity and objectivity, just as it demonstrates universality that immediately permeates its self-differentiated objective particulars. Briefly put, the unity that life achieves is immediate because life ceases to be what it is in the absence of the unity and the common identity of its particularity and its continuing process. In other words, life is always and already a self-realizing and self-perpetuating process.⁶ This general framework of life applies not only to natural organisms but also to the state.

⁵ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 681. [References to this work are hereafter cited as *SL*, followed by page number].

⁶ To read Hegel's account of life in the *Science of Logic*, see *SL* 676–688. For a detailed critical commentary on this account, see Ebeturk, 2017.

Although the young Marx maintains that explaining the necessary relation between organic constituents on the basis of the organic nature of the whole is tautological,⁷ he does not seem to disagree with Hegel's conception of life in general or with the claim that the state exhibits this organic character. Nonetheless, he is highly critical of the way Hegel presents his idea of the political organism. His lines of criticism in this context can be construed to converge at two main points, empiricism and reductionism, which are themselves connected to Marx's broader criticism of mysticism.⁸

First, Marx thinks that Hegel's account of the state as a political organism is a mystified attempt to fit empirical observations about the state into the framework of his logical category of the Idea without providing a real derivation of uniquely political determinacies. More specifically, what Marx finds unconvincing is the way Hegel argues that the internal constitution of the state exhibits this organic character by virtue of its necessary differentiation into different powers. Marx maintains that the differentiation of this Idea into those differences is simply an application of a ready-made template, borrowed from the logic of the concept and of the Idea and filled in with empirical observations mostly from Hegel's own time.⁹ In its form, Marx's objection is downright Hegelian, as Hegel himself accuses other thinkers of dogmatism for not providing an immanent derivation but simply applying given formulas. Marx argues that Hegel starts with the Idea, from which he claims to develop differences, whereas the Idea, for Marx, presupposes those different functions in the first place. This choice of beginning indicates how Hegel conflates the subject and the predicate by making the abstract Idea into the subject thereby rendering real differences merely apparent.¹⁰

Second, Marx points out that Hegel cannot differentiate between the animal and the political organism, and this is again because he does not specify the

⁷ *CHR*, 11.

⁸ This paper is limited to the young Marx's criticism of Hegel's account of the state as an organism internally differentiating into diverse powers. How this criticism relates to Marx's later writings or to their major disagreement concerning the character of civil society, the economic sphere, classes, and their relationship with the domain of politics is therefore outside its scope. Admittedly, Marx's critique in general indicate a general discontent with Hegel's philosophy and its aims as a whole. But in this paper, I would like to engage with those macro-level criticisms by way of looking at his criticism of Hegel's state as a political organism.

⁹ *CHR*, 9–15.

¹⁰ *CHR* 12.

organic constitution of the body-politic in a way that distinguishes it from the logical determinacy of the Idea.¹¹ Thus, in connection with the first criticism, Marx maintains that Hegel's account of the internal constitution of the state has essentially nothing that would differentiate it from the logical account of life or the natural determinacy of the animal. Hegel is simply paraphrasing the "differences" or "members" of life with the powers of the state, giving no further elucidation into the necessary character of those members or powers.¹² What Hegel brings into the account as the content of the constitution of the body-politic is nothing but the empirical content that he would like to justify using his logic.¹³ Moreover, even this justification is secondary for Hegel. What he really wants to do is to corroborate his logic through the domain of politics, and prove his mystic Idea as the actual subject:

Hegel's true interest is not the philosophy of right but logic. The philosophical task is not the embodiment of thought in determinate political realities, but the evaporation of these realities in abstract thought. The philosophical moment is not the logic of fact but the fact of logic. Logic is not used to prove the nature of the state, but the state is used to prove the logic.¹⁴

Both criticisms lead to Marx's claim that Hegel always makes the subject into the predicate and the predicate into the subject. According to Marx, while Hegel is supposed to start with the objective or empirical constituents from which a unity is to be derived, he rather presupposes this unity under the name of the Idea, the mystical subject that seems to be simply making its manifestations appear. The particularity of the state, the different members of its constitution are derived on the basis, not of the object of knowledge (*Gegenstand*) but of the abstract logical categories, and determined not "by their own nature" but by the Idea, "something alien to them."¹⁵

From within the Hegelian framework, both empiricism and logical reductionism are serious objections. One of the major tenets of this framework is the commitment to systematicity in the pursuit of knowledge. Philosophy, the

¹¹ *CHR*, 12.

