The Metaqualia Structure of Consciousness:
Clarifying Its Epistemic Status as Conjecture, Theory, Model, and Frame
Keywords:
Metaqualia Theory (MTQ), Structural Model of Consciousness, Epistemic Classification, Conjecture-Theory-Model-Frame, Meta-theoretical AnalysisAbstract
The Metaqualia framework, abbreviated as MTQ, is a proposed structural account of consciousness organized around three elements: Q, M, and T. Q denotes qualia, the qualitative contents of experience; M denotes metaqualia, the interpretive configurations that organize qualia into coherent meaning; and T denotes transformative operations or transition fields, the processes through which such configurations are selected, modified, and stabilized across contexts. Although MTQ has often been referred to as Metaqualia Theory, this paper does not assume in advance that it is a theory in the strict epistemological sense. Rather, it asks what kind of epistemic object MTQ is: a conjecture, a theory, a model, a frame, or a stratified combination of these. I argue that MTQ has a layered epistemic identity. It begins as a set of testable conjectures, develops into a systematic account of conscious organization, takes shape as a structural model, and functions as an interpretive frame for rethinking mental phenomena. This classification does not weaken MTQ’s status. Instead, it clarifies how a single framework can operate across empirical, philosophical, clinical, and interdisciplinary contexts while remaining open to critique and revision.
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