Levinas’ Ethics of Responsibility and the Idea of the Face: An Evaluation of Alain Badiou’s Criticisms

Abstract

This paper examines Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of responsibility, grounded in his concepts of Otherness and the face-to-face relation, and compares it with Alain Badiou’s critique and alternative ethical vision. For Levinas, ethics does not arise from universal principles or intentional consciousness, but from the asymmetrical demand of the Other—whose face calls us to an infinite responsibility that comes before thought or choice. The ethical subject (the Same) is not autonomous, but is summoned into responsibility by the undeniable presence of the Other’s vulnerability. Badiou, however, challenges this view. He sees Levinas’ ethics as overly focused on passive victimhood and as lacking engagement with historical truth and action. For Badiou, ethics comes not from compassion but from fidelity to truth-events—disruptive acts that break with the existing order and call for active participation in creating change. In his view, the ethical Same becomes a subject of history by doing good through commitment to truth, not by simply witnessing suffering. This paper explores the strengths and limitations of both thinkers, arguing that while Levinas highlights the deep ethical demand of the Other, Badiou presents a more activist and dynamic vision of ethical agency. The paper suggests that Badiou’s approach may be more effective when confronting injustice or striving to build a more just world.