¹² *CHR*, 13.

¹³ *CHR*, 18.

¹⁴ *CHR*, 18.

¹⁵ *CHR*, 14–15.

science of true knowing, cannot but be a system.¹⁶ Hegel's philosophical system consists of three interconnected domains: logic as the system of thought determinacies, the philosophy of nature, and finally, the philosophy of mind and forms of intersubjectivity including the society and state. In keeping with this tripartite structure, Hegel tells us that philosophical science considers life in three major respects: first, as a logical category, second, as it is embodied by forms of nature, and third, as it pertains to the mind and the activity of interacting minds.¹⁷ The formation and the general character of this system as a whole and the relationships among its constituents is an extremely broad issue that divides Hegelian scholarship in a way that has far-reaching consequences. I argue that the real determinacies of Hegel's system, namely the determinacies of nature, mind, and intersubjectivity, can neither be concepts borrowed from positive sciences, nor can they be produced by a simple application of logical categories supplemented by observation in a way that clothes the bare bones of logical form with empirical flesh and blood. As Hegel often repeats, the derivation of the real determinacies must be immanent in a way similar to the unfolding of the logical categories.¹⁸ This follows from Hegel's commitment to the self-grounding character of philosophical knowing.

Therefore, if Hegel's system is to be a self-determining philosophical system as it claims to be, the political determinacies must be irreducible to the logical categories and independent of empirical factors externally introduced to the system. Hence the question is whether Hegel is able to specify the features of the state that makes it a distinctive organic form irreducible to logical categories or natural determinacies. In other words, in accordance with the above construal of

¹⁶ "A philosophizing *without a system* can be nothing scientific. Apart from the fact that such philosophizing expresses by itself more of a subjective outlook, it is also random in terms of its content. A particular content is justified solely as a moment of the whole. When separated from it, it represents an unjustified presupposition or a subjective certainty." G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I, Science of Logic*, Cambridge University Press, 2010 [hereafter cited as *EL*], 43.

¹⁷ *SL*, 677.

¹⁸ For example, contrary to those who conflate Hegel's view of systematic philosophy and the task of philosophers who are willing to engage in it, Hegel argues that the *Philosophy of Nature* should lay out what is universal in nature "in its *own immanent necessity*" and "in accordance with the self-determination of the Concept." G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Oxford University Press, 2004, 6 (§246).

Marx's critique, it is worth exploring the extent to which Hegel distinguishes the organic unity of the state from the logical unity of life and from the organic unity exhibited by the natural forms of life. As a part of this task, in this paper, I focus on the transition to the Idea of the state and its initial determinacy in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and try to point out the distinctive content of the political organism.

The organization of Hegel's account of the state *does* resemble the Idea of life in the *Science of Logic* in some respects. Like the latter, the state has three moments. For both the logical idea of life and the real determinacy of the state, the first moment signifies the internal constitution and activity that pertain to the living individual as a logical Idea and the state as a real Idea. The structure, together with the entirety of the process it enables, is the organic unity of the life form. Likewise, the fundamental structure of the state and its objective process of self-determination in abstraction from the state's external relations is what makes the state the political organism. The second moment of both the living individual and the state concerns their relations to what is outside, which in politics means international relations. The third moment of the logic of life is its genus process where different living individuals have a relation through which they raise their particularity to universality. The third moment of the state is likewise its genus process, which Hegel calls the world history. The world history also signifies self-determining universality the differentiations of which are universals, as it is a sequence of political subjects each of which has a universal character reflecting the truth of its developmental stage.

Admittedly, there are several differences between the moments of these two determinacies of the system, such as the emergence of the genus in each case. But since Marx's criticism aims at the first moment, which concerns the organic unity of the state, here I will be focusing on the first moment. Just as the first moment of the logic of life is about the living individual and its internal process, the first moment of the state concerns the state as an individual. Hegel notes that this is not to be conflated with a particular existing state. What is being explicated is the character of the state philosophically conceived, and considered first in abstraction from its relations to other states.

