Being and Implication: On Hegel and the Greeks


  • Andrew Haas SUNY


Ambiguity, Aristotle, Aspect, Being, Concept, Hegel, Heidegger, History, Implication, Phenomenology, Time, Unity


This work shows that being must originally be understood as implication. We begin with what Heidegger calls Hegelrsquo;s lsquo;new concept of beingrsquo; in the emPhenomenology of Spirit/em: time as history is the essence of being. This concept however, is not univocalmdash;for supersession means destroying-preserving. Hegel shows himself to be the thinker of truth as essentially ambiguous; and the emPhenomenology/em is onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, the history of the being and unity, time and aspect, of the conceptrsquo;s ambiguity. For Heidegger however, conceptual ambiguity confirms that Hegelrsquo;s history of being is stuck in a vulgar interpretation of time; and the emPhenomenology/em can explain neither the origin of this time, nor the necessity of negation for the historical determination of beingmdash;for Hegel cannot think the ground of the concept of being, that is, the grounding of the ground. If Heidegger argues however, that the emPhenomenology/em is pre-determined by its ancient point of departure, we must go back to the Greeks, back to Aristotlersquo;s original insight (overlooked by the entire history of philosophy as metaphysics): being and unity emimply/em one anothermdash;for they are essentially implications. Thus the question of the meaning of being becomes the question of the meaning of implication.




How to Cite

Haas, A. (2007). Being and Implication: On Hegel and the Greeks. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 3(2-3), 192–210. Retrieved from