The Argument From Addition for the Elimination of Ordinary Objects
Keywords:
Metaphysics, Ordinary Objects, Eliminativism, Conservatism, Double CountingAbstract
If tables exist, then a table is one more object in addition to the atoms that compose it. For example, if one billion atoms compose it, then there would be a total of one billion and one objects. But this seems wrong. Intuitively, a table should not be counted as one more object in addition to its parts. So, by modus tollens, it follows that tables do not exist. After presenting this eliminativist argument, I indicate why it should be distinguished from the problem of material constitution. Next I examine a series of strategies for resisting the argument, highlighting their strengths as well as their weaknesses. Finally, I present a new solution to this problem.
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