One general way in which Hegel advocates for the autonomy of the domains of logic and *Realphilosophie*, namely nature and spirit, is by appeal to the fact that

the determinations of the latter have presuppositions that are different from those of the logical categories.¹⁹ To begin, although animal life and the state do incorporate the logic of life as their general framework, their presuppositions are real as opposed to purely logical. The logical Idea of life presupposes the logic of the concept and objective processes such as mechanism and chemism. The real Idea of animal life presupposes the determinacy of plant life and geochemical cycles. Only by looking at its immediate presuppositions, Hegel can argue that the state as a political organism is more complex than the unity of a natural organism and the unity of a rational animal with volition. Just as any particular, existing state does, a systematic account of political organism presupposes life in nature, life of the mind, and the logical framework of the Idea. Yet, it also has presuppositions that belong to the domain of intersubjectivity. In Hegel's system, the state is the final sphere of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), which also involves family and civil society. The state does not only incorporate family and civil society as its components, but its concept entails a warranty of their freedoms. Moreover, the ethical life as a whole also presupposes concepts of free will, right and morality, which Hegel explicates following his philosophy of mind and before his ethics.

Given these presuppositions, Hegel's state is in broad terms the objective realization of self-determination in the domain of intersubjectivity and pertains to the unity of rational beings as rights holders, moral agents, family members, and civilians, making them self-governing citizens. But more specifically, the state signifies a transition in the ethical sphere from the domain of private or particular interests to an interest in the universal. As I will explain below, this interest is at minimum the self-conscious and willing disposition of each towards the unity and self-determination of the whole. Unlike the private ends of the civil society, the end as the universal interest in self-determination is pursued for its own sake and realized through the activity of complementary institutions, which are supposed to be the internal differentiations of the state.

Similar to the state, a *natural* organic unity is self-regulating by means of an internal differentiation of organs that maintain one another and constitute a shared, universal identity. Such a natural system needs more or less stable and

¹⁹ *SL*, 677; *Werke*, 6:471.

regular physical, mechanical, and chemical processes which the organism can subordinate to its end of sustaining its internal constitution. However, not only the particular constituents but also the system as a whole requires neither intelligence, nor linguistic acquisition to maintain itself, nor does it need understanding or consciousness of its end of self-perpetuation. After all, the organic unity in question might belong to a plant form of life, which does not have perception, desire, or mobility, even though the plant has a limited organic unity and implicit individuality.²⁰

Furthermore, by the objective self-determination of citizens, Hegel is not talking simply about the unity of a will that wills itself, enabled by the workings of the faculties of the mind that is capable of representing ends, and recognizing them to be objectively realizable. Although such a will that wills itself would presuppose the realization of mind and practical intelligence, as such, its self-determination does not need to involve interactions between moral agents or occur in the framework of community membership.

However, in order to dispute the attempt to distinguish the political organism by way of presuppositions, one might suggest that the allegedly distinctive presuppositions of the state might themselves be reducible to some other logical categories. Thus, specifying different presuppositions might not be convincing unless it is demonstrated that those presuppositions are in turn immanently derived from their predecessors to which they are irreducible. Obviously, tracing the determinacy of the state back to those of abstract right or space and time cannot be achieved in a paper of this length. Instead, to have an idea of whether Hegel's state has any distinctive determination, here I consider its initial determinacy, and ask if the political organism follows from what precedes it.

What precedes the state is in macro-level the sphere of civil society. One may ask why the state is still more than a self-regulating system of individual wills that consciously recognize and realize one another as free in and through a network of freely chosen pursuits of private ends where each provides for the others. That is akin to what Plato calls the city of pigs, and denotes the initial character of civil society broadly conceived before it is carried to its logical conclusions.²¹ But such

²⁰ *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, 303–312.

²¹ Plato. *Complete Works*, 1997, 1008–1011. Also see *PR* §183.

a system of needs, even before it necessarily undermines its self-determination, falls short of the objective self-determination realized by the state proper.

