Metaphysics as the Study of Non-Restrictive Existential Statements

Abstract

In this short article I initiate a defense of the Hartshornian claim that metaphysics is the study of non-restrictive existential statements.  Two metaphysical claims are defended: "Something exists" and "God exists."  The latter claim is defended via a modal version of the ontological argument.  I argue that metaphysical claims are those that apply necessarily or cosmically rather than contingently or locally.

That is, if they are affirmative, they at least implicitly deny something; further, if they are negative, they at least implicitly affirm something.  For example, if I say that the corkscrew is in the drawer, I am denying that the drawer is filled with things other than corkscrews. Or if I say that there is no corkscrew in the drawer, I am affirming that everything in the drawer is something other than a corkscrew.

The above statements are partially restrictive, in contrast to those that are either completely restrictive or completely non-restrictive.  A completely restrictive statement is one that denies that any existential possibility is realized.  An example would be saying that “absolutely nothing exists.”  A completely non-restrictive statement is exemplified in the claim that “something exists.”  This latter claim is the contradictory of the wholly restrictive statement that “absolutely nothing exists.”  I will argue that the claim that “absolutely nothing exists” expresses an impossibility rather than a conceivable but unrealized fact (as in the possibility that there could be a corkscrew in the drawer even if there is no corkscrew there at present).  A contradictory of an impossible statement is necessarily true, hence it will be no surprise to learn that I will also argue that the statement that “something exists” is necessarily true.