The key to the reason why the state is a higher stage of self-determination lies in its not being a one-sided determinacy, or in other words, in its embodying the Idea. Although the family, civil society, and the state are all different spheres of ethical life, the latter is the determinacy in which the principles governing the spheres of family and civil society are united. This is what Hegel means by the ideality of those two spheres. Ideality of constituents implies the overcoming of opposition or difference by virtue of being incorporated in the Idea as its internal moments. In this case, while family is governed by the principle of immediate unity of interest based on love, civil society is governed by the principle of difference based on particular interests. The state is thus the unity of these principles of unity and difference. Once this unity is in place, it is inherent to those spheres, but governing them as a subject presiding over them. The state does so by legislating laws that would enable the self-determination of the members of those spheres and ensuring their enforcement.²²

Thus, the life of the state, the political activity, consists in making laws and implementing them. The state is a self-determining political organism insofar as it is engaged in this activity of governing itself for its own sake. The activity of self-government as a whole, which is the unity of complementary functions enacted by institutions, is the universal end that sustains itself. To repeat, the unity that the state attains is through overcoming the one-sided aspects of those two spheres with respect to realization of interests. Political activity of the constituent

²² Marx argues that in Hegel's speculative philosophy, the spheres of family and civil society do not comprise the state through their own activity, but are produced by the life of the Idea (*CHR*, 8–9). Marx knows that the determinacies of family and civil society precede that of the state. In this regard, since they are the constituent subjects of the Idea, they of course partake in the development of the Idea. Also, the state as well as the family and civil society are determinacies of the mind or spirit, which itself expresses the Idea in a general sense. Certainly, each of these more sophisticated determinacies of the spirit develops from the interactions among embodied minds. Nonetheless, since Hegel speaks of the Idea's sundering itself into the finite spheres of family and civil society, Marx argues that Hegel's actual subject is not the individual agents but the Idea-Subject. It should be noted, however, that Hegel's account is not a historical one. He is not trying to explain the generation of individual states either. The order of development is ontological (Also see *PR*, §258R). The unity of the family and civil society brings about the implicit Idea as the state, which can only be realized through the activity that also incorporates family and civil society. When they do comprise the state, they are continually re-produced in and through the life of the state, according to its self-determining concept.

institutions and their members consciously aims at the realization of the universal end while this realization comes with the self-determined and self-conscious particularity of those constituents, supposedly extricated from their natural or traditional ties. Citizens realize their rights by fulfilling their duties towards others and to the state, while the state is upheld and sustained as the ground of their individual rights and particular freedom.²³

Admittedly, Marx *does* speak of the nature of the transition from the civil society to the state and this formal content of the state, namely the will of the universal interest, which derives its unity from its reconciling particular interests. He correctly identifies this universal will as the abstract definition of the state's reality and existence. This "merely a very general definition," as Marx puts it,²⁴ is for Hegel the immediacy of the Idea of the state. Thus, Marx seems well aware that in Hegel's account, the state's inner differentiation is at the beginning only implicit and yet to be explicitly self-relating. Accordingly, it is not fair to judge Hegel's concept of the state with reference to its immediacy alone. However, even this immediacy and abstract definition points to the novel content of the state in distinction from other organic forms.

The unity of the spheres of family and civil society in the body of the state is the reconciliation of the universal and particular interests on the broader plane. A more specific integration that expresses the transition from civil society to the state is through the role of what Hegel calls corporations. Corporations make it possible for a member of civil society to mediate their private interests by the common or universal interest of a group.²⁵ This mediated unity that contrasts with the given and immediate unity of the family brings about the possibility of the unity of particularity and universality in the sphere of ethical life. Although such a unity is already implicit in the notion of civil society where each

²³ *PR*, §261R. As Hegel puts it, "the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the cooperation of particular knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal for the sake of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at the universal end. The principle of modern states ... allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantial unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself" (*PR*, §260).

²⁴ *CHR*, 71.

²⁵ *PR*, §250–252.

unintentionally fends for the interests of others, this interrelationship becomes “a known and thoughtful ethical mode of life” together with the corporation.²⁶ Once in place, the unity of the corporation bestows its members with a shared identity that is reproduced by their education and lives on through different individual members.

Although the concept of corporation implies the unity of the universal with particularity, the universal interest of the corporation is still a finite and particular one in relation to those of other corporations.²⁷ Furthermore, the particularity of the ends that the corporation accommodates is not brought about by the differentiation of the corporation’s universal end, while the joint activity is not truly for its own sake. For the philosophical account to not relapse into an indeterminate plurality of mutually undermining particular interests but to advance toward a more truly self-determining determinacy, it has to continue with the thought and the will of a universal, self-conscious and self-determining end that is for its own sake. Self-government expresses in a nutshell Hegel’s conception of this end.

Thus, on one hand, regardless of whether this transition is compelling or not, Marx is not entirely right when he says that the transition has nothing to do with the nature of the determinacies that are to be overcome in the emerging determinacy. Both the determinacies of the family and civil society, and the concept of the corporation has elements that entail the theoretical introduction of the state. Inasmuch as the determinacies that precede the state in the order of derivation are products of the thought process, the emerging determinacy does not contain empirical content, either. On the other hand, even though the concept of the corporation implies the Idea of the state as universality with objective being, Marx is not entirely wrong when he says that Hegel derives the internal differentiation of the state not from its own initial, immediate content, but from the fact that it has the structure of the Idea.

Indeed, at the beginning of the section on the state, Hegel invites Marx’s criticism by stating that this inward differentiation is discoverable from the logic

²⁶ *PR*, §255A. It is only expected for this transition to parallel the transition from inorganic world to organism, as the unities in the form of chemical cycles that produce their presuppositions imply the idea of life in the domain of nature.

²⁷ *PR*, §256.

of the concept. Arguably, Hegel's recourse to the logical framework could be justified as a heuristic element. After all, the concept *does* provide the fundamental form of self-determination as such. Similarly, because self-determination involves the subject's deriving determinacy from within itself, the concept in its immediacy, namely the universal as such, is self-differentiating. For Hegel, once it is acknowledged that the state exhibits the determinacy of the concept or of the Idea, its differentiation necessarily follows. Both the concept and the Idea are self-determining, which involves, for each, giving itself determinacy. Provided that the starting moment is the universal, this universal's giving itself determinacy is nothing but its unfolding into particulars that instantiate the character of that universal. Moreover, universality as such is subjectivity implicit. Once this universality determines itself as the unity of particularity, namely, individuality, it realizes explicit, true subjectivity.²⁸

The fact that the logical system provides real determinacies with a fundamental ontological framework does not mean that this logical framework exhausts all further philosophical content. But once again, regardless of whether Marx endorses this underlying logical structure of self-determination, what he criticizes here is that Hegel does not specify anything that pertains to state and only to the state in general and to its differentiation in particular. Indeed, although Hegel speaks about the initial determinacy and specifies the functions differentiated in accordance with the concept, he does not clearly explain how or why the specific content of its initial determinacy leads to the differentiated content of different powers.²⁹

To pre-empt such objections, Hegel could have more clearly specified the necessary self-differentiation of the state in terms of the unique character of its will and of the content of the state's element of universality. The will of the state emerges as the universal will of particular wills, following the determinacy of

²⁸ Hegel's choice of setting out from immediacy and implicit subjectivity to determination and explicit subjectivity is grounded on his conception of self-determination. That which is self-determining needs to be a unity from the outset. Mere multiplicity cannot determine itself before it is a unity. By contrast, a unity proves itself to be self-determining only after it gives itself determinacy through its self-differentiation. Hence, the state is at first only an immediate unity that is to realize itself as self-determining subjectivity. See Ebeturk, 2017, pp.76–79.

²⁹ A succinct statement of the initial determinacy and the necessity of its differentiation into different powers in accordance with the concept can be found in *PR*, §270.

corporation. This is the moment when the civil society attains its genuine unity. When this unity takes its immediate form in abstraction from the particularity of corporations and their given and finite content, it becomes a new universal that is to determine and differentiate itself from within itself. Initially, the universal will that incorporates particularity is still abstract. That is, it is not yet determinate or embodied. Its self-determined content, its objectivity, is yet only presupposed as its end. But what would the self-determined determinacy of the universal will that wills itself as its end be? This self-determined determinacy must be nothing but activities that guarantee the realization and perpetuation of the universal will determining its own content. Again, this determinacy designates the embodiment of self-government. As soon as the self-determining universal will commits to its own realization, it is determining itself by positing its own laws. The activity of self-legislating is the state's element of universality.

Consequently, one would expect Hegel to start with legislation as the first power to lay out in his explication of the differentiated political powers. Indeed, Hegel lists the legislative power as the first moment of the state, standing for its power to determine its universality³⁰, and asserts that the state is the law that follows from the self-consciousness of citizens and permeates all relationships.³¹

Hegel's account of political disposition (*Gesinnung*) is thus also consistent with beginning with legislation and parallels his account of animal life. While at the outset, the subjectivity of life is in logic the immediate self-relation illustrated by feeling, and in the philosophy of nature the animal feeling itself, in ethical life, it begins with the political disposition that is universally permeating the body-politic in a way similar to how feeling permeates the entire body. This political disposition, this initial subjective content of the state, which Hegel refers to as the patriotic feeling, is not derived from the determinacy of civil society in general, but as Hegel says, from the internal constitution of the state.³² It is simply the certainty of political freedom, a feeling of trust in the institutions of the state and their rationality, which is to be developed into a habit, and in turn, into the consciousness of this freedom. In this sense, this immediate subjectivity of the state already presupposes its being a working organic whole. Thus, the

³⁰ *PR*, §273.

³¹ *PR*, §274.

³² *PR*, §269.

subjectivity of the state, which also stands for its unity and its inward determinacy, is in its simplest form a pervasive feeling of harmony, a consciousness of the fact that community is one's substantial basis. The institutions and the political constitution they form amount to "the *organism* of the state," that is, the realization and objectivity of this political disposition.³³

Thus, it is safe to argue that while Hegel's account of the state, particularly in its initial determinacy, demonstrates the fundamental structure found in the logic of the living individual, it not only differentiates as a real determinacy from the logical category in itself but also distinguishes itself from other real determinacies that embody the logic of life in their respective domains. Hegel could have maintained this immanent progression and coherence by focusing on the differentiation of the state's universal and all-pervading element, namely legislation. Legislation represents not only the demonstration of the universal will that wills itself as a self-governing unity, but also the very activity of its constituents that enables its own being and objectivity. Nonetheless, instead of beginning with legislation, grounded on a common political disposition of belonging to a self-governing community, Hegel starts with explicating the authorizing power and with his infamous positing of the monarch.

The reason why Hegel starts with the crown cannot simply be attributed to stylistic choices or courtesy, as that would constitute a massive contradiction given Hegel's view of philosophy. His approach cannot be justified by the fact that each moment of the concept is itself the totality of all three, either. Even though all three moments prove themselves to integrate the others, the very proof of this fact necessitates that the first moment be nothing other than the indeterminate universality, from which the others unfold. Similarly, it might seem that Hegel's primary rationale is the need to begin with concrete subjectivity that initiates and halts the activity of the political organism as the ultimate source of decision. However, this path would be utterly inconsistent with the way he accounts for subjectivity and its embodiments in nature and spirit, as he always begins with the moment of immediate universality and implicit subjectivity.³⁴ In this regard, Marx fails to notice that, contrary to his claim, Hegel actually does *not* adhere to

³³ *PR*, §267.

³⁴ For a similar comment, see K. H. Ilting, "The Structure of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right,'" in *Hegel's Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 90-110.

the exact course of his logic of the concept or the Idea when he begins with the crown. Put differently, if there is an issue with Hegel's delineation of the state's moments, it lies not in his blind adherence to the structure of the logical explication of the logic of life, nor in his attempt to replicate the determinacy of life in the realm of nature. Had Hegel followed the trajectory of the logic of life, he would have commenced with the universal moment, legislation, and concluded with the individuality of the state, its authorizing will that comes back to itself from its universal ground